The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis (Stanford Nuclear Age Series)

The Cuban missile crisis was the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War and the most perilous moment in American history. In this dramatic narrative written especially for students and general readers, Sheldon M. Stern, longtime historian at the John F. Kennedy Library, enables the reader to follow the often harrowing twists and turns of the crisis. Based on the author’s authoritative transcriptions of the secretly recorded ExComm meetings, the book conveys the emotional ambiance of the meetings by capturing striking moments of tension and anger as well as occasional humorous intervals. Unlike today's readers, the participants did not have the luxury of knowing how this potentially catastrophic showdown would turn out, and their uncertainty often gives their discussions the nerve-racking quality of a fictional thriller. As President Kennedy told his advisers, “What we are doing is throwing down a card on the table in a game which we don't know the ending of.” Stern documents that JFK and his administration bore a substantial share of the responsibility for the crisis. Covert operations in Cuba, including efforts to kill Fidel Castro, had convinced Nikita Khrushchev that only the deployment of nuclear weapons could protect Cuba from imminent attack. However, President Kennedy, a seasoned Cold Warrior in public, was deeply suspicious of military solutions to political problems and appalled by the prospect of nuclear war. He consistently steered policy makers away from an apocalyptic nuclear conflict, measuring each move and countermove with an eye to averting what he called, with stark eloquence, “the final failure.”

The Cuban missile crisis was the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War and the most perilous moment in American history. In this dramatic narrative written especially for students and general readers, Sheldon M. Stern, longtime historian at the John F. Kennedy Library, enables the reader to follow the often harrowing twists and turns of the crisis.
Based on the author’s authoritative transcriptions of the secretly recorded ExComm meetings, the book conveys the emotional ambiance of the meetings by capturing striking moments of tension and anger as well as occasional humorous intervals. Unlike today's readers, the participants did not have the luxury of knowing how this potentially catastrophic showdown would turn out, and their uncertainty often gives their discussions the nerve-racking quality of a fictional thriller. As President Kennedy told his advisers, “What we are doing is throwing down a card on the table in a game which we don't know the ending of.”
Stern documents that JFK and his administration bore a substantial share of the responsibility for the crisis. Covert operations in Cuba, including efforts to kill Fidel Castro, had convinced Nikita Khrushchev that only the deployment of nuclear weapons could protect Cuba from imminent attack. However, President Kennedy, a seasoned Cold Warrior in public, was deeply suspicious of military solutions to political problems and appalled by the prospect of nuclear war. He consistently steered policy makers away from an apocalyptic nuclear conflict, measuring each move and countermove with an eye to averting what he called, with stark eloquence, “the final failure.”

Foreign Affairs

The discovery that President John F. Kennedy had installed a system for taping conversations in the Oval Office transformed the historiography of the Cuban missile crisis, and Stern was at the heart of the effort to transcribe them at the John F. Kennedy Library. An earlier and much longer version of this book (published in 2003 as Averting the Final Failure) expressed his disappointment with the inadequacy of the best-selling version of these transcripts, edited by Ernest May and Philip Zelikow. He believes strongly that at issue is intonation as well as language, evidence of the emotions at play, and the substance of the debate — so that emphasis can turn bland comment into heavy sarcasm. Only careful listening brings home, for example, how irritated Kennedy got with McGeorge Bundy during the critical discussions on October 27, 1962. This shortened version centers on a blow-by-blow account of the crisis as revealed in the tapes, getting across the ebb and flow of the discussions, the changes in mood, and the groping for a solution to an apparently desperate situation. As such it is a useful addition to the vast literature on the missile crisis and on Kennedy as a crisis manager.

Stanford University Press Contents 8 Plate Section 48 1 The JFK Cuban Missile Crisis Tapes 12 2 The Making of the Cuban Missile Crisis 22 The Cold War: JFK’s Crucible 22 The Cold War and Cuba 25 Nuclear Confrontation in Cuba 29 The Kennedy Paradox 34 Key Members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council 40 3 The Secret Meetings of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council 54 Epilogue: The November Post-Crisis 222 Conclusion 230 Notes 236 Selective Bibliography 248 Index 252 A 252 B 252 C 252 D 252 E 253 F 253 G 253 H 253 I 253 J 253 K 253 L 254 M 254 N 254 O 254 P 254 Q 254 R 254 S 255 T 255 U 255 W 255 Z 255 ISBN-13:,9780804750769,ISBN-13:,9780804750776 ISBN-13: 9780804750769,ISBN-13: 9780804750776 Contents......Page 8 Plate Section......Page 48 1 The JFK Cuban Missile Crisis Tapes......Page 12 The Cold War: JFK’s Crucible......Page 22 The Cold War and Cuba......Page 25 Nuclear Confrontation in Cuba......Page 29 The Kennedy Paradox......Page 34 Key Members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council......Page 40 3 The Secret Meetings of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council......Page 54 Epilogue: The November Post-Crisis......Page 222 Conclusion......Page 230 Notes......Page 236 Selective Bibliography......Page 248 D......Page 252 K......Page 253 R......Page 254 Z......Page 255 In the summer of 1973, the nation was captivated by the televised "Watergate" hearings into charges of illegal activities in Richard Nixon's White House. Rev. and condensed version of: Averting'the final failure': John F. Kennedy and the secret Cuban Missile Crisis meetings. 2003.