The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology (Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy)

What is an epistemic virtue? Are epistemic virtues reliable? Are they motivated by a love of truth? Do epistemic virtues produce knowledge and understanding? How can we develop epistemic virtues? The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology answers all of these questions. This landmark volume provides a pluralistic and comprehensive picture of the field of virtue epistemology. It is the first large-scale volume of its kind on the topic. Composed of 41 chapters, all published here for the first time, it breaks new ground in four areas. It articulates the structure and features of epistemic virtues. It provides in-depth analyses of 10 individual epistemic virtues .It examines the connections between epistemic virtue, knowledge, and understanding. It applies virtue epistemology, and explores its impact on related fields. The contributing authors are pioneers in the study of epistemic virtue. This volume is an outstanding resource for students and scholars in philosophy, as well as researchers in intersecting fields, including education, psychology, political science, and women’s studies. $c --From publisher's description The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology- Front Cover The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Contents Acknowledgments Introduction PART I: EPISTEMIC VIRTUES: GENERAL STRUCTURE AND FEATURES PART II: ANALYSES OF INDIVIDUAL EPISTEMIC VIRTUES PART III: EPISTEMIC VIRTUES, KNOWLEDGE, AND UNDERSTANDING PART IV: VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY: APPLICATION AND IMPACT REFERENCES PART I: EPISTEMIC VIRTUES: GENERAL STRUCTURE AND FEATURES Chapter 1: Telic Virtue Epistemology 1.1 A VIRTUE THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 1.2 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS 1.3 JUDGMENT AND AGENCY Chapter 2: Intellectual Virtues: Admirable Traits of Character 2.1 ADMIRABLE HUMAN TRAITS 2.2 THE COMPONENTS OF CHARACTER TRAITS 2.3 INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER TRAITS AND EPISTEMOLOGY Chapter 3: Do Epistemic Virtues Require a Motivation for Truth? 3.1 WHY DO EPISTEMIC VIRTUES REQUIRE A MOTIVATION FOR TRUTH? 3.2 EPISTEMIC AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 3.3 FOR THE SAKE OF TRUTH 3.4 KNOWLEDGE, VIRTUE, AND EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY 3.5 ANIMAL KNOWLEDGE 3.6 PERCEPTION 3.7 RESPONSIBILITY AND TRUTH-MOTIVATION: REFINING THE POSITION 3.8 ACTION, KNOWLEDGE, AND RESPONSIBILITY 3.9 SOSA ON KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH-MOTIVATION, AND EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY 3.10 SUMMARY Chapter 4: The Role of Emotion in Intellectual Virtue 4.1 GROUNDWORK 4.2 EMOTIONS AS MOTIVATORS 4.3 EMOTIONS AS ENABLING RELIABLE SUCCESS Chapter 5: Are Epistemic Virtues a Kind of Skill? 5.1 INTRODUCTION: TWO CONCEPTS OF SKILL—ABILITY AND TECHNÊ 5.2 VIRTUE RELIABILISM 5.3 VIRTUE RESPONSIBILISM 5.4 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER CONNECTIONS Chapter 6: What Makes the Epistemic Virtues Valuable? 6.1 THE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES 6.2 SOME DISTINCTIONS IN VALUE 6.3 WHAT MAKES THE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES VALUABLE? 6.4 CONCLUSION Chapter 7: Virtue Epistemology and the Sources of Epistemic Value 7.1 THE ETHICS OF BELIEF: WHICH ETHICS? 7.2 VIRTUE RELIABILISM AND RESPONSIBILISM 7.3 PLURALISM AS DISTINCT FROM MIXED VIRTUES THEORY 7.4 VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY DOES NOT PROVIDE A SUI GENERIS SOURCE OF EPISTEMIC VALUE 7.5 WHAT MIGHT UNIFY AN ARETAIC AXIOLOGY? 7.6 HALO EFFECTS AND THE RIGHT VERSUS THE GOOD Chapter 8: Virtue Epistemology, Virtue Ethics, and the Structure of Virtue 8.1 A CONSEQUENTIALIST ANALOGUE? 8.2 A SENTIMENTALIST ANALOGUE? 8.3 A RATIONALIST OR PERCEPTUAL ANALOGUE? 8.4 THE INTEGRATION OF FACULTY VIRTUES AND CHARACTER VIRTUES 8.5 CONCLUSION Chapter 9: Sentimentalist Virtue Epistemology: Beyond Responsibilism and Reliabilism 9.1 RESPONSIBILISM AND SENTIMENTALISM 9.2 RELIABILISM AND SENTIMENTALISM 9.3 SENTIMENTALISM AND CHINESE PHILOSOPHY Chapter 10: A Third Kind of Intellectual Virtue: Personalism 10.1 RELIABILISM 10.2 RESPONSIBILISM 10.3 PERSONALISM 10.4 OBJECTIONS AND PROJECTS Chapter 11: There Are No Epistemic Virtues 11.1 INTRODUCTION 11.2 A DIFFICULTY ABOUT VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 11.3 A UNIFIED APPROACH TO VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY? 11.4 THE DILEMMA RESTATED 11.5 CONCLUSION PART II: ANALYSES OF INDIVIDUAL EPISTEMIC VIRTUES Chapter 12: Open-Mindedness 12.1 RELIABILISM OR RESPONSIBILISM? 12.2 ANALYSIS OF OPEN-MINDEDNESS 12.3 SUCCESS! 12.4 THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH 12.5 PROSPECTS Chapter 13: Curiosity and Inquisitiveness 13.1 PRELIMINARIES 13.2 WHAT IS CURIOSITY? 13.3 WHAT IS INQUISITIVENESS? 13.4 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CURIOSITY AND INQUISITIVENESS 13.5 WHY DOES THE DISTINCTION MATTER? Chapter 14: Creativity as an Epistemic Virtue 14.1 CREATIVE ACTS AND PERSONS: A FIRST PASS 14.2 EPISTEMIC CREATIVITY, VIRTUE, AND KEY QUESTIONS 14.3 EPISTEMIC AIMS AND RELIABILITY 14.4 EPISTEMIC CREATIVITY AS A DISPOSITION 14.5 THE MOTIVATION OF CURIOSITY AND EPISTEMIC CREATIVITY 14.6 EXEMPLARY EPISTEMIC CREATIVITY v. RESPONSIBILISM 14.7 OBJECTIONS Chapter 15: Intellectual Humility 15.1 INTRODUCTION 15.2 UNDERESTIMATION OF STRENGTHS AND SEMANTIC CLUSTERS 15.3 TWO PROPER BELIEF ACCOUNTS 15.4 LOW CONCERN 15.5 LIMITATIONS-OWNING 15.6 CLUSTER OF ATTITUDES 15.7 CONFIDENCE MANAGEMENT 15.8 CONCLUSION Chapter 16: Epistemic Autonomy in a Social World of Knowing 16.1 INTRODUCTION 16.2 SELF-RELIANCE AND CRITICISMS OF EPISTEMIC AUTONOMY 16.3 THE NEED FOR A SOCIAL VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 16.4 RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: RESOURCES FROM FEMINIST MORAL THEORISTS 16.5 AUTONOMY VERSUS HETERONOMY: RESOURCES FROM KANT 16.6 AUTONOMY-RELATED VIRTUES IN SOCIAL CONTEXTS: THE CASE OF OPPRESSION 16.7 THE PROSPECTS FOR EPISTEMIC AUTONOMY IN A SOCIAL VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY Chapter 17: The Epistemic Virtue of Deference 17.1 INTRODUCTION 17.2 VIRTUE AND CONSEQUENCE: HUME, MILL, AND DRIVER 17.3 CONSEQUENTIALIST EPISTEMIC VIRTUE AND DEFERENCE 17.4 DEFERENCE AND THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COMPLIANCE 17.5 THE EPISTEMIC VIRTUE OF LENDING AN EAR 17.6 ON BLIND DEFERENCE 17.7 CONCLUSION Chapter 18: Skepticism 18.1 THE PYRRHONIAN DEFENSE 18.2 THE CARTESIAN DEFENSE 18.3 THE LIBERAL DEFENSE 18.4 THE VIRTUE OF SKEPTICISM 18.5 CONCLUSION Chapter 19: Epistemic Justice: Three Models of Virtue 19.1 INTRODUCTION 19.2 EPISTEMIC JUSTICE AS A TRAIT OF INDIVIDUAL KNOWERS 19.3 EPISTEMIC JUSTICE AS A TRAIT OF INSTITUTIONS OR STRUCTURED SOCIAL SPACES 19.4 CONCLUSION: A THIRD WAY FOR EPISTEMIC JUSTICE? Chapter 20: Epistemic Courage and the Harms of Epistemic Life 20.1 COURAGE: SOME KEY FEATURES 20.2 HARMS AND VULNERABILITY 20.3 ACTS OF COURAGE 20.4 COLLECTIVE EPISTEMIC COURAGE 20.5 PROFESSIONAL EPISTEMIC COURAGE Chapter 21: Intellectual Perseverance 21.1 EXEMPLARS 21.2 A DEFINITION OF THE VIRTUE 21.3 VIRTUES 21.4 IVP’S VICE COUNTERPARTS 21.5 MOTIVATION, BEHAVIOR, AND OBSTACLES 21.6 BELIEFS 21.7 EMOTIONS 21.8 REMAINING QUESTIONS PART III: EPISTEMIC VIRTUES, KNOWLEDGE, AND UNDERSTANDING Chapter 22: Virtue, Knowledge, and Achievement 22.1 SOME ADVANTAGES OF THE ACHIEVEMENT VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE 22.2 SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE ACHIEVEMENT VIEW 22.3 KNOWLEDGE TRANSMISSION AND JOINT AGENCY Chapter 23: Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck 23.1 THE GETTIER PROBLEM: KNOWLEDGE, LUCK, AND VIRTUE 23.2 VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE GETTIER PROBLEM 23.3 TWO DILEMMAS FOR ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 23.4 ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC LUCK 23.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS Chapter 24: Virtue Epistemology and Explanatory Salience 24.1 VIRTUES AND KNOWLEDGE 24.2 A DILEMMA FOR ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 24.3 SALIENCE AND VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 24.4 AGAINST GRECO’S COVARIANCE CLAIM 24.5 ENVIRONMENTS AND ABILITIES 24.6 CONCLUSION Chapter 25: Virtue Epistemology and Abilism on Knowledge Chapter 26: Virtue Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge: Classical and New Problems 26.1 VIRTUE RELIABILISM AND THE CLASSICAL VALUE PROBLEMS 26.2 SOSA’S VIRTUE RELIABILISM AND THE NEW VALUE PROBLEM 26.3 CONCLUSION Chapter 27: Epistemic Virtues in Understanding 27.1 EPISTEMIC VIRTUE 27.2 UNDERSTANDING 27.3 NORMATIVITY 27.4 VIRTUE REDUX Chapter 28: Understanding as an Intellectual Virtue 28.1 UNDERSTANDING THE NATURAL WORLD 28.2 INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER AND UNDERSTANDING 28.3 UNDERSTANDING PEOPLE 28.4 JUDGMENTALISM AND UNDERSTANDING 28.5 CONSTITUTIVE OR AUXILIARY? 28.6 UNDERSTANDING AND PERSPECTIVE-TAKING Chapter 29: Intellectual Virtue, Knowledge, and Justification 29.1 THE DOMAIN OF THE EPISTEMIC 29.2 KNOWLEDGE-BASED INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE 29.3 INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE, SKEPTICISM, AND RELIABILITY 29.4 JUSTIFICATION-BASED VIRTUE 29.5 CROSS-CATEGORIAL VIRTUES 29.6 VIRTUES OF PURSUIT, RESPONSIVENESS, AND PRODUCTION 29.7 CONCLUSION Chapter 30: Understanding, Humility, and the Vices of Pride 30.1 INTRODUCTION 30.2 THE “VALUE” OF SELF-IMPORTANCE 30.3 UNDERSTANDING AS WE UNDERSTAND IT 30.4 PRACTICAL UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIVE OF THE LOVE OF KNOWLEDGE 30.5 UNDERSTANDINGS OF SELF AND OTHER IN THE VICES OF PRIDE 30.6 THE PRIDES OF DISTORTED AGENCY 30.7 VIRTUE INDIVIDUATION AND INTERCONNECTION 30.8 CONCLUSION PART IV: VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY: APPLICATION AND IMPACT Chapter 31: Feminist Virtue Epistemology 31.1 INTRODUCTION 31.2 A LIBERATORY APPROACH TO VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 31.3 EPISTEMIC VIRTUES REINTERPRETED 31.4 EPISTEMIC INJUSTICES AND WILLFUL IGNORANCE 31.5 HOW ARE LIBERATORY VIRTUES DIFFERENT FROM CONVENTIONAL VIRTUES? 31.6 CONCLUSION Chapter 32: Virtue Epistemology and the Environment 32.1 INTRODUCTION 32.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE 32.3 IMPACTS OF GREEN SPACES AND ENVIRONMENTS ON INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE 32.4 ARROGANCE, HUMILITY, AND CURIOSITY: ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURAL WORLD 32.5 EPISTEMIC VIRTUES AND SITUATED KNOWING VIA TESTIMONY 32.6 EPISTEMIC VIRTUES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GROUP DELIBERATION Chapter 33: Virtue Epistemology and Collective Epistemology 33.1 COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND COLLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 33.2 CENTRAL QUESTIONS IN COLLECTIVE VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 33.3 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 33.4 SUMMATIVISM AND NON-SUMMATIVISM 33.5 COLLECTIVE ASCRIPTIONS OF FACULTY VIRTUES 33.6 COLLECTIVE ASCRIPTION OF CHARACTER VIRTUES 33.7 APPLIED COLLECTIVE VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 33.8 FUTURE RESEARCH Chapter 34: Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition 34.1 INTRODUCTION: VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EXTENDED COGNITION 34.2 VIRTUE RELIABILISM AND EXTENDED COGNITION 34.3 VIRTUE RESPONSIBILISM AND EXTENDED COGNITION 34.4 NEW PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS Chapter 35: Psychological Science and Virtue Epistemology: Intelligence as an Interactionist Virtue 35.1 INTRODUCTION 35.2 THE MISGUIDED PERSON-SITUATION DEBATE 35.3 INTELLIGENCE AND ITS MEASUREMENT 35.4 INTELLIGENCE FOR VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGISTS 35.5 CONCLUSION Chapter 36: Dual-Process Theory and Intellectual Virtue: A Role for Self-Confidence 36.1 INTRODUCTION 36.2 HEURISTICS AND THEIR MISAPPLICATION 36.3 COGNITIVE BIASES 36.4 INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY, SELF-VIGILANCE AND GREGARIOUSNESS 36.5 GUT FEELINGS 36.6 LINDA THE BANK TELLER REVISITED 36.7 INTELLECTUAL CONFIDENCE AND OPTIMISM 36.8 CONCLUSION Chapter 37: Virtue Epistemology and Confucian Philosophy 37.1 INTRODUCTION 37.2 VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 37.4 CONFUCIUS AND VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY Chapter 38: Virtue Epistemology and Education 38.1 INTRODUCTION 38.2 INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE 38.3 JUSTIFYING EDUCATION IN INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES 38.4 EPISTEMIC MOTIVATION 38.5 PEDAGOGY, THE CURRICULUM, AND EVALUATION 38.6 CONCLUSION Chapter 39: Virtue Epistemology and Developing Intellectual Virtue 39.1 PRELIMINARIES 39.2 EXTENDING LOCAL TRAITS TO GLOBAL VIRTUES 39.3 VIRTUE DEVELOPMENT AS SKILLS DEVELOPMENT 39.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF “FOLK” VIRTUES Chapter 40: Virtue Epistemology and Clinical Medical Judgment 40.1 INTRODUCTION 40.2 MEDICINE AS ART AND SCIENCE 40.3 VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY IN MEDICINE 40.4 CLINICAL JUDGMENT AS AN INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE IN MEDICINE 40.5 IS CLINICAL JUDGMENT MORAL OR TECHNICAL? 40.6 CONCLUSION Chapter 41: The Relation Between Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology 41.1 INTRODUCTION 41.2 VIRTUE ETHICS, VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE “MORAL” 41.3 MORALITY “IN THE SPECIAL SENSE” 41.4 MORALITY IN THE BROAD SENSE AND VIRTUE ETHICS 41.5 VIRTUE ETHICS AND VIRTUE PROPER 41.6 INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE AND VIRTUE ETHICS 41.7 CONCLUSION Contributors Index What is an epistemic virtue? Are epistemic virtues reliable? Are they motivated by a love of truth? Do epistemic virtues produce knowledge and understanding? How can we develop epistemic virtues? The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology answers all of these questions. This landmark volume provides a pluralistic and comprehensive picture of the field of virtue epistemology. It is the first large-scale volume of its kind on the topic. Composed of 41 chapters, all published here for the first time, it breaks new ground in four areas. It articulates the structure and features of epistemic virtues. It provides in-depth analyses of 10 individual epistemic virtues. It examines the connections between epistemic virtue, knowledge, and understanding. It applies virtue epistemology, and explores its impact on related fields. The contributing authors are pioneers in the study of epistemic virtue. This volume is an outstanding resource for students and scholars in philosophy, as well as researchers in intersecting fields, including education, psychology, political science, and women’s studies.-- Provided by publisher