The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials

Présentation de l'éditeur : "This collection is the first book-length examination of the various epistemological issues underlying legal trials. Trials are centrally concerned with determining truth: whether a criminal defendant has in fact culpably committed the act of which they are accused, or whether a civil defendant is in fact responsible for the damages alleged by the plaintiff. Truth is not, however, the only epistemic value which seems relevant to how trials proceed. We may think that a jury shouldn't convict a defendant, even one who is as a matter of fact guilty, unless its members know or at least are justified in believing that the defendant committed the crime in question. Similarly, we might reasonably assume that the trier of fact must have some level of understanding to reach an adequate verdict in any case, but legitimate questions arise as to what level of understanding should be required. The essays collected in this volume consider a range of epistemological issues raised by trials, such as how much credence jurors should give to eyewitness testimony, the admissibility and role of statistical evidence, and the appropriate standards of proof in different contexts. The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials will be of interest to scholars and upper-level students working on issues at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of law." This collection is the first book-length examination of the various epistemological issues underlying legal trials. Assessing the value of trials as truth-seeking endeavors requires that we consider a host of underlying social epistemological questions. The contributors to this volume address a number of these pressing questions. Cover 1 Half Title 2 Series Page 3 Title Page 4 Copyright Page 5 Contents 6 Introduction 8 1. Credibility Deficits, Memory Errors and the Criminal Trial 16 2. Eyewitness Testimony, the Misinformation Effect and Reasonable Doubt 37 3. On Testifying and Giving Evidence 53 4. Explaining the Justificatory Asymmetry between Statistical and Individualized Evidence 67 5. Character, ‘Propensities’, and the (Mis)use of Statistics in Criminal Trials 84 6. Against Legal Probabilism 99 7. Justified Belief and Just Conviction 113 8. The ‘She Said, He Said’ Paradox and the Proof Paradox 131 9. Against the Odds: The Case for a Modal Understanding of Due Care 151 10. Criminal Trials for Preventive Deprivations of Liberty 167 Notes on Contributors 180 Index 181 Jon,Robson;,Zachary,Hoskins;,R.A.,Duff;,Sandra,Marshall;,Hadassa,Noorda;,Martin,Smith;,Samuel,Fox,Krauss;,Stephen,Wright;,Christopher,Bennett;,Jeffrey,Helmreich;,Duncan,Pritchard;,Katherine,Puddifoot;,Georgi,Gardiner;,Clayton,Littlejohn;,Renee,Bolinger;,epistemology;,philosophy,of,law;,criminal,trials;,civic,trials;,social,epistemology;,applied,epistemology;,standard,of,proof;,testimony;,immunity;,testimonial,evidence;,witness,reliability;,misinformation;,due,care;,modal,risk;,aggregative,permissibility;,base,rates;,proof,paradox;,reasonable,doubt;,individualized,evidence;,expert,witness;,eyewitness,testimony Jon Robson,Zachary Hoskins,R.A. Duff,Sandra Marshall,Hadassa Noorda,Martin Smith,Samuel Fox Krauss,Stephen Wright,Christopher Bennett,Jeffrey Helmreich,Duncan Pritchard,Katherine Puddifoot,Georgi Gardiner,Clayton Littlejohn,Renee Bolinger,epistemology,philosophy of law,criminal trials,civic trials,social epistemology,applied epistemology,standard of proof,testimony,immunity,testimonial evidence,witness reliability,misinformation,due care,modal risk,aggregative permissibility,base rates,proof paradox,reasonable doubt,individualized evidence,expert witness,eyewitness testimony "This collection is the first book-length examination of the various epistemological issues underlying legal trials. Trials are, among other things, centrally concerned with determining truth: whether a criminal defendant has in fact culpably committed the act of which they are accused, or whether a civil defendant is in fact responsible for the damages alleged by the plaintiff. But are trials truth-conducive? Assessing the value of trials as truth-seeking endeavors requires that we consider a host of underlying social epistemological questions. The contributors to this volume address a number of these pressing questions, including but not limited to the following: How much credence should they give to eyewitness testimony? How should we balance the relative epistemic value of testimony offered by defense witnesses and prosecution (or plaintiff) witnesses? Are juries an effective means of arriving at justified beliefs about a defendant's guilt or innocence? When, if ever, is statistical information about a defendant's character relevant? What degree of certainty should we require to support a verdict of 'guilty'? How should standards of proof be interpreted for allegations that contain numerous discrete components? The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials will be of interest to scholars and upper-level students working on issues at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of law"-- Provided by publisher Présentation de l'éditeur : "This collection is the first book-length examination of the various epistemological issues underlying legal trials. Trials are centrally concerned with determining truth: whether a criminal defendant has in fact culpably committed the act of which they are accused, or whether a civil defendant is in fact responsible for the damages alleged by the plaintiff. Truth is not, however, the only epistemic value which seems relevant to how trials proceed. We may think that a jury shouldn't convict a defendant, even one who is as a matter of fact guilty, unless its members know or at least are justified in believing that the defendant committed the crime in question. Similarly, we might reasonably assume that the trier of fact must have some level of understanding to reach an adequate verdict in any case, but legitimate questions arise as to what level of understanding should be required. The essays collected in this volume consider a range of epistemological issues raised by trials, such as how much credence jurors should give to eyewitness testimony, the admissibility and role of statistical evidence, and the appropriate standards of proof in different contexts. The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials will be of interest to scholars and upper-level students working on issues at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of law." Introduction / Zachary Hoskins and Jon Robson -- Credibility deficits, memory errors, and the criminal trial / Kathy Puddifoot -- Eyewitness testimony, the misinformation effect, and reasonable doubt / Christopher Bennett -- On testifying and giving evidence / Stephen Wright -- Explaining the justificatory asymmetry between statistical and individualized evidence / Renèe Jorgensen Bolinger -- Character, "propensities", and the (mis)use of statistics in criminal trials / R. A. Duff and S.E. Marshall -- Against legal probabilism / Martin Smith -- Justified belief and just conviction / Clayton Littlejohn -- The "she said, he said" paradox and the proof paradox / Georgi Gardiner -- Against the odds : the case for a modal understanding of due / Care Jeffrey Helmreich and Duncan Pritchard -- Criminal trials for preventive deprivations of liberty / Hadassa Noorda