The specter of Munich : reconsidering the lessons of appeasing Hitler

NO HISTORICAL EVENT has exerted more influence on post-World War II U.S. presidential use-of-force decisions than the Anglo-French appeasement of Nazi Germany that led to the outbreak of World War II. The great lesson drawn from appeasement—namely, that capitulating to the demands of territorially aggressive dictatorships simply makes inevitable a later, larger war on less favorable terms— has informed most major U.S. uses of force since the surrender of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in 1945.1 From the Truman administration’s 1950 decision to fight in Korea to the George W. Bush administration’s 2003 decision to invade Iraq, presidents repeatedly have relied on the Munich analogy to determine what to do in a perceived security crisis. They have also employed that analogy as a tool for mobilizing public opinion for military action.? It was of course at the Munich conference of September— October 1938 that Britain and France bowed to Hitler’s threat of war and ceded the German-speaking areas of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany. In so doing, Britain and France not only sacrificed eastern Europe’s only democracy to Adolf Hitler but also earned the utter contempt of the German dictator. Hitler subsequently invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia. As the United States approached its second war with Iraq, neoconservatives and other war proponents cited the consequences of the democracies’ appeasement of the burgeoning Nazi menace during the 1930s and asserted that war was necessary to remove Saddam Hussein before he acquired the nuclear weapons with which he would threaten and even attack the United States. Munich’s great lesson, they argued, was to move early and decisively against rising security threats. World War II could have been avoided had the democracies been prepared to stop Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 or to fight for Czechoslovakia in 1938. Instead, they did nothing when a mere three German army battalions crossed over to the Rhine’s left bank, and they handed over vital chunks of Czech territory. With each act of appeasement Hitler’s appetite grew. Thus military action against a prenuclear Saddam Hussein in 2003 would be much easier and less risky than war with a nuclear Saddam later on. War with Saddam, as with Hitler, was in any event inevitable, so it was better to have it now on more favorable terms rather than later on less favorable ones. No historical event has exerted more influence on America's post–World War II use of military force than the Anglo-French appeasement of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Informed by the supposed grand lesson of Munich–namely, that capitulating to the demands of aggressive dictatorships invites further aggression and makes inevitable a larger war–American presidents from Harry Truman through George W. Bush have relied on the Munich analogy not only to interpret perceived security threats but also to mobilize public opinion for military action. In The Specter of Munich, noted defense analyst Jeffrey Record takes an unconventional look at a disastrous chapter in Western diplomatic history. After identifying the complex considerations behind the Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler and the reasons for the policy's failure, Record disputes the stock thesis that unchecked aggression always invites further aggression. He proceeds to identify other lessons of the 1930s more relevant to meeting today's U.S. foreign policy and security challenges. Among those lessons are the severe penalties that foreign policy miscalculation can incur, the constraints of public opinion in a modern democracy, and the virtue of consistency in threatening and using force. The Specter of Munich concludes that though today's global political, military, and economic environment differs considerably from that of the 1930s, the United States is making some of the same strategic mistakes in its war on terrorism that the British and French made in their attempts to protect themselves against Nazi Germany. Not the least of these mistakes is the continued reliance on the specter of Adolf Hitler to interpret today's foreign security threats. No Historical Event Has Exerted More Influence On America's Post-1945 Use Of Military Force Than The Failure Of Anglo-french Appeasement Of Nazi Germany At The 1938 Munich Conference. In The Specter Of Munich, Defense Analyst Jeffrey Record Takes A Fresh Look At The Disastrous Diplomatic History Of The 1930s. After Identifying The Complex Considerations Behind The Anglo-french Appeasement Of Hitler And The Reasons For The Policy's Failure, Record Disputes The Stock Thesis That Unchecked Aggression Always Invites Further Aggression. He Argues That Appeasement Failed Primarily Because Hitler Was Both Unappeasable And Undeterrable - And Extremely Rare Situation. Record Proceeds To Identify Other Lessons Of The 1930s That Are More Relevant To Meeting Today's U.s. Foreign Policy And Security Challenges. Among Those Lessons Are The Severe Penalties That Foreign Policy Miscalculation Can Incur, The Perils Of Strategic Overextension, The Constraints Of Public Opinion In A Democracy, And The Virtue Of Consistency In Threatening And Using Force. The Specter Of Munich Concludes That The United States Can Learn A Great Deal From British And French Failures Of The 1930s, But The Continued Reliance On The Specter Of Adolf Hitler To Interpret Today's Foreign Security Threats Is A Mistake. Making This Analogy Clouds The Judgment Of Policymakers And The Public, Narrows Policy Options, And Has And Will Continue To Lead The Country Into Unnecessary Wars.--book Jacket. The Staying Power Of The Munich Analogy -- Why Britain And France Appeased Hitler -- Why Appeasement Failed -- Appeasement's Lessons For The United States Today. Jeffrey Record. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 146-155) And Index. CONTENTS Chronology Map: Europe after World War I Map: Nazi Germany’s Expansion, 1936-39 1. Introduction: The Staying Power of the Munich Analogy 2. Why Britain and France Appeased Hitler 3. Why Appeasement Failed 4. Appeasement’s Lessons for the United States Today 5. Concluding Observations and Recommendations Notes Bibliography Index About the Author ix 18 19 13 67 73 1 130 146 156 164