The Royal Navy And Nazi Germany, 1933?39: A Study In Appeasement And The Origins Of The Second World War (studies In Military And Strategic History)

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Front Matter....Pages i-xii Introduction....Pages 1-10 The Naval Staff and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935....Pages 11-37 Anglo-German Naval Relations, June 1935 to July 1937....Pages 38-62 Naval Staff Perceptions of German Naval Strategy, 1934–39....Pages 63-86 Admiralty Technical Intelligence and the German Navy, 1936–39....Pages 87-110 The Naval Staff, British Strategy and the German Menace, 1934–38....Pages 111-132 The Naval Staff and Defence and Foreign Policy, 1937–38....Pages 133-158 The End of Appeasement and the Bid to Transform Admiralty Strategy, 1938–39....Pages 159-185 Conclusion....Pages 186-194 Back Matter....Pages 195-259 Annotation This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest Focusing on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler, this book examines the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement, casting new light on British naval intelligence and combining diplomatic events