The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Series Number 65)

Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.--Publisher description Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behavior. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion but, once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favorable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly independent states and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. However, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversaries than between allies.

argues That, Paradoxically, Countries Are Likely To Use Sanctions Under Conditions Where They Will Produce The Feeblest Results.