The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy)

This Handbook offers students and more advanced readers a valuable resource for understanding linguistic reference; the relation between an expression (word, phrase, sentence) and what that expression is about. The volume’s forty-one original chapters, written by many of today’s leading philosophers of language, are organized into ten parts: I Early Descriptive Theories II Causal Theories of Reference III Causal Theories and Cognitive Significance IV Alternate Theories V Two-Dimensional Semantics VI Natural Kind Terms and Rigidity VII The Empty Case VIII Singular ( De Re ) Thoughts IX Indexicals X Epistemology of Reference Contributions consider what kinds of expressions actually refer (names, general terms, indexicals, empty terms, sentences), what referring expressions refer to, what makes an expression refer to whatever it does, connections between meaning and reference, and how we know facts about reference. Many contributions also develop connections between linguistic reference and issues in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. Cover Half Title Series Information Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents Notes on Contributors Introduction Early Descriptive Theories Causal Theories of Reference Causal Theories and Cognitive Significance Alternate Theories Two-Dimensional Semantics Natural Kind Terms and Rigidity The Empty Case Singular (De Re) Thoughts Indexicals Epistemology of Reference References Part I Early Descriptive Theories 1 The Concept of Linguistic Reference before Frege Ancient Greek Philosophy Medieval Philosophy Renaissance Philosophy 17th- and 18th-century Philosophy 19th-century Philosophy References 2 Frege on Reference 1 Introduction 2 Reference to Numbers 3 Sense 4 Reference and Meaningfulness 5 Reference and Definition 6 Concluding Remark Acknowledgments Notes References 3 Fregean Descriptivism 1 Introduction 2 Descriptivism in Kripke’s Frege 3 Frege and Name Descriptivism 4 Frege and Sense Descriptivism 5 Frege and Reference-Fixing Descriptivism 6 Conclusion Acknowledgements Notes References 4 the Referential–Attributive Distinction 1 Introduction 2 Classic Treatments of the Referential-Attributive Distinction 3 Epistemic Access and the Referential-attributive Contrast 4 Signaling Referential Versus Attributive Uses 5 Contemporary Linguistic Treatments of the Referential-attributive Distinction 6 Experimental Work on Cases of Misdescription 7 Conclusions Notes References Part II Causal Theories of Reference 5 The Case(s) against Descriptivism Further Reading Note References 6 Fruits of the Causal Theory of Reference The Anti-descriptivist Treatment of Names in Naming and Necessity Strong Descriptivism About Names Weak Descriptivism About Names Against Strong Descriptivism Against Weak Descriptivism The Historical Chain Model of Reference-fixing and Transmission The Architecture of Causal Descriptivism About Names Natural Kind Terms Saving Important Insights of Causal Descriptivism Further Reading Notes References 7 The Problem of Reference Change Reference Change and Reference Preservation Kripke and His Opponents Evans Back to Kripke Note References Part III Causal Theories and Cognitive Significance 8 Cognitive Significance 1 Frege’s Challenge 2 Sense and ‘the New Theory’ of Reference 3 Clarifying the Challenge(s) 3.1 Simple Sentences 3.2 Attitude Ascriptions 4 A Taxonomy of Approaches 4.1 Pragmatic Departures 4.2 Propositional Departures 4.3 Cognitive Departures 4.4 Semantic Departures 5 Interactions Acknowledgments Further Reading Notes References 9 Conversational Implicature in Belief Reports A Question About Two Interpretations of Belief Reports Two Examples Why Aren’t Belief Reports Ambiguous? The Principle of Implicated Normalcy Normalcy and Belief Recap Acknowledgment Further Reading Notes References 10 Context Sensitivity and ‘Believes’ 1 2 3 4 5 6 Notes References 11 A Return to Simple Sentences Note References 12 Eliciting and Conveying Information The Importance of Simple Sentences Braun and Saul’s Mistaken Evaluation Mental Files and Information Webs Accessing Files Enlightened and Unenlightened Subjects When Substitutions Are Permitted Further Reading Notes References Part IV Alternate Theories 13 Causal Descriptivism Non-classical Descriptivism Causal Descriptivism Two-dimensional Causal Descriptivism Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes References 14 Reference-Fixing and Presuppositions 1 Introduction: reference-fixing, Semantics, and Metasemantics 2 Semantic Content: character and Locution 3 Force-indicators: semantics and Metasemantics 4 Semantic Reference in an Austinian Framework Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes References 15 Names as Predicates 1 Introduction 2 The Predicate View (predicativism) 3 Singular Reference and Rigid Designation 4 The Sloat Chart 5 Extended Uses of Names Further Reading Notes References 16 Variabilism 1 Introduction 2 Millianism 3 Empirical Challenges 4 Variabilism 5 Addressing the Empirical Challenges 6 Concluding Remarks Notes References Part V Two-dimensional Semantics 17 Two-dimensional Semantics 1 The Informational Background 2 Rigidification 3 De Se or Centred Information 4 A Helpful Thought Experiment 5 Natural Kind Terms 6 Names 7 Learning from the De Se Acknowledgements Further Reading Notes References 18 Two-Dimensional Semantics and Identity Statements 1 Introduction 2 Names, Millianism, and Descriptivism 3 Identity Statements 4 Rigidification and a World Considered as Actual Considering a Word as Actual 5 Two Kinds of Intensions 6 Jackson’s Two-dimensionalism 7 Chalmers’s Two-dimensionalism 8 the Semantic Argument and Recipe 9 Semantics and Metasemantics Further Reading Notes References 19 Two-Dimensionalism and the Foundation of Linguistic Analysis 1 The Classical Foundation for Linguistic Analysis 2 The Externalist Challenge to Linguistic Analysis 3 A Two-dimensional Foundation for Linguistic Analysis? 4 A Problem for the Two-dimensional Foundation Further Reading Notes References 20 A Puzzle about Assertion I Introduction: two-dimensionalism II Internalist and Externalist Versions of Two-dimensionalism III Stalnaker’s Pragmatic Theory of Assertion IV The Problem V a Diagnosis VI Concluding Remarks: actual vs. Presupposed Externalism Acknowledgments Notes References Part VI Natural Kind Terms and Rigidity 21 Rigidity of General Terms The Notion of Rigidity Extending Rigidity Beyond Singular Terms: Three Desiderata The Essentialist Characterization of Rigidity for Kind Terms Rigid Application Essentialist Rigidity and the Necessity of Theoretical Identifications Other Issues The Denotationalist Characterization of Rigidity for General Terms Rigidity as Sameness of Designation in Every Possible World The Problem of Trivialization Overgeneralization and the Necessity of Theoretical Identifications Flying Rigidity Acknowledgments Notes References 22 The Psychology of Natural Kind Terms Categories as Natural Kinds How Natural Kinds Get Their Status in Psychology and Language Where Do Natural Kind Representations Come From? Why Do People Come to Represent Any Particular Category as a Natural Kind? How the Language of Natural Kinds Shapes Cognition, Development, and Behavior Other Interpretations of Generics Concluding Thoughts Acknowledgments References 23 Pervasive Externalism 1 Introduction 2 The Semantics of Natural Kind Terms 3 Why There Are Natural Kind Terms 4 Pervasive Externalism 5 The Limits of Pervasive Externalism 6 Putnam and Pervasive Externalism 7 Conclusion Appendix Notes References 24 Theoretical Identities as Necessary and a priori Discovering Essence A posteriori Direct Reference Apriority and Aposteriority after Direct Reference Descriptivism Paring Open Texture by Stipulation Other Kinds of Kinds and Other Versions of Apriority Case by Case and Qualified Apriority that is Still Substantive Acknowledgment Further Reading Notes References 25 The Need for Descriptivism 1 Introduction 2 Which are the Natural Kind Terms? 3 the Untenability of Essentialism 4 Evidence from Ordinary Usage 5 Conclusion Notes References 26 The Accommodation Theory of Reference Realism and Theories of Reference Reference and Natural Kinds are Two Aspects of a Single Phenomenon Ground Squirrels The Human Case: first Approximation Partial Denotation, and Other Complications One More Factor: property Clusters Social Construction, Realism, and ‘mind-independence’ Some Consequences Reference Is Neither ‘pure Causal’ nor ‘causal-descriptive’ Definitions, in the Accommodationist Sense, Are Not Representational Entities Published Definitions Are Usually Hypotheses About Accommodationist Definitions Definitions Don’t ‘fix Reference’ Reference as a Dialectical Process: reference Is Often Not ‘fixed’ Rethinking Truth: for More Correspondence Not Less Accommodation Without Approximate Theoretical Truth Theoretical Approximation Without Determinate Reference Scientific Progress Without Approximate Truth Referential Relations and Truth as Special Cases of Accommodation Accommodation and Our Animal Friends Approximation and the Growth of Knowledge Further Reading Note References 27 Science, the Vernacular and the ‘Qua’ Problem Introduction: referential Continuity Two Problems of Many Kinds Classificatory Pluralism Science and the Vernacular Conclusion Notes References Part VII The Empty Case 28 Mill and the Missing Referents Millianism Problems That Empty Names Raise for Millianism Are There Any Empty Names? Yes, There Are Some Empty Names A Millian Theory of Empty Names Objections to Millianism with Gappy Propositions, and Replies Further Reading Notes References 29 Fregean Theories of Names from Fiction 1 Introduction 2 Stipulation 2.1 The View 2.2 Fictive and Transfictive Sentences 2.3 Identities and Predications 3 Reference to Sense 3.1 The View 3.2 Fictive and Transfictive Sentences 3.3 Identities 4 Sense Without Reference 4.1 The View 4.2 Fictive and Transfictive Sentences 4.3 More Transfictive Sentences 4.4 Alternatives 5 Kripke’s Objections 5.1 Background 5.2 Kripke’s First Objection 5.3 Kripke’s Second Objection Acknowledgments Notes References Part VIII Singular (De Re) Thoughts 30 Reference and Singular Thought 1 Reference and Singular Propositions: The Russellian Legacy 2 Modes of Presentation and Cognitive Content: The Fregean Legacy 3 Modes of Presentation as Descriptions 4 Mental Files 5 Are Modes of Presentation Aspects of Content? Further Reading Notes Bibliography 31 Singular Thoughts, Sentences and Propositions of That Which Does Not Exist I Introduction II Fregeanism and Russellianism III the Metaphysics of Existence and Nonexistence IV Acquaintance V Empty and Nonempty Singularity are Semantically/Psychologically the Same VI the Metaphysics of Singular Propositions (Again) Acknowledgments Notes References 32 Names and Singular Thought 1 Names, Singular Thought and Name-based Singular Thought 2 The Name-based Singular Thought Thesis 3 Assumptions Behind NBT 4 Pure Testimony Cases and the Function of Names 5 Referential Communication, Significant Objects and the Learning of Names 6 Name-based Referential Communication and Singular Thought 7 Singular Linguistic Content and Singular Thought: Denying Content accessibility Notes References Part IX Indexicals 33 How Demonstratives and Indexicals Really Work I Speaker Meaning II Speaker Reference III Non-primary Speaker Reference IV The Semantics of Indexicals and Demonstratives V An Alternative Conception of the Semantics of Indexicals and Demonstratives VI Dropping the Russellian Assumption Notes References 34 Demonstrative Reference to the Unreal: The Case of Hallucinations 1 Macbeth’s Dagger 2 Terms and Terminology (i) Demonstrative Reference (ii) The Unreal (iii) Hallucinations 3 Hypnagogia 4 An Obvious Question and an Equally Obvious (if Problematic) Response 5 Numbers, Fictional Characters, and Auditory Hallucinations (i) Numbers and Fictional Characters (ii) Auditory Hypnagogia 6 A Couple of Semantically Irrelevant Distinctions (i) Conversation vs. Soliloquy (ii) Ignorance vs. Knowledge 7 A Provisional Picture Extended 8 Situation Within a General Theory of Demonstrative Reference 9 Related Philosophical Problems (i) The Qua-problem (ii) Negative Existentials (iii) The Argument from Hallucination 10 The Theoretical Importance of Paradigmatically Non-paradigmatic Cases Notes References 35 What is Special about De Se Attitudes? 1 Introduction 2 Indexical Attitudes, De Se Attitudes, and the Traditional Theory 3 The Cognitive Role of De Se Beliefs 3.1 Three Arguments from De Se Attitudes Against the Traditional Theory 3.2 De Se Attitudes and Frege’s Puzzle 4 De Se Attitudes and Action Explanation 5 Are De Se Beliefs Epistemically Special? 5.1 Do Some De Se Judgments Exhibit Iem? 5.2 Assuming That Some De Se Judgments Exhibit Iem, is this Indicative of a Special Feature of De Se Judgments? 6 Conclusion Further Reading Notes References 36 De Se Attitudes and Action 1 Introduction 2 Essentiality 3 The Doctrine of Propositions 4 The Specification Problem 5 Expanding the Doctrine of Propositions 6 The Problem 7 Is the Problem Specific to the De Se? 8 Truth and Motivation 9 Conclusion Acknowledgments Further Reading Notes References 37 Acting Without Me: Corporate Agency and the First Person Perspective 1 Introducing Corporate Agency 2 There is no De Se Requirement on Corporate Action 2.1 Corporate Agency and the De Se 3 Corporations Can Act 3.1 Objection: corporations Only Act Because They Consist of People with De Se States First Reply Second Reply 4 An Objection Notes References 38 Semantic Monsters 1 Kaplan on Monsters 2 Different Notions of Monsters 3 Indexical Shift 4 Monsters and Content Compositionality 5 Meaning-shifting Operators 6 Where Monsters Dwell Acknowledgments Further Reading Notes References Part X Epistemology of Reference 39 Cross-cultural Semantics at 15 1 Experimental Results 1.1 Descriptivism vs. Causal-historical Approach 1.2 Machery Et al. (2004) 1.3 Replicating and Extending Machery Et al.’s (2004) Results: The Gödel Case 1.4 Replicating and Extending Machery Et al.’s (2004) Results: The Jonah Case 2 Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference 2.1 Criticism of Machery Et al. (2004) 2.2 Theoretical Responses 2.3 Empirical Responses 3 How to Test Theories of Reference? 3.1 Martí’s Criticism 3.2 Truth-value Judgments 3.3 Testing Use Directly 4 Philosophical Implication: Assessing Theories of Reference Conclusion Notes References 40 Reference and Intuitions Introduction 1 Meta-externalism and Meta-internalism 2 Meta-externalism and Intuitions 2.1 Platonism 2.2 Reference as a Natural Phenomenon 2.3 Inscrutability 3 Meta-internalism and Intuitions 3.1 Different Kinds of “intuitions” 3.1.1 Intuitions and Intuition Reports 3.1.2 First- and Second-level Intuitions 3.2 First-level Intuitions and Meta-internalism References 41 The Myth of Quick and Easy intuitions 1 The Epistemology of Reference: Data and Theories 2 An Intuition-based Theory 3 Experimental Philosophy 4 Centrality and “the Myth of the Intuitive” 5 The Myth of Quick and Easy Intuitions Acknowledgments Further Reading Notes References Index "This Handbook offers students and more advanced readers a valuable resource for understanding linguistic reference; the relation between an expression (word, phrase, sentence) and what that expression is about. The volume's forty-one original chapters, written by many of today's leading philosophers of language, are organized into ten parts: Early Descriptive Theories, Causal Theories of Reference, Causal Theories and Cognitive Significance, Alternate Theories, Two-Dimensional Semantics, Natural Kind Terms and Rigidity, The Empty Case, Singular (De Re) Thoughts, Indexicals, [and] Epistemology of Reference. Contributions consider what kinds of expressions actually refer (names, general terms, indexicals, empty terms, sentences), what referring expressions refer to, what makes an expression refer to whatever it does, connections between meaning and reference, and how we know facts about reference. Many contributions also develop connections between linguistic reference and issues in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science"--Provided by publisher