The Syrian Information and Propaganda War : The Role of Cognitive Bias

This book focuses on the propaganda war between the Syrian government and the opposition movement, which excludes the Islamic State and the Kurdish-led SDF. Drawing on international relations, psychology, and media studies, the book encourages readers to question the dominant discourse on the war. The core of the book outlines the propaganda battles over the main paradigms and narratives that framed the war, exploring the shortcomings of those paradigms and narratives, identifying who won the propaganda war and why, and assessing what impact it had on the military side of the war. In particular, it focuses on the role of cognitive bias amongst primary and secondary sources in determining the outcome of the propaganda war, and whether the influence of this propaganda is best explained by effects or limited effects theory. Through explaining the dynamics of the propaganda war, the book encourages readers to critically question the dominant discourse on the war, assists them in understanding primary and secondary reporting on the war, and shows that the impact of the propaganda war is best understood in terms of limited effects theory. The book's main findings are that: i) the opposition won the international propaganda war but failed to win the propaganda war inside Syria; ii) propaganda had relatively little effect on shaping attitudes either inside Syria or internationally (instead, its main effect was to reinforce attitudes that had already been shaped by other factors); and iii) the reality of the war lies between the conflicting paradigms and narratives being promoted by each side. Preface Acknowledgements Contents Abbreviations Chapter 1: Propaganda: Power and Bias Power and Propaganda Bias and Discourse Structure Government Influence Over the Dominant Power Structures The Syrian Government Propaganda Machine Bias and Primary Sources of Information: Citizen Journalists or Activists Bias and Secondary Sources of Information Building and Maintaining Conformity Power, Bias and the Dynamics of the Propaganda War Chapter 2: The Pre-uprising Propaganda War Regime Change and the “Rogue Nation” Narrative, 1946-2010 The Arab Spring and Citizen Journalists The Syrian Government and Its Domestic Support Base Social Groups in Syrian society Syrian Nationalism and Syrian National Identity Pro-reform Sentiment Prior to 2011 Islamism, Salafism and Extremism in Syria The Dominant Pre-uprising Paradigms and the Question of Bias Chapter 3: Establishing the Dominant Discourse Arab Spring or Armed Uprising, March–August Assad Is Killing His Own People The Syrian Government Fails to Shift the “Assad the Dictator” Paradigm Assad Protector of the Nation A Peaceful Revolution Turned Violent Because of Government Violence Setting the Dominant Paradigms and Narratives Chapter 4: Assad Is Sectarian Sectarianism in 2011—Early 2012 Massacres in Hama and Homs Provinces, 2012 The Homs Group of Activists Christians as Victims of Rebel Sectarianism The Massacres Spread Syrian Government Messaging Begins to Cut Through The Syrian Government Fails to Shift the Narrative Chapter 5: Assad Is Killing His Own People Emphasising and De-emphasising Civilian Casualties Exaggerating the Number of Civilian Casualties Did an Airstrike Hit Its Reported, or Intended, Target Portraying All Damage to Civilian Infrastructure as Being Deliberate Failing to Report How Civilian Infrastructure Is Being Used Allegations of False Flag Attacks Allegations that Evidence of Airstrikes Was Faked Controlling the Narrative Chapter 6: Assad Is Using Chemical Weapons The Syrian Armed Forces and CW Use, 2012 to Mid-2013 East and West Ghouta, 21st August 2013 The Switch to Chlorine Khan Sheykhoun, April 2017 Douma, April 2018 Alleged Rebel Chlorine Attack on West Aleppo, 2018 The Syrian Government Failure to Shift the Narrative Chapter 7: Assad Protector of the Nation The Opposition and Nationalism Syrian Minority Communities, Nationalism and National Identity A Foreign Proxy War Foreign Sunni Jihadis The Syrian Arab Army as the Symbol of the Nation Iran and the Shia Jihad The Syrian Government Retains Its Nationalist Legitimacy Chapter 8: Syria Is Secular Progressive Secularism Versus Regressive Islamism Challenging the Government’s Secularism A Secular—Islamist Split Emerges in Opposition Messaging Islamism Is an Acceptable Alternative to Secularism Gender Equality in Syrian Society An Overlooked Issue in the West Chapter 9: The Rebels Are Extremists The Syrian Government Narrative The Free Syrian Army: A Propaganda Construct? The Southern Front David Cameron’s 70,000 Moderate Rebels Jaysh al-Islam’s Problematic Transition to Moderation Ahrar al Sham’s Successful Transition to Moderation Re-branding the Extremists: Jabhat Al-Nusra Success and Failure Chapter 10: Business as Usual Pro-government Counter-demonstrations 2011 Business as Usual Fracturing the Syrian Government and Its Support Base Poor Governance and Insecurity in Rebel Held Areas The Failure of Opposition Messaging Chapter 11: Limited Effects Shaping the Policy Debate in the Western MSM Shaping Western Public and Political Opinion The Policy Response of Western Governments The Impact of Propaganda on Syrian Public Opinion The Impact of the Propaganda War on the Military Conduct of the War Chapter 12: Decoding the Propaganda War Index "This book focuses on the propaganda war between the Syrian government and the opposition movement, which excludes the Islamic State and the Kurdish-led SDF. Drawing on international relations, psychology, and media studies, the book encourages readers to question the dominant discourse on the war. The core of the book outlines the propaganda battles over the main paradigms and narratives that framed the war, exploring the shortcomings of those paradigms and narratives, identifying who won the propaganda war and why, and assessing what impact it had on the military side of the war. In particular, it focuses on the role of cognitive bias amongst primary and secondary sources in determining the outcome of the propaganda war, and whether the influence of this propaganda is best explained by effects or limited effects theory. Through explaining the dynamics of the propaganda war, the book encourages readers to critically question the dominant discourse on the war, assists them in understanding primary and secondary reporting on the war, and shows that the impact of the propaganda war is best understood in terms of limited effects theory. The book's main findings are that: 1) the opposition won the international propaganda war but failed to win the propaganda war inside Syria; 2) propaganda had relatively little effect on shaping attitudes either inside Syria or internationally (instead, its main effect was to reinforce attitudes that had already been shaped by other factors); and 3) the reality of the war lies between the conflicting paradigms and narratives being promoted by each side. Ben Cole is Honorary Lecturer at the School of Psychology, University of Liverpool, UK. He currently specializes in the process by which individuals become radicalized into violent extremism; terrorist decision making with regard to CBRN weapons; real-time monitoring and analysis of conflicts and terrorist movements using online media; and the war in Syria."-- Provided by publisher