The Spiritual Automaton : Spinoza's Science of the Mind

Eugene Marshall presents an original, systematic account of Spinoza's philosophy of mind, in which the mind is presented as an affective mechanism, one that, when rational, behaves as a spiritual automaton. The central feature of the account is a novel concept of consciousness, one that identifies consciousness with affectivity, a property of an idea paradigmatically but not exhaustively instantiated by those modes of thought Spinoza calls affects. Inadequate and adequate ideas come to consciousness, and thus impact our well-being and establish or disturb our happiness, only insofar as they become affects and, thus, conscious. And ideas become affects by entering into appropriate causal relations with the other ideas that constitute a mind. Furthermore, the topic of consciousness in Spinoza provides an eminently well-placed point of entry into his system, because it flows directly out of his central metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological commitments--and it does so in a way that allows us to see Spinoza's philosophy as a systematic whole. Further, doing so provides a thoroughly consistent yet novel way of thinking about central themes in his thought. Marshall's reading provides a novel understanding of adequacy, innateness, power, activity and passivity, the affects, the conatus, bondage, freedom, the illusion of free will, akrasia, blessedness, salvation, and the eternity of the soul. In short, by explaining the affective mechanisms of consciousness in Spinoza, __The Spiritual Automaton__ illuminates Spinoza's systematic philosophical and ethical project as a whole, as well as in its details, in a striking new way. Marshall Provides A Systematic Account Of Spinoza's Philosophy Of Mind. He Presents Spinoza's Concept Of The Mind As Affective Mechanism, One That, When Rational, Behaves As A Spiritual Automaton. The Central Feature Of This Account Is A Novel Concept Of Consciousness, One That Identifies Consciousness With Affectivity, A Property Of An Idea Paradigmatically But Not Exhaustively Instantiated By Those Modes Of Thought Spinoza Calls Affects. 1. Introduction And Background -- 1. General Introduction -- 2. Background -- 2.1. Ideas -- 2.2. Inadequate Ideas -- 2.3. Inadequate Ideas, Essences, And Representation -- 3. Conclusion Of The Introduction -- 2. Adequate Ideas Are Innate -- 1. Introduction -- 2.the Challenge -- 3. Adequacy -- 3.1. The Common Notions -- 3.2. God's Essence -- 3.3. Particular Essences -- 4. Innateness -- 4.1. Skepticism Concerning Innateness In Spinoza -- 4.2. Leibniz And Spinoza On Innateness -- 5. Conclusion -- 3. Power, Conatus, And Affects -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Power Of Acting -- 2.1. Modes Of Substance And The Power Of Acting -- 2.2. On Complex Individuals -- 2.3. Ideas And Power -- 3. Conatus -- 3.1. A Tendency To Persevere -- 3.2. The Tendency In Complex Individuals -- 4. Affects Of The Mind -- 5. Adequate Ideas And Active Affects -- 5.1. Rejecting The Human Inadequacy Argument -- 5.2. Being An Adequate Cause -- 5.3. Adequacy And Explanation -- 6. Conclusion -- 4. Affects And Consciousness -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1. A Note On Consciousness Terms In Spinoza -- 2. Competing Theories -- 2.1. Ideas Of Ideas -- 2.2. Complexity -- 2.3. The Power Of An Idea 3. A Theory Of Consciousness In Spinoza -- 3.1. What Would A Good Account Of Consciousness Look Like? -- 3.2. Consciousness As Affectivity -- 3.3. More Than Just Emotions -- 3.4. The Richness Of Affectivity -- 3.5. Consciousness And Desire -- 3.6. Affectivity And The Ethical Project -- 4. Objections -- 4.1. Avoiding Old Objections -- 4.2. Addressing New Concerns -- 4.3. An Evaluation And Summary Of The Interpretation -- 5. Conclusion -- 5. Moral Psychology And Bondage -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Bondage And Freedom -- 2.1. Two Senses Of Freedom -- 2.2. Freedom And Action -- 2.3. Freedom And Living According To Reason -- 2.4. A Few Conclusions So Far -- 3. The Mechanisms Of Bondage -- 3.1. The Illusion Of Free Will -- 3.2. Affects And Akrasia -- 3.3. Mind As Affective Mechanism -- 3.4. Akrasia In Spinoza -- 3.5. The Mechanisms Of Bondage And Akrasia -- 4. Conclusion -- 6. Freedom, Therapy, And Salvation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Affective Mechanisms Of Freedom -- 2.1. The Mechanisms Of Freedom -- 2.2. Further Mechanisms -- 3. Blessedness, Salvation, And The Soul -- 3.1. Our Highest Happiness And Blessedness -- 3.2. Faith And Salvation -- 3.3. Consciousness And The Eternity Of The Soul -- 4. Final Conclusions Eugene Marshall. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Cover 1 The Spiritual Automaton 5 Copyright 6 Dedication 7 Acknowledgements 9 Contents 11 List of Abbreviations 15 1 Introduction and Background 17 1. General Introduction 17 2. Background 26 2.1. Ideas 27 2.2. Inadequate Ideas 28 2.3. Inadequate Ideas, Essences, and Representation 34 3. Conclusion of the Introduction 35 2 Adequate Ideas are Innate 36 1. Introduction 36 2. The Challenge 37 3. Adequacy 40 3.1. The Common Notions 47 3.2. God鈥檚 Essence 52 3.3. Particular Essences 57 4. Innateness 66 4.1. Skepticism Concerning Innateness in Spinoza 69 4.2. Leibniz and Spinoza on Innateness 70 5. Conclusion 72 3 Power, Conatus, and Affects 74 1. Introduction 74 2. Power of Acting 76 2.1. Modes of Substance and the Power of Acting 77 2.2. On Complex Individuals 81 2.3. Ideas and Power 87 3. Conatus 94 3.1. A Tendency to Persevere 94 3.2. The Tendency in Complex Individuals 97 4. Affects of the Mind 103 5. Adequate Ideas and Active Affects 108 5.1. Rejecting the Human Inadequacy Argument 109 5.2. Being an Adequate Cause 111 5.3. Adequacy and Explanation 113 6. Conclusion 118 4 Affects and Consciousness 120 1. Introduction 120 1.1. A Note on Consciousness Terms in Spinoza 122 2. Competing Theories 124 2.1. Ideas of Ideas 124 2.2. Complexity 127 2.3. The Power of an Idea 130 3. A Theory of Consciousness in Spinoza 133 3.1. What Would a Good Account of Consciousness Look Like? 134 3.2. Consciousness as Affectivity 134 3.3. More Than Just Emotions 136 3.4. The Richness of Affectivity 138 3.5. Consciousness and Desire 139 3.6. Affectivity and the Ethical Project 141 4. Objections 145 4.1. Avoiding Old Objections 145 4.2. Addressing New Concerns 149 4.3. An Evaluation and Summary of the Interpretation 153 5. Conclusion 156 5 Moral Psychology and Bondage 157 1. Introduction 157 2. Bondage and Freedom 157 2.1. Two Senses of Freedom 158 2.2. Freedom and Action 168 2.3. Freedom and Living According to Reason 171 2.4. A Few Conclusions So Far 174 3. The Mechanisms of Bondage 175 3.1. The Illusion of Free Will 176 3.2. Affects and Akrasia 181 3.3. Mind as Affective Mechanism 183 3.4. Akrasia in Spinoza 186 3.5. The Mechanisms of Bondage and Akrasia 190 4. Conclusion 200 6 Freedom, Therapy, and Salvation 202 1. Introduction 202 2. The Affective Mechanisms of Freedom 203 2.1. The Mechanisms of Freedom 203 2.2. Further Mechanisms 212 3. Blessedness, Salvation, and the Soul 221 3.1. Our Highest Happiness and Blessedness 221 3.2. Faith and Salvation 230 3.3. Consciousness and the Eternity of the Soul 238 4. Final Conclusions 245 Bibliography 249 Index 257 Eugene Marshall provides a systematic account of Spinoza's philosophy of mind, which presents Spinoza's concept of the mind as an affective mechanism, one that, when rational, behaves as a spiritual automaton. The central feature of the account is a novel concept of consciousness, one that identifies consciousness with affectivity, a property of an idea paradigmatically but not exhaustively instantiated by those modes of thought Spinoza calls affects. Inadequate and adequate ideas come to consciousness, and thus impact our well-being and establish or disturb our happiness, only insofar as they become affects and, thus, conscious. And ideas become affects by entering into appropriate causal relations with the other ideas that constitute a mind. Furthermore, the topic of consciousness in Spinoza provides an eminently well-placed point of entry into his system, because it flows directly out of his central metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological commitments-and it does so in a way that allows us to see Spinoza's philosophy as a systematic whole. Further, doing so provides a thoroughly consistent yet novel way of thinking about central themes in his thought. Marshall's reading provides a novel understanding of adequacy, innateness, power, activity and passivity, the affects, the conatus, bondage, freedom, the illusion of free will, akrasia, blessedness, salvation, and the eternity of the soul. In short, by explaining the affective mechanisms of consciousness in Spinoza, The Spiritual Automaton illuminates Spinoza's systematic philosophical and ethical project as a whole, as well as in its details, in a striking new way. Book jacket