The Typic in Kant's 'Critique of Practical Reason': Moral Judgment and Symbolic Representation (Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte, 188)

In a short chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason entitled “On the Typic of the Pure Practical Power of Judgment,” Kant addresses a crucial problem facing his theory of moral judgment: How can we represent the supersensible moral law so as to apply it to actions in the sensible world? Despite its importance to Kant's project, previous studies of the Typic have been fragmentary, disparate, and contradictory. This book provides a detailed commentary on the Typic, elucidating how it enables moral judgment by means of the law of nature, which serves as the 'type', or analogue, of the moral law. In addition, the book situates the Typic, both historically and conceptually, within Kant's theory of symbolic representation. While many commentators have assimilated the Typic to the aesthetic notion of 'symbolic hypotyposis' in the third Critique, the author contends that it has greater continuities with the theoretical notion of 'symbolic anthropomorphism' in the Prolegomena. As the first comprehensive, book-length study of the Typic that critically engages with the secondary literature, this monograph fills an important gap in the research on Kant's ethics and aesthetics and provides a starting point for further inquiry and debate. Contents Method of citation and list of abbreviations Introduction 1. The Typic chapter in the Critique of Practical Reason 2. Need for the present study 2.1 Obscurity of the primary text 2.2 Conflicting interpretations in the secondary literature 3. Goals of the present study 4. Approach and methodology 4.1 General approach 4.2 Specific methodology 4.3 On the selection of texts 5. Overview 5.1 Part One. Commentary 5.2 Part Two. The typic’s place in Kant’s theory of symbolic representation Commentary Chapter 1. The task 1.1 Objects of pure practical reason and the concepts of good and evil 1.2 Moral appraisal Chapter 2. The ‘particular difficulties’ 2.1 Construals of the problem in the secondary literature 2.1.1 Natural necessity vs. freedom 2.1.2 Is vs. ought 2.1.3 Concrete vs. abstract 2.1.4 Matter vs. form 2.1.5 Subjective ends vs. objective ends 2.2 The representational mismatch: sensible intuitions vs. supersensible Ideas 2.2.1 From ‘the very same difficulties’ as theoretical judgment to the ‘particular difficulties’ of practical judgment 2.2.2 Reason and finitude 2.2.3 Sensible intuitions vs. supersensible Ideas Chapter 3. The resources 3.1 The schematism and the imagination 3.1.1 Nature and function 3.1.2 Two problems with the schematism 3.2 The ‘schema of a law itself’ 3.3 The law of nature and the understanding Chapter 4. The solution 4.1 Overcoming the ‘particular difficulties’ 4.1.1 Type1: the law of nature as the ‘type’ of the moral law 4.1.2 Type2: Natura formaliter spectata as the type of supersensible nature 4.2 Accomplishing the task 4.2.1 The typic-procedure 4.2.2 The typic-procedure’s place in Kant’s ethics 4.2.3 The typic-procedure in the secondary literature Chapter 5. The outcome and effectiveness 5.1 The Typic’s heuristic effectiveness for the ‘common understanding’ 5.1.1 The common understanding’s moral discernment 5.1.2 An ‘example in a case of experience’ 5.1.3 Isolation and amplification 5.2 The typic’s protective functions 5.2.1 Guarding against empiricism 5.2.2 Type3 5.2.3 Guarding against mysticism The Typic’s Place in Kant’s Theory of Symbolic Representation Chapter 6. The typic and symbolic hypotyposis 6.1 The symbolist interpretation of the Typic chapter 6.1.1 The task 6.1.2 The ‘particular difficulties’ 6.1.3 The resources 6.1.4 The solution 6.1.5 The outcome and effectiveness 6.2 Critical assessment of the symbolist interpretation 6.2.1 The task 6.2.2 The ‘particular difficulties’ 6.2.3 The resources 6.2.4 The solution 6.2.5 The outcome and effectiveness 6.3 Against aestheticizing the Typic 6.3.1 Two agendas 6.3.2 Betting on the wrong horse 6.4 Conclusion Chapter 7. The typic and symbolic anthropomorphism 7.1 ‘Symbolic anthropomorphism’ in the Prolegomena 7.1.1 Merely symbolic, as opposed to absolute 7.1.2 Analogical 7.1.3 Non-sensible 7.1.4 Permitted and required 7.1.5 Sufficient 7.1.6 Protective 7.2 Symbolic anthropomorphism and Aquinas’ doctrine of analogical predication 7.3 Symbolic anthropomorphism and symbolic hypotyposis 7.4 Symbolic anthropomorphism and the typic 7.4.1 Merely symbolic, as opposed to absolute 7.4.2 Analogical 7.4.3 Non-sensible 7.4.4 Permitted and required 7.4.5 Sufficient 7.4.6 Protective 7.5 Conclusion Conclusion 1. Summary of Part One 2. Summary of Part Two 3. The Typic in the evolution of Kant’s thought 3.1 Symbolic representation 3.2 The relation between nature and morality Works Cited Primary sources Immanuel Kant’s works in German Secondary sources Appendices Appendix I : German text of the Typic chapter Appendix II: English translation of the Typic chapter Index of names Subject index "In the Typic chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant aims to enable moral judgment by means of the law of nature, which serves as the 'type', or formal analogue, of moral law. The present monograph is the first comprehensive study of this key text. It provides a detailed commentary on the Typic, situates it within Kant's ethics and his theory of symbolic representation, and critically engages with the relevant secondary literature."-- Provided by publisher