The structure of pluralism : on the authority of associations

Pluralist arguments are increasingly common in political and legal theory, but scepticism persists about whether pluralism marks a distinct intellectual tradition. This book reconstructs the pluralist tradition in political theory, arguing that it makes distinctive and radical claims regarding political authority and the state. Pluralism proceeds from the observation that many associations in liberal democracies claim to possess, and attempt to exercise, a measure of legitimate authority over their members. They assert that this authority does not derive from the magnanimity of a liberal and tolerant state but is grounded, rather, on the common practices and aspirations of those individuals who choose to take part in a common endeavor. As an account of the authority of associations, pluralism is distinct from other attempts to accommodate groups like multiculturalism, subsidiarity, corporatism, and associational democracy. It is consistent with the explanation of legal authority proposed by contemporary legal positivists, and recommends that the formal normative systems of highly organized groups be accorded the status of fully legal norms when they encounter the laws of the state. In this book, Muniz-Fraticelli argues that political pluralism is a convincing political tradition that makes distinctive and radical claims regarding the sources of political authority and the relationship between associations and the state. Drawing on the intellectual tradition of the British political pluralists, as well as recent developments in legal philosophy and social ontology, the book argues that political pluralism makes distinctive and radical claims regarding the sources of political authority and the relationship between associations and the state Cover 1 OXFORD CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY Series Editors: Martin Loughlin, John P McCormick, and Neil Walker The Structure of Pluralism 2 OXFORD CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 3 Copyright 5 Acknowledgements 8 Contents 12 Introduction 14 Part one The Distinctiveness of Pluralism 20 1 The Structure of Pluralist Arguments 22 1.1 Pluralism as Ideal 24 1.2 Meta-ethical Pluralism: The Model of the Argument 26 1.3 Political Pluralism: Conflict Over Sovereignty 30 1.4 Legal Pluralism: Conflicts of Legality 38 1.5 Pluralism Across the Domains of Practical Reason 41 2 The Inadequacy of Multiculturalism 44 2.1 The Multicultural Paradigm 47 2.2 What Pluralism is Not About 51 2.3 Pluralism, Multiculturalism, and Justice 54 2.4 Political Pluralism and Jurisdictional Competition 59 3 The Incompatibility of Subsidiarity 69 3.1. Before Subsidiarity 70 3.2. The Principle of Subsidiarity 77 3.3 A Word on the European Union 86 4 Associative Democracy and the Corporatist Temptation 94 4.1 Cohen and Rogers on Associative Democracy 96 4.2 Hirst on Associative Democracy 99 4.3 Neither Corporatism nor Syndicalism 105 Part two The Constitutional Theory of Pluralism 112 5 Two Conceptions of Sovereignty 114 5.1 The Idea of Sovereignty 114 5.2 Early Modern Sovereignty 118 5.3 Medieval Sovereignty 123 5.4 The Limits of Medieval Constitutionalism 126 6 A Positivist Pluralism? 131 6.1 The Roots of Antipathy Towards Positivism 133 6.2 The Fallacies of the Critique of Legal Positivism 138 7 Law as Intelligibility 150 7.1 Law as Institutionality 152 7.2 A Non-essentialist Concept of Law? 156 7.3 Intelligibility as a Criterion of Legality 163 7.4 Law Before Law 166 8 Pluralist Authority 174 8.1 The Tradition of Political Pluralism 175 8.2 An Account of Authority 181 8.3 Reconsidering the Authority of the State 187 8.4 The Intractability of Conflict 188 Part Three The Personality of Associations 194 9 This Unity of Life and Action 196 9.1 The Birth of the Pluralist Theory of Group Personality 196 9.2 The Death of Real Personality 204 9.3 The Contemporary Resurrection of Group Personality 208 10 The Personality of Associations 212 10.1 The Argument Against Real Personality 213 10.2 The Importance of Group Personality 216 10.3 Supervenience and Group Personality 220 10.4 Two Kinds of Legal Personality 228 10.5 From Group Agency to Group Personality 234 11 Property, Personality, and Public Justification 240 11.1 Property and Personality 241 11.2 Hegel on Abstract Right 243 11.3 Property and Public Justification 247 Conclusion 254 12 The Spectre of Intractability 256 Bibliography 264 Index 276 Pluralist Arguments Are Increasingly Common In Political And Legal Theory, But Scepticism Persists About Whether Pluralism Marks A Distinct Intellectual Tradition. This Book Reconstructs The Pluralist Tradition In Political Theory, Arguing That It Makes Distinctive And Radical Claims Regarding Political Authority And The State. The Structure Of Pluralist Arguments -- The Inadequacy Of Multiculturalism -- The Incompatibility Of Subsidiarity -- Associative Democracy And The Corporatist Temptation -- Two Conceptions Of Sovereignty -- A Positivist Pluralism? -- Law As Intelligibility -- Pluralist Authority -- This Unity Of Life And Action -- The Personality Of Associations -- Property, Personality, And Public Justification -- The Spectre Of Intractability Victor M. Muñiz-fraticelli. Based On The Author's Thesis (doctoral)--university Of Chicago, 2008. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 251-262) And Index.