The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science (Routledge Philosophy Companions)

This indispensable reference source and guide to the major themes, debates, problems and topics in philosophy of science contains fifty-five specially commissioned entries by a leading team of international contributors. Organized into four parts it covers: * historical and philosophical context * debates * concepts * the individual sciences. The __Companion__ covers everything students of philosophy of science need to know - from empiricism, explanation and experiment to causation, observation, prediction and more - and contains many helpful features including: a section on the individual sciences, including chapters on the philosophy of biology, chemistry, physics and psychology, further reading and cross-referencing at the end of each chapter. Cover......Page 1 Title page......Page 5 Contents......Page 7 Illustrations......Page 11 Contributors......Page 13 Introduction......Page 21 Part I: Historical and philosophical context......Page 31 1 The epistemology of science after Quine......Page 33 Empiricism, epistemology, and science in “Two Dogmas”......Page 34 Science without foundations......Page 36 Science fully naturalized......Page 38 Naturalism and normativity/politics and epistemology......Page 41 Further reading......Page 44 2 The history of philosophy and the philosophy of science......Page 45 The end of history......Page 47 History recalled......Page 51 Further reading......Page 55 Introduction......Page 56 Early attempts at demarcation......Page 57 Rethinking the divide......Page 59 Contemporary responses: getting our priorities right......Page 61 The Canberra plan......Page 62 A posteriorism......Page 63 Non-alignment......Page 64 Further reading......Page 65 4 Philosophy of language......Page 66 Proper names: the description view......Page 67 The new theory of reference......Page 68 Putnam's “Twin Earth” examples......Page 69 The two-dimensionalist backlash......Page 71 Holism and incommensurability......Page 73 References......Page 75 Further reading......Page 76 Introduction......Page 77 The standard logic......Page 78 Methodological concepts......Page 79 Logics for methodological concepts......Page 80 Formal problem-solving processes......Page 84 Content-guided reasoning......Page 85 References......Page 86 Further reading......Page 87 What is critical rationalism?......Page 88 Critical rationalism and science......Page 89 Some criticisms of critical rationalism......Page 92 Critical rationalism and its limits......Page 94 Further reading......Page 96 Thomas Kuhn......Page 97 Imre Lakatos......Page 101 Paul Feyerabend......Page 104 Recent developments......Page 106 Further reading......Page 107 The analytic and the synthetic......Page 108 What kind of empiricism?......Page 109 The analytic-synthetic distinction and theoretical language......Page 111 The nature of the empirical basis......Page 112 The reference of theoretical terms......Page 113 The unity of science......Page 115 Conclusion......Page 117 References......Page 118 Further reading......Page 119 Pragmatism......Page 121 Pragmatism and induction......Page 122 Scientific realism......Page 124 Explanation......Page 126 Conclusion......Page 127 Further reading......Page 128 Part II: Debates......Page 131 The rules of epistemic probability......Page 133 “Logical omniscience”......Page 134 Bayesian confirmation theory......Page 135 The old-evidence problem......Page 136 Conditionalization......Page 137 The principle of indifference......Page 138 Objective Bayesianism......Page 140 Subjective Bayesianism......Page 141 Convergence of opinion......Page 142 References......Page 143 Further reading......Page 144 Concepts of confirmation......Page 145 Qualitative confirmation......Page 146 Instance confirmation and the ravens paradox......Page 147 Probability theory and probabilistic measures of support......Page 148 Logical probability: Carnap's program......Page 154 Acknowledgements......Page 157 Further reading......Page 158 12 Empiricism......Page 159 Observation......Page 160 Acceptance......Page 164 Contrastive empiricism......Page 165 Whither the super-empirical virtues?......Page 166 Concluding comments......Page 167 Further reading......Page 168 Natural kinds and real essences......Page 169 Essentialist metaphysics......Page 172 Laws of nature......Page 173 Counterfactuals......Page 174 Meinongianism......Page 177 Further reading......Page 178 Justifying ethical norms in science......Page 179 The universality of ethical norms in science......Page 180 The normative ethics of science......Page 182 Openness......Page 183 Respect for colleagues......Page 184 Stewardship of research resources......Page 185 Humane treatment of animal subjects......Page 186 Comments about science's ethical norms......Page 187 Further reading......Page 188 The early history and philosophy of experiment......Page 189 The place of experiment in twentieth-century philosophy of science......Page 191 Towards an epistemology of experiment......Page 193 The exploratory role of experiment and its relationship to theory......Page 195 Concluding remarks: the autonomy of experimental practice......Page 198 Further reading......Page 199 The D-N model......Page 201 Motivation for the D-N/I-S model......Page 202 Counterexamples to the D-N/I-S model......Page 203 The CM model......Page 204 Unificationist models......Page 205 Open issues and future work......Page 206 Explanation, the D-N model, and other areas of philosophy......Page 209 Further reading......Page 211 17 The feminist approach to the philosophy of science......Page 212 Dismissal......Page 213 The feminist approach as a philosophy of science......Page 214 Assessing the feminist challenge to traditional philosophy of science......Page 215 Sandra Harding on women and science: the epistemic challenge......Page 216 Helen Longino on women and science: the methodological challenge......Page 218 The feminist approach and liberal ideals for inquiry......Page 220 References......Page 221 Further reading......Page 222 Introduction......Page 223 Articulating the slogan......Page 226 Identification, matching, and guiding......Page 227 Explanationism and Bayesianism......Page 230 The justificatory project......Page 231 Further reading......Page 232 Introduction......Page 233 What laws do......Page 234 What laws are......Page 238 References......Page 241 Further reading......Page 242 Naturalism as a methodological stance......Page 243 Naturalism in the philosophy of science......Page 245 Naturalism and evolutionary theory......Page 246 Naturalism and cognitive science......Page 247 Naturalism and normativity......Page 248 Naturalism and model choice......Page 249 Naturalism and pragmatism......Page 250 Naturalism and realism......Page 251 Naturalism and secularism......Page 252 Further reading......Page 253 What are the realism issues?......Page 254 Common-sense realism......Page 256 Arguments for scientific realism......Page 257 The underdetermination argument......Page 259 The pessimistic meta-induction......Page 262 Conclusions......Page 263 Further reading......Page 264 22 Relativism about science......Page 266 Sociology of science......Page 267 Feminist epistemology and relativist interpretations of science......Page 268 Postmodernist relativism and science......Page 269 Underdetermination and its consequences......Page 270 Incommensurability and relativism......Page 272 Conclusion......Page 275 Further reading......Page 276 23 Scientific method......Page 278 Naive inductivism......Page 279 The hypothetico-deductive method......Page 281 Popper's falsificationist theory of method......Page 282 From paradigms to pluralism......Page 284 The justification of method......Page 286 References......Page 287 Further reading......Page 288 Francis Bacon on knowledge, power, and method......Page 289 Marx on science and production......Page 290 Merton's ethos of science......Page 291 The social construction of scientific knowledge......Page 293 Some salvos in the science wars......Page 297 Further reading......Page 298 The “syntactic” view......Page 299 The “semantic” approach......Page 302 Partial structures......Page 304 Truth and meta-representation......Page 306 Further reading......Page 309 Introduction......Page 311 Theory-change and scientific rationality......Page 312 Theory-change and scientific realism......Page 317 References......Page 320 Further reading......Page 321 What does it mean to say that one thing is underdetermined by another?......Page 322 Why is underdetermination philosophically interesting?......Page 323 What reason(s) do we have to believe underdetermination claims?......Page 324 What can one say in response to underdetermination claims?......Page 326 References......Page 330 Further reading......Page 331 Social and epistemic values......Page 332 Justifying the value-ladenness thesis......Page 335 Postmodernism: it's politics all the way down......Page 337 Normative naturalism and externalist reliabilism......Page 338 Objectivity, rationality, relativism, and critique......Page 339 Further reading......Page 343 Part III: Concepts......Page 345 Introduction......Page 347 Challenges......Page 348 Regularity theories of causation......Page 349 Probabilistic theories of causation......Page 350 Counterfactual theories of causation......Page 352 Manipulability theories of causation......Page 353 Process theories of causation......Page 354 References......Page 355 Further reading......Page 356 30 Determinism......Page 357 Clarifying determinism......Page 358 Determinism and quantum theory......Page 361 Determinism and statistical mechanics......Page 364 Conclusion......Page 365 Further reading......Page 366 Four concepts of evidence......Page 367 Objective Bayesian definition......Page 369 The error-statistical view......Page 370 Satisfaction definitions......Page 371 The weakness assumption......Page 372 Rejection of these assumptions......Page 374 Final definitions......Page 375 References......Page 377 Further reading......Page 378 Reductive non-teleological function......Page 379 Ersatz teleological function......Page 380 Contribution to fitness......Page 382 Causal role function......Page 383 Non-reductive teleological function......Page 385 References......Page 386 Further reading......Page 387 Introduction......Page 388 Mathematical idealization......Page 389 Idealization and representation: models and theories......Page 390 Idealization and scientific realism......Page 394 References......Page 395 Further reading......Page 396 Epistemic questions......Page 397 Quantification......Page 400 The improvement of precision......Page 401 Some problems of measurement in the social sciences......Page 402 Further reading......Page 405 Introduction......Page 406 Mechanisms are productive of phenomena or behaviors......Page 407 Mechanisms are hierarchical......Page 408 Discovering, representing, and explaining mechanisms......Page 409 Mechanisms and causation......Page 411 The scope of the mechanical paradigm......Page 412 Further reading......Page 414 Introduction......Page 415 The background to philosophical views about scientific models......Page 416 Current debate on the nature and function of scientific models......Page 418 Conclusion......Page 423 References......Page 424 Further reading......Page 425 37 Observation......Page 426 Kuhn's view......Page 427 Fodor's view......Page 428 Van Fraassen's view......Page 430 Critique of Fodor's and van Fraassen's views......Page 431 Further reading......Page 434 Deductive and probabilistic prediction......Page 435 Prediction and confirmation......Page 436 Beam balance example......Page 437 Prediction versus accomodation......Page 438 Other kinds of prediction that emerge from the overdetermination of parameters......Page 440 Prediction and approximate truth......Page 441 Further reading......Page 442 Historical sketch......Page 444 The classical interpretation......Page 447 The frequency interpretation......Page 448 The propensity interpretation......Page 449 The logical interpretation......Page 450 The subjective interpretation......Page 452 References......Page 453 Further reading......Page 454 Introduction......Page 455 Substantive issues......Page 456 Hierarchy and compositionality......Page 457 Multiple realizability......Page 459 The unity and disunity of science......Page 460 Trouble in the details......Page 461 Research strategy......Page 463 Further reading......Page 464 Representation in science: linguistic and otherwise......Page 465 The ubiquitous inexactitude of human representation......Page 466 Evaluation of inexact representations......Page 467 An approach to evaluating truth-evaluable representations......Page 468 Representation in science......Page 470 Further reading......Page 471 Historical overview......Page 472 Some reasons for pessimism......Page 473 Some reasons for optimism......Page 475 Conclusion: goodbye to the global, two-context distinction......Page 479 References......Page 480 Further reading......Page 481 Introduction......Page 482 Space and time in classical mechanics......Page 483 Substantivalism, relationalism, and Mach's principle......Page 485 Special relativity......Page 487 Special relativity and the philosophy of time......Page 491 General relativity......Page 492 The hole argument......Page 494 References......Page 496 Further reading......Page 497 The basics......Page 498 Symmetry and scientific theories......Page 501 Spontaneous symmetry-breaking: between symmetry and asymmetry......Page 502 Interpretive issues: between mathematics and physics......Page 504 References......Page 506 Further reading......Page 507 45 Truthlikeness......Page 508 The content approach......Page 509 The likeness approach......Page 511 Hybrid approaches......Page 513 Frame dependence......Page 514 Truthlikeness and value theory......Page 516 References......Page 517 Further reading......Page 518 Introduction......Page 519 What is unification?......Page 520 Unification and explanation......Page 523 References......Page 526 Further reading......Page 527 A little history......Page 528 Kuhn and the multiplicity of theory virtues......Page 530 Empirical fit and explanatory power......Page 531 Internal virtues......Page 532 Contextual virtues......Page 533 Diachronic virtues......Page 534 The diachronic dividend......Page 536 References......Page 537 Further reading......Page 538 Part IV: Individual sciences......Page 539 Darwin refutes Kant......Page 541 Biological laws......Page 542 Functional attributions and explanations......Page 543 Reduction of functional to molecular biology......Page 545 Biology and the human sciences......Page 546 Biology, ethics, and meta-ethics......Page 547 References......Page 548 Further reading......Page 549 Chemical kinds......Page 550 Microstructuralism......Page 551 Intertheoretic reduction......Page 555 Ontological reducibility......Page 557 Further reading......Page 560 Theories and explanations: mechanisms......Page 561 Disciplinary interrelations......Page 565 General philosophical implications......Page 569 References......Page 571 Further reading......Page 572 Economists about economics......Page 573 Testability and progress: Popper and Lakatos......Page 574 Models and their assumptions......Page 576 Rhetorical persuasion and truth......Page 579 Economics as a resource for the philosophy of science......Page 580 Explanatory expansionism and interdisciplinary relations......Page 581 References......Page 583 Further reading......Page 584 Introduction......Page 585 Frege's Constraint......Page 586 Abstractionism......Page 588 Structuralism......Page 591 Applied mathematics and set theory......Page 594 References......Page 595 Further reading......Page 596 Orthodoxy......Page 597 Pilot-wave theory......Page 602 State-reduction theories......Page 604 The Everett interpretation......Page 606 Whither quantum mechanics?......Page 608 Further reading......Page 609 Computationalism......Page 611 Virtues......Page 612 Productivity and systematicity......Page 613 Objections......Page 614 Virtues......Page 615 Hybrid views and radical alternatives......Page 616 Fodorian modularity......Page 617 Massive modularity......Page 618 Nativism......Page 619 Arguments......Page 620 What is innateness?......Page 621 References......Page 622 Further reading......Page 623 Models and reality......Page 624 Mechanisms and individuals......Page 627 Evolution and function......Page 629 Fact and value......Page 630 References......Page 633 Further reading......Page 634 B......Page 635 C......Page 636 D......Page 637 E......Page 638 G......Page 639 H......Page 640 L......Page 641 M......Page 642 N......Page 643 P......Page 644 Q......Page 645 S......Page 646 V......Page 648 Z......Page 649

This indispensable reference source and guide to the major themes, debates, problems and topics in philosophy of science contains fifty-five specially commissioned entries by a leading team of international contributors. Organized into four parts it covers:

• historical and philosophical context


• debates


• concepts


• the individual sciences.

The Companion covers everything students of philosophy of science need to know - from empiricism, explanation and experiment to causation, observation, prediction and more - and contains many helpful features including: a section on the individual sciences, including chapters on the philosophy of biology, chemistry, physics and psychology, further reading and cross-referencing at the end of each chapter.

Savannah Schroll Guz - Library Journal

Psillos (Scientific Realism) and Curd (Principles of Reasoning) have amassed essays by 58 internationally dispersed integrative science and philosophy scholars. Divided into four parts, the book's multipage essays discuss historical and philosophical contexts, explain debates surrounding various isms, unpack broad philoscientific concepts like causation, and survey individual areas that employ scientific approaches, including economics and mathematics. While filled with allusions and field-specific language not accessible to uninitiated readers, the essays illuminate more abstruse philosophical tracts and make carefully measured connections between the higher realms of science and the actual world. Highly recommended for history of science and philosophy collections.