The Stupidity of War American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency : American Foreign Policy and the Case forComplacency

Verlagsinfo: It could be said that American foreign policy since 1945 has been one long miscue; most international threats - including during the Cold War - have been substantially exaggerated. The result has been agony and bloviation, unnecessary and costly military interventions that have mostly failed. A policy of complacency and appeasement likely would have worked better. In this highly readable book, John Mueller argues with wisdom and wit rather than ideology and hyperbole that aversion to international war has had considerable consequences. There has seldom been significant danger of major war. Nuclear weapons, international institutions, and America's super power role have been substantially irrelevant; post-Cold War policy has been animated more by vast proclamation and half-vast execution than by the appeals of liberal hegemony; and post-9/11 concerns about international terrorism and nuclear proliferation have been overwrought and often destructive. Meanwhile, threats from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, or from cyber technology are limited and manageable. Unlikely to charm Washington, Mueller explains how, when international war is in decline, complacency and appeasement become viable diplomatic devices and a large military is scarcely required 01.0_pp_i_ii_The_Stupidity_of_War 02.0_pp_iii_iii_The_Stupidity_of_War 03.0_pp_iv_iv_Copyright_page 04.0_pp_v_vi_Dedication 05.0_pp_vii_vii_Contents 06.0_pp_viii_viii_Figures 07.0_pp_ix_ix_Acknowledgements 08.0_pp_x_x_Additional_material 09.0_pp_1_26_The_Rise_of_War_Aversion_and_the_Decline_of_International_War 10.0_pp_27_138_Assessing_the_Threat_Record 10.1_pp_29_46_Korea_Massive_Extrapolation_Deterrence_and_the_Crisis_Circus 10.2_pp_47_64_Containment_Vietnam_and_the_Curious_End_of_the_Cold_War 10.3_pp_65_88_Military_Intervention_and_the_Continued_Quest_for_Threat_after_the_Cold_War 10.4_pp_89_120_Al-Qaeda_and_the_911_Wars_in_Afghanistan_Iraq_Pakistan 10.5_pp_121_138_Chasing_Terrorists_Around_the_Globe_and_Other_Post-911_Ventures 11.0_pp_139_206_Evaluating_Present_Threats 11.1_pp_141_167_The_Rise_of_China_the_Assertiveness_of_Russia_and_the_Antics_of_Iran 11.2_pp_168_192_Proliferation_Terrorism_Humanitarian_Intervention_and_Other_Problems 11.3_pp_193_206_Hedging_Risk_Arrogance_and_the_Iraq_Syndrome 12.0_pp_207_223_Aversion_to_International_War_as_an_Explanatory_Variable 13.0_pp_224_234_A_Sardonic_Litany 14.0_pp_235_276_Notes 15.0_pp_277_311_References 16.0_pp_312_332_Index "At the conclusion of World War II, the Western victors faced two major international problems: what to do about the defeated countries, Germany and Japan, and what to do about an emerging conflict-the Cold War-with another victor, the Soviet Union. Since it involved a lot of interesting conflict, the latter problem has inspired a much greater literature. But it seems quite possible that in time the Cold War contest will be remembered as something of a historical curiosity"-- Provided by publisher This innovate argument shows how increased aversion to international war over the last century has caused countries to no longer view war as a way to resolve differences. Undergraduates and interested readers will consider complacency and appeasement as productive diplomatic devices and discover why a large military force is no longer necessary. John Mueller. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Cambridge Available Via World Wide Web.