The Rule by law: the politics of courts in authoritarian regimes

I recently took a comparative constitutional law class at my law school. Even though my school is one of the best for international law, I felt it really lacked depth when we discussed courts in illiberal countries like China. Frankly, this book was much more useful than that class. I purchased this book because I am currently doing research on judicial systems in Asia under authoritarian control. The articles provide both a theoretical framework for how courts operate in such environments and a selection of case studies from all over the world. The overarching theme is that authoritarian regimes in many cases actually provide an illiberal form of rule of law for their courts, rather than simply treating them as a facade. I thought the chapters on Singapore (Silverstein), Chile (Hilbank), Egypt (Moustafa), and and Turkey (Shambayati) were particularly insightful and made me look at courts and judges in these regimes differently. On a personal note, I wish the book had included one more chapter looking at another judicial system in Asia. Given recent events last year, a chapter on Pakistan would have been very interesting. I also think the book would have benefitted from a chapter exploring the patronage and corruption that authoritarian leaders in Southeast Asia used to influence judges, such as Suharto in Indonesia or Mahathir in Malaysia. Overall, this is a great book and I hope it encourages more research in this field. Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Contents......Page 9 Contributors......Page 11 Introduction: The Functions of Courts in Authoritarian Politics......Page 13 why study courts in authoritarian regimes?......Page 14 Social Control......Page 16 Legitimation......Page 17 Controlling Administrative Agents and Maintaining Elite Cohesion......Page 19 Credible Commitments in the Economic Sphere......Page 20 The Delegation of Controversial Reforms to Judicial Institutions......Page 21 Complementarities among the Functions......Page 22 time horizons and the double-edged sword......Page 23 Judicial Self-Restraint......Page 26 Fragmented versus Unified Judicial Systems......Page 29 Constraining Access to Justice......Page 30 Incapacitating Judicial Support Networks......Page 32 conclusion......Page 33 introduction......Page 35 security courts in brazil and the southern cone......Page 36 patterns of military-judicial collaboration......Page 40 Pushing the Envelope in Brazil’s Security Courts......Page 44 extending the analytical framework......Page 49 Nazi Germany......Page 51 Franco’s Spain......Page 54 Salazar’s Portugal......Page 57 the united states after 9/11: authoritarian courts in a democracy?......Page 59 conclusion......Page 66 appendix......Page 69 2 Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents in Authoritarian Regimes......Page 70 Internalization and Ideology......Page 72 Hierarchy and Second-Party Supervision......Page 73 Judicial Control and Third-Party Supervision......Page 75 why administrative law? comparative institutional choice......Page 77 an illustration: the case of china and the shift from hierarchy to administrative law......Page 79 conclusion......Page 83 3 Singapore: The Exception That Proves Rules Matter......Page 85 unpacking the rule of law......Page 87 singapore and the rule of law......Page 88 Puzzle 1 ... De-Linking Globalization and Judicialization......Page 90 Puzzle 2 ... De-Linking Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law......Page 95 Puzzle 3 ... Law, Courts, and the Shape of International Opinion......Page 98 Puzzle 4 ... Law, Courts, and Domestic Political Opposition......Page 104 singapore: a model or an exception?......Page 109 appendix: singapore by the numbers......Page 111 introduction......Page 114 the judicial role in the pinochet regime: context and content......Page 116 Habeas Corpus (Amparo)......Page 117 Review of Military Court Decisions......Page 118 Constitutional Review (Inaplicabilidad por Inconstitucionalidad)......Page 119 The New Constitutional Review Mechanism: Recurso de Proteccion......Page 121 contrasting performance of the constitutional tribunal......Page 123 Regime-Related Factors......Page 124 The Attitudinal Explanation......Page 127 The Class-Based Explanation......Page 129 The Legal Theory Explanation......Page 130 the institutional argument......Page 132 conclusions and implications......Page 141 5 Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt......Page 144 judicial institutions and economic development......Page 145 judicial institutions and bureaucratic discipline......Page 151 marketing judicial reform at home and abroad......Page 158 mobilizing through the courts......Page 161 the limits of legal mobilization: state security courts and “insulated liberalism”......Page 163 introduction......Page 168 the context of judicial failure: military dictatorship and constitutional exception......Page 171 Military Dictatorship as Constitutional Exception......Page 175 Exception, Dictatorship, and the Courts......Page 176 modalities of repression and the rule of law......Page 179 judicial failure in context......Page 182 preliminary conclusion......Page 189 introduction......Page 192 autocratic rule and the courts......Page 194 citizens’ rights and autocratic abuse......Page 202 enforcing political order......Page 205 The Crumbling of the Autocratic Political Order......Page 209 empowering the supreme court and the 1994 constitutional reform......Page 211 the democratic court......Page 213 alternative theories of judicial empowerment......Page 215 conclusion......Page 217 8 The Institutional Diffusion of Courts in China: Evidence from Survey Data......Page 219 Trust......Page 222 Explaining Institutional Diffusion: Networks......Page 226 Community Experiences and Institutional Diffusion......Page 230 Social Networks......Page 232 Political Institutions and the Acquisition of Legal Knowledge......Page 233 Media Consumption......Page 236 Education......Page 237 Modeling the Propensity to Go to Court......Page 238 Institutional Diffusion......Page 239 Party and Youth League Membership......Page 244 conclusion......Page 245 9 Building Judicial Independence in Semi-Democracies: Uganda and Zimbabwe......Page 247 judicial independence as an equilibrium......Page 248 a tale of two courts......Page 249 Uganda: Persistent Ambiguity......Page 250 Zimbabwe: Unhappy Outcomes......Page 260 External Leverage......Page 266 Factions and Ideas......Page 268 The Court......Page 269 tentative implications......Page 270 theoretical perspectives......Page 273 tsarist russia: courts and autocracy......Page 275 courts in the service of the regime: judicial power in the ussr......Page 279 liberalization, democratization, and the courts......Page 284 russian courts in an age of competitive authoritarianism......Page 287 conclusion......Page 293 11 Courts in Semi-Democratic/Authoritarian Regimes: The Judicialization of Turkish (and Iranian) Politics......Page 295 military-inspired judicial empowerment......Page 297 the turkish political system......Page 299 Judicial Empowerment in Turkey......Page 302 The Judiciary After 1982......Page 305 The Courts in Action......Page 307 courts in the islamic republic of iran......Page 310 conclusion......Page 314 the economic role of the courts according to regime type......Page 316 Dilemma 1: Property Rights and Securing Investment Opportunities for Distribution to Loyalists......Page 319 Dilemma 2: Financial Credibility and Debt Repayment......Page 321 Dilemma 3: Secrecy, Central Authority, and Administrative Discipline......Page 324 linkages between political discipline and commercial law enforcement......Page 326 the law and regime change......Page 328 Dualism and Inclusivity as a Steady-State Equilibrium......Page 329 Revolution or Evolution......Page 331 The Law and Emerging Loyalty to the State......Page 333 conclusion......Page 336 the expansion of judicial studies......Page 338 the rule of law......Page 341 the development and rights story......Page 342 of individuals and institutions......Page 343 convergence......Page 344 the legitimacy paradox......Page 346 courts and regimes......Page 347 References......Page 349 Index......Page 375 Of judges and generals : security courts under authoritarian regimes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile / Anthony Pereira Administrative law and judicial control of agents in authoritarian regimes / Tom Ginsburg Singapore : the exception that proves rules matter / Gordon Silverstein Judicial independence in authoritarian regimes : insights from Chile / Lisa Hilbink Law and resistance in authoritarian states : the Egyptian case / Tamir Moustafa Courts out of context : the authoritarian sources of judicial failure in Chile (1973 1990) and Argentina (1976 1983) / Robert Barros - An authoritarian enclave? the supreme court in Mexico's emerging democracy / Beatriz Magaloni The institutional diffusion of courts in China : evidence from survey data / Pierre Landry Building judicial independence in semi-democracies : Uganda and Tanzania / Jennifer Widner Judicial power in authoritarian states : the Russian experience / Peter Solomon Courts in a semi-democratic authoritarian regime : the judicialization of Turkish and Iranian politics / Hootan Shambayati Judicial systems and economic development / Hilton Root & Karen May Courts in authoritarian regimes / Martin Shapiro. Scholars have generally assumed that courts in authoritarian states are pawns of their regimes, upholding the interests of governing elites and frustrating the efforts of their opponents. As a result, nearly all studies in comparative judicial politics have focused on democratic and democratizing countries. This volume brings together leading scholars in comparative judicial politics to consider the causes and consequences of judicial empowerment in authoritarian states. It demonstrates the wide range of governance tasks that courts perform, as well as the way in which courts can serve as critical sites of contention both among the ruling elite and between regimes and their citizens. Drawing on empirical and theoretical insights from every major region of the world, this volume advances our understanding of judicial politics in authoritarian regimes.