The Threat of Solipsism: Wittgenstein and Cavell on Meaning, Skepticism, and Finitude (Issn, 16)

Much attention has been paid to Wittgenstein’s treatment of solipsism and to Cavell’s treatment of skepticism. But comparatively little has been made of the striking connections between the early Wittgenstein’s view on the truth of solipsism and Cavell’s view on the truth of skepticism, and how that relates to the claim that the later Wittgenstein sees privacy as a constant human possibility. This book offers close readings of representative writings by both authors and argues that an adequate understanding of solipsism and skepticism requires taking into account a set of underlying difficulties related to a disappointment with finitude which might ultimately lead to the threat of solipsism. That threat is further interpreted as a wish not to bear the burden of having to constantly negotiate and nurture the fragile connections with the world and others which are the conditions of possibility for finite beings to achieve meaning and community. By presenting Wittgenstein’s and Cavell’s responses in an order which reflects the chronology of their writings, the result is a cohesive articulation of some under-appreciated aspects of their philosophical methodologies which has the potential of reorienting our entire reading of their work. Acknowledgments 9 Contents 11 Abbreviations 13 Introduction 15 1. Solipsism and the limits of sense in the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus 32 2. Solipsism and method in the Philosophical Remarks 75 3. Solipsism, privacy, and the grammar of the first person in The Blue Book 108 4. The threat of privacy in the Philosophical Investigations: Cavell and Kripke on skepticism about meaning 133 5. Seeing souls: Wittgenstein and Cavell on skepticism about other minds 157 6. Taking skepticism seriously: Stroud and Cavell 177 7. Skepticism, perfectionism, and the limits of morality 201 References 216 Index of subjects 222 Index of names 224