The Third Macedonian War and Battle of Pydna: Perseus' Neglect of Combined-arms Tactics and the Real Reasons for the Roman Victory

This is a fascinating and thoroughly researched study of these dramatic events that adds fresh insight to the question of the legion's supposed innate supremacy over the phalanx. The Third Roman-Macedonian War was a disaster for Macedon, a defeat leading to the end of that kingdom's independence. This is usually attributed to an innate superiority of the Roman legionary tactics over the Macedonian system. Graham Wrightson, on the other hand, argues that the blame lies entirely with Perseus, the last king of Macedon. He analyzes the whole war, following the primary source accounts and focusing on Perseus’ military decisions and his battlefield strategies. It confirms the prevailing view of the sources that Perseus was too hesitant and non-committal in his early conduct of the war. More significantly it argues that Perseus mishandled the Macedonian army when it comes to combined-arms tactics by adopting a defensive posture, particularly at the final battle of Pydna. The Macedonian military system based on a slow sarissa phalanx is suited entirely to an offensive battle plan coordinating a frontally irresistible phalanx in the center and a rapid heavy cavalry attack on one wing. Most importantly, though, Perseus refused to spend money to hire 10,000 Gallic horsemen and the lack of cavalry cost him the initiative and the victory. This is a fascinating and thoroughly researched study of these dramatic events that adds fresh insight to the question of the legion's supposed supremacy over the phalanx. The Third Macedonian War and Battle of Pydna. Perseus’ Neglect of Combined-arms Tactics and the Real Reasons for the Roman Victory Contents List of Figures Acknowledgements Introduction Part 1: The Hellenistic Sarissa phalanx The Sarissa The Phalanx Length of Hellenistic sarissas Part 2: Macedonian style armies Combined arms Hammer and Anvil Part 3: Standard Macedonian battle tactics Refused flank Feigned withdrawal Summary 1 The Army of Philip V, Perseus and the ‘conscription decree’ 2 The Roman Army and Polybius Flaws in Polybius’ arguments Ditches and water courses Ridges and Hillsides Clumps of trees Conclusions concerning Polybius’ comparison 3 The Build Up to War Plates 4 Invasion! – The First Year of the War and the Battle of Callinicus 5 Strategic Manoeuvring 6 Aemilius Paullus and the Road to Pydna 7 The Battle of Pydna Conclusion. Perseus’ Failures of Combined Arms Notes Introduction Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Bibliography Index