The Security of Iceland and the Arctic 2030: A Recommendation for Increased Geopolitical Stability (Springer Polar Sciences)

This book outlines a recommended Icelandic security force as part of the country’s defence against sub-strategic threats such as human trafficking by criminals or border incursions by other states. It also tests the recommended security force through the development of four different hypothetical scenarios in the year 2030 designed to show the force’s successful implementation. Melting of the Arctic ice pack, and the opening of the Transpolar Sea Route around 2025 could lead to an increase in traffic into the North Atlantic from the Pacific (and vice versa). That movement is predicted to bring a massive influx of tourists, business interests, and government entities into the region. Along with legitimate uses of the new shipping lanes, the opportunity for terrorists, criminals, and rogue states to travel in and around the Arctic could lead to increased smuggling, violence, and sovereignty disputes (i.e., seizing uninhabited terrain). A review of Iceland’scurrent security policies indicates that the parliament provided the legal framework to create the recommended security force with the 2016 Parliamentary Resolution establishing a National Security Policy for Iceland. Many scholars and government officials believe that the Iceland public would not support a security force culturally. Yet, recent surveys reveal that many Icelanders could accept a security force to protect them from sub-strategic threats, especially if the increased security could be attained without the intervention of foreign military forces. The recommended security force utilizes Icelandic search-and-rescue volunteers and Reservists to increase the protection of the country funded by its full NATO contribution. Foreword to Robert P. Wheelersburg, The Security of Iceland and the Arctic 2030: A Recommendation for North Atlantic Geostrate... Preface Heart of Darkness References Acknowledgments Contents Chapter 1: Introduction and Setting the Stage 1.1 Introduction to North Atlantic Security 1.2 Past Is Prologue - Militarization of the Arctic 1.3 Iceland ́s Internal Security Posture 1.4 Recommendation for Icelandic Security References Chapter 2: Globalism Failed - Iceland Alone in an Insecure Arctic 2.1 Introduction to Globalism and Iceland 2.2 Globalism and the Nation-State 2.3 Types of Globalism and Their Predicted Outcomes 2.4 Globalism - Theory Versus Reality 2.5 Globalism Dies Due to a Virus References Chapter 3: Arctic States ́ Comparative Sub-Strategic Security Policies 3.1 Introduction to Arctic Security 3.2 Arctic States ́ Sub-strategic Security Policies 3.2.1 Canada ́s Arctic Security Policy 3.2.2 Denmark ́s Arctic Security Policy 3.2.3 Finland ́s Arctic Security Policy 3.2.4 Iceland ́s Arctic Security Policy 3.2.5 Norway ́s Arctic Security Policy 3.2.6 Russia ́s Arctic Security Policy 3.2.7 Sweden ́s Arctic Security Policy 3.2.8 United States ́ Arctic Security Policy 3.3 Summary References Chapter 4: Icelandic Security Sector Reform and Proposed Security Force 4.1 Introduction to Security Sector Reform 4.2 Examples of SSR: Germany, Georgia, and Costa Rica 4.3 Iceland and Security Sector Reform 4.4 Swedish and Canadian Rangers as Models for an Icelandic Security Force 4.5 Recommendation for an Icelandic Security Force 4.6 Security Force Management and Operational Principles 4.7 U.S. Inability to Survive and Fight in the Arctic 4.8 Summary References Chapter 5: Icelandic Security Force Scenarios 2030 5.1 Introduction to Operations Other Than War/Irregular Conflicts 5.2 Exercise Design and Scenario Development 5.3 A Possible North Atlantic Geopolitical Situation in 2030 5.4 Icelandic Security Force Scenarios 2030 5.4.1 Scenario 1 - Cruise Ship Hijacking, Akureyri, North Iceland 5.4.2 Scenario 2 - Arctic-State Limited Territorial Incursion, Þorlkshöfn, South Iceland 5.4.3 Scenario 3 - Non-Arctic State Occupies Grimsey Island, North Iceland 5.4.4 Scenario 4 - Human Trafficking in Seyisfjörur and Egilsstair, East Iceland 5.5 Summary References Chapter 6: Iceland ́s Conflict History and Attitudes Toward Security 6.1 Iceland 2030 - Organians in a Dark World 6.2 Threats to Iceland 2030 6.3 Iceland ́s History of Conflict 6.3.1 Conflict During the Age of Settlement 6.3.2 Conflict During the Icelandic Commonwealth and the Age of Sturlungs 6.3.3 Conflict During the Reformation and the Witch Trials 6.3.4 Conflict During Piracy and Human Trafficking 6.3.5 Crown Sheriffs, Icelandic Police, and Provisional Security Forces 6.3.6 Iceland as ``Nonbelligerent Ally ́ ́ in a Global Conflict 6.3.7 The Atom Station, NATO, and Violent Protests 6.4 Modern Icelandic Attitudes Toward Security 6.5 Icelandic Sub-strategic Security Force 6.6 Summary and Conclusion References This book outlines a recommended Icelandic security force as part of the countrys defence against sub-strategic threats such as human trafficking by criminals or border incursions by other states. It also tests the recommended security force through the development of four different hypothetical scenarios in the year 2030 designed to show the forces successful implementation. Melting of the Arctic ice pack, and the opening of the Transpolar Sea Route around 2025 could lead to an increase in traffic into the North Atlantic from the Pacific (and vice versa). That movement is predicted to bring a massive influx of tourists, business interests, and government entities into the region. Along with legitimate uses of the new shipping lanes, the opportunity for terrorists, criminals, and rogue states to travel in and around the Arctic could lead to increased smuggling, violence, and sovereignty disputes (i.e., seizing uninhabited terrain). A review of Icelands current security policies indicates that the parliament provided the legal framework to create the recommended security force with the 2016 Parliamentary Resolution establishing a National Security Policy for Iceland. Many scholars and government officials believe that the Iceland public would not support a security force culturally. Yet, recent surveys reveal that many Icelanders could accept a security force to protect them from sub-strategic threats, especially if the increased security could be attained without the intervention of foreign military forces. The recommended security force utilizes Icelandic search-and-rescue volunteers and Reservists to increase the protection of the country funded by its full NATO contribution