The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-87: The Problem of the SS-20 (Studies in Russian and East European History and ... in Russian & East European History & Society)

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. 5 The Reaction in Western Europe, 1977-79 5.1 The Impact of SS-20 Deployment 5.2 The Neutron Bomb Fiasco 5.3 The Dual-Track Decision vii viii The Roots of the Problem, 1945-69 7 have acted as a spur. Analyzing the Peenemiinde facilities and output, rocket scientist Dr Tokaty Tokaev submitted a report to Politburo member and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Georgii Malenkov in March 1946.Tokaev and his colleagues had concluded that in practical rocketry the Russians were behind the Germans.22 The capture of V-1 and V-2 rockets plus details of the A 9/10 two-stage transatlantic rocket project, as well as of German engineers, technicians and workers thus accelerated existing Soviet experimentation, 23 though Stalin was reportedly outraged that the Americans had taken the lion's share, including the leading scientists (such as von Braun) and the underground V-2 factory in the Harz mountains. 24 Colonel-General of Artillery Mitrofan Nedelin-years later appointed chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces-was summoned to Stalin in mid-April 1946 to discuss the further application of rocket technology to warfare. 25 'Stalin ... assigned most missile development programs . . . to the artillery component of the ground forces and kept their development under strict scrutiny'. 26 However, not until after rocket specialist Sergei Korolev returned from supervising the collection of data and materials in Germany at the end of 1946 did work begin at his design bureau, 27 though from then on the results were not long delayed. At a meeting in the Kremlin on 14 March 1947-two days after the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine-Malenkov emphasised to Soviet rocket scientists that developing the V-2 was far from enough: 'our strategic needs are predetermined by the fact that our potential enemy is to be found thousands of miles away', he is reported to have said. 2 8 A day later, at a joint meeting of the Politburo and the Council of Ministers, Stalin made the same point. Referring to the A 9/10 transatlantic rocket project developed by the Germans, he stressed that such missiles 'could be an effective straightjacket for that noisy shopkeeper Harry Truman'. A special commission was thus set up for that purpose-the PKRDD (Pravitel'stvennaya Komissiya po Raketam Dalnego Deistviya), chaired by the First Deputy Minister of the NKVD, Colonel-General Serov. 29 By September of that year a draft project was presented to the government, but from then on work was paralysed by the onset of renewed terror from the secret police and the entire schedule was set back by years.3° The V-2 programme was already underway, however. On 18 October 1947 the Russians successfully launched their first ballistic missile: the R-1. And within three years they had also successfully tested the more advanced R-additional element of U.S. strategic air capability and to be essential to the conduct of the military operations on the Eurasian continent in case of general war. 36 The B-36 remained outnumbered by the medium-range B-29. And when from early 1953 the new jet-propelled B-47 medium-range bomber began to replace the B-29, there was no great incentive to cut back on foreign bases. But even when the new and far more effective intercontinental jet-propelled B-52 bomber became operational in June 1955, the USAF continued to rely on shorter-range aircraft operating from overseas positions. And when this continued dependence on what were increasingly vulnerable bases was called into question 'Air Force officers maintained that the continued use of these admittedly vulnerable bases gave additional flexibility and efficiency to the strategic attack, added complexity to the timing of a Soviet surprise attack, and permitted the B-47s to operate from ranges nearer to their targets'. The knowledge that the Strategic Air Command (SAC) is a truly global force, pointed out Lieutenant General Walter C. Sweeney, Jr., Commander of the Eighth Air Force, 'complicates Soviet targeting and dilutes his war effort' .37 This was said in 1959. By then the Russians had not only acquired the potential for an intercontinental capability, they were also introducing ever more effective means of attacking US air bases in Western Europe which were given priority over the intercontinental mission. Whether one judges Soviet aims as primarily offensive or defensive there could be no doubt that ridding the continent of Europe-the British Isles included-of US forward-based systems was an important aim for the Soviet military. At this stage there was no prospect of doing so through negotiation. Nor was there any real likelihood of the West Europeans asking the Americans to leave (except perhaps France under De Gaulle). A nuclear arms race in Europe was therefore inevitable.On 17 December 1959 the Soviet Politburo and Council of Ministers created the Strategic Rocket Forces as a separate and senior service. This move followed a frustrating experience of attempting to match the United States in comparable nuclear-capable aircraft. In November 1954 the Tupolev-16 (Western designation 'Badger') entered service to supersede the TU-4 as the leading medium-range bomber. Attempts at an intercontinental capability also continued. Some equivalent of the B-52 had to be found if the United States was to be deterred from contemplating a first strike. In 1954 the Index Front Matter....Pages i-xv Introduction: The Roots of the Problem, 1945–69....Pages 1-14 SALT I and Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969–72....Pages 15-34 The Chinese Connexion, 1969–73....Pages 35-41 SALT’S Side–Effects, 1973–74....Pages 42-57 The SS-20 Decisions: from Testing to Deployment, 1974–77....Pages 58-88 The Reaction in Western Europe, 1977–79....Pages 89-105 Negotiation from Weakness: The INF Talks, 1980–83....Pages 106-140 Reversing from the Cul-de-Sac, 1984–87....Pages 141-174 Conclusions....Pages 175-179 Back Matter....Pages 180-227 A comprehensive study of the reasons for the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 missile in the 1970s and the reasons why they agreed to eliminate it in the 1987 INF Treaty. In the process, Haslam examines the evolution of Soviet foreign and defence policy towards Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.