The Virtue of Agency : Sôphrosunê and Self-Constitution in Classical Greece

Sôphrosunê (“self-discipline”) is the often-forgotten sibling of justice, wisdom, courage, and piety in discussions of canonical Greek virtues. Christopher Moore shows that during the classical period it was the object of significant debate--about its scope, its feel, its practical manifestations, and its value. By interpreting sôphrosunê as a commitment to norm-following, we see that these pointed discussions of the virtue, previously ignored as parodic moralizing or expressions of political propaganda, are in fact concerned with the ideal of human agency. These discussions query the way we become fully responsible for our actions. Greek thinking about sôphrosunê becomes thinking about self-constitution, our crucial capacity to act on the general reasons that we come to identify with as our own. This perspective explains sôphrosunê's inclusion in Plato's canon of virtues, and before that its frequent appearance in funerary inscriptions, elegiac poetry, tragic drama, and historiography. It also explains the analytic attention given to it by Heraclitus, the Sophists, the historians, Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato. Moore deals principally with the classical period, though the book includes one chapter addressing earlier poetry and another addressing the virtue in two gender-sensitive post-classical works. An appendix deals with the epigraphic material. For the Greeks (and perhaps for us) there is a virtue of agency, an acquirable capacity to be guided by what's best. Hardly just a concern for reticence and reserve, commitment to sôphrosunê is a commitment to whatever it is that makes us truly ourselves. "Among the cardinal virtues of classical Greece - wisdom, courage, justice, piety, and sôphrosunê - sôphrosunê is the least understood or valued. But, as this book shows - studying the vigorous and wide-ranging debates about the virtue, across fifth- and fourth-century poetry, prose, and philosophy - many Greeks in fact judged it the preeminent virtue. They understood it to be the capacity to choose between one's conflicting desires and to act only on those aiming at what one judges one's authoritative or properly life-defining ends. This is the capacity to be a mature human: facing down one's bodily and social promptings with discipline, identifying with one's long-term goals or acknowledged norms over one's evanescent impulses. This is what makes one count as an "agent": someone who acts on her own principles, rather than simply reacts to external or internal proddings. Thus sôphrosunê is the virtue of agency. The clearest evidence for the nature of and significance granted to sôphrosunê is the disagreement found across ancient Greek literature over the term's application and scope. This book starts by appraising remarks about sôphrosunê from the archaic and early-Classical period in Homer, Theognis, Pindar, Aeschlyus, Heraclitus, and funerary inscriptions. Then it turns to later fifth-century exchanges in Euripides especially but also Herodotus, Thucydides, Aristophanes, Critias, Antiphon, and Democritus. Socrates is a crucial figure for the study, as we see in the works of his associates Antisthenes, Xenophon, and particularly Plato. After several chapters on Plato, we turn to the radical innovations of Aristotle and the less familiar Pythagorean assessments"-- Provided by publisher ## Abstract Among the cardinal virtues of classical Greece—wisdom, courage, justice, piety, and sôphrosunê—sôphrosunê is now the least understood or esteemed. But, as this book shows—studying the vigorous and wide-ranging debates about the virtue across fifth- and fourth-century poetry, prose, and philosophy—many Greeks in fact judged it the preeminent virtue. They understood it to be the capacity to choose between one’s conflicting desires and to act only on those aiming at what one judges one’s authoritative or properly life-defining ends. This is the capacity to be a mature human: facing down one’s bodily and social promptings with discipline, identifying with one’s long-term goals or acknowledged norms over one’s evanescent impulses. This is what makes one count as an “agent”: someone who acts on her own principles rather than on external or internal proddings. Thus sôphrosunê is the virtue of agency. The clearest evidence for this is the disagreement found across ancient Greek literature over the term’s application and scope. This book starts by appraising remarks about sôphrosunê from the archaic and early Classical period in Homer, Theognis, Pindar, Aeschlyus, Heraclitus, and funerary inscriptions. Then it turns to later fifth-century exchanges in Euripides especially but also Herodotus, Thucydides, Aristophanes, Critias, Antiphon, and Democritus. Socrates is a crucial figure for the study, as we see in the works of his associates Antisthenes, Xenophon, and particularly Plato. After several chapters on Plato, we turn to the radical innovations of Aristotle and some less familiar Pythagorean assessments. Cover The Virtue of Agency Copyright Dedication Contents Acknowledgments Selected Abbreviations and Editions 1. Debating a Virtue 2. The Early History of Sôphrosunê 3. Heraclitus, Self-​Knowledge, and the Greatest Virtue 4. Tragic Sôphrosunê in Two Plays of Euripides 5. The Late Fifth Century 6. The Figure of Socrates 7. Xenophon on Sôphrosunê and Enkrateia 8. Plato 1—​Sôphrosunê and the Capacity for Action 9. Plato 2—​Two Formulations of Agency 10. Plato 3—​Sôphrosunê with Wisdom in Two Late Dialogues 11. Aristotle and the Later Fourth Century 12. Pythagorean Sôphrosunê 13. Sôphrosunê for Later Greek Women Epilogue: Translating an Ancient Virtue for Modern Times Epigraphical Appendix Bibliography Index Locorum Index