The U.S. Army Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual : U.S. Army field manual no. 3-24 : Marine Corps warfighting publication no. 3-33.5

When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency.The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine.An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America’s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org. (20070729) When The U.s. Military Invaded Iraq, It Lacked A Common Understanding Of The Problems Inherent In Counterinsurgency Campaigns. It Had Neither Studied Them, Nor Developed Doctrine And Tactics To Deal With Them. It Is Fair To Say That In 2003, Most Army Officers Knew More About The U.s. Civil War Than They Did About Counterinsurgency. The U.s. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Was Written To Fill That Void. The Result Of Unprecedented Collaboration Among Top U.s. Military Experts, Scholars, And Practitioners In The Field, The Manual Espouses An Approach To Combat That Emphasizes Constant Adaptation And Learning, The Importance Of Decentralized Decision-making, The Need To Understand Local Politics And Customs, And The Key Role Of Intelligence In Winning The Support Of The Population. The Manual Also Emphasizes The Paradoxical And Often Counterintuitive Nature Of Counterinsurgency Operations: Sometimes The More You Protect Your Forces, The Less Secure You Are; Sometimes The More Force You Use, The Less Effective It Is; Sometimes Doing Nothing Is The Best Reaction. A New Introduction By Sarah Sewall, Director Of The Carr Center For Human Rights Policy At Harvard's Kennedy School Of Government, Places The Manual In Critical And Historical Perspective, Explaining The Significance And Potential Impact Of This Revolutionary Challenge To Conventional U.s. Military Doctrine. An Attempt By Our Military To Redefine Itself In The Aftermath Of 9/11 And The New World Of International Terrorism, The U.s. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Will Play A Vital Role In American Military Campaigns For Years To Come. Insurgency And Counterinsurgency -- Unity Of Effort: Integrating Civilian And Military Activities -- Intelligence In Counterinsurgency -- Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns And Operations -- Executing Counterinsurgency Operations -- Developing Host-nation Security Forces -- Leadership And Ethics For Counterinsurgency -- Sustainment -- Appendix A.a Guide For Action -- Appendix B. Social Network Analysis And Other Analytical Tools -- Appendix C. Linguist Support -- Appendix D. Legal Considerations -- Appendix E. Airpower In Counterinsurgency. Foreword By David H. Petraeus And James F. Amos. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [391]-399) And Index. When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them.It isfair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvards Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of Americas injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit (http://www.fisherhouse.org) www.fisherhouse.org . When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America’s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org. Cover......Page 1 The U.S. Army Marine CorpsCounterinsurgency Field Manual. U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24......Page 4 Contents......Page 6 List of Tables, Figures, and Vignettes......Page 10 Foreword to the University of Chicago Press Edition......Page 14 Introduction to the University of Chicago Press Edition......Page 22 Foreword......Page 46 Preface......Page 48 Acknowledgements......Page 50 Introduction......Page 52 chapter 1. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency......Page 56 chapter 2. Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities......Page 108 chapter 3. Intelligence in Counterinsurgency......Page 134 chapter 4. Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations......Page 192 chapter 5. Executing Counterinsurgency Operations......Page 206 chapter 6. Developing Host-Nation Security Forces......Page 254 chapter 7. Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency......Page 292 chapter 8. Sustainment......Page 310 Appendix A. a guide for action......Page 342 Appendix B. social network analysis and other analytical tools......Page 360 Appendix C. linguist support......Page 390 Appendix D. legal considerations......Page 402 Appendix E. airpower in counterinsurgency......Page 418 Source Notes......Page 428 Glossary......Page 434 SECTION II: TERMS AND DEFINITIONS......Page 436 Annotated Bibliography......Page 446 Military References......Page 452 Index......Page 456 "When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is not unfair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. This volume was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. A new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine."--Back cover