The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions

Front Matter......Page 1 Introduction......Page 3 The Model......Page 8 The Use of Information When Delta Is Small......Page 10 Heuristic Interpretation of D(N)......Page 12 Examples......Page 13 Proving the Bound in Games With Frequent Actions......Page 16 Converse of the Theorem......Page 19 Impatient Players, r>0......Page 21 Identifiability......Page 24 Do Small Modeling Differences Matter?......Page 26 Final Remark......Page 27 Appendix A: Construction of the Family of Curves C(s) Containing M......Page 28 Appendix B: Lemmas......Page 32 References......Page 37 Author's Addresses......Page 38 Estimating the Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation ......Page 39 Introduction......Page 40 A Model of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation......Page 41 Identifying the Technology Using Dynamic Factor Models......Page 45 Identifying the Distribution of the Latent Variables......Page 46 Identification of the Factor Loadings and of the Joint Distributions of the Latent Variables......Page 47 The Identification of a General Measurement Error Model......Page 50 Nonparametric Identification of the Technology Function......Page 52 Anchoring Skills in an Interpretable Metric......Page 54 More General Forms of Endogeneity......Page 56 Estimating the Technology of Skill Formation......Page 59 Empirical Specification......Page 60 Empirical Estimates......Page 61 The Empirical Importance of Measurement Error......Page 63 Controlling for Time-Invariant Unobserved Heterogeneity in the Estimated Technology......Page 70 A More General Approach to Solving the Problem of the Endogeneity of Inputs......Page 72 A Model Based Only on Cognitive Skills......Page 76 Interpreting the Estimates......Page 77 Some Economic Intuition That Explains the Simulation Results......Page 82 Implications of a One Cognitive Skill Model......Page 83 Conclusion......Page 84 References......Page 85 Author's Addresses......Page 87 Introduction......Page 88 Benchmark Setting......Page 93 Utilitarian Policy......Page 101 Fixed Quorum......Page 103 Time-Varying Quorum......Page 105 Commitment and Endogenous Quorum......Page 106 General News Arrival Processes......Page 108 Negative-News Shocks......Page 111 Negative Value of Experimentation......Page 113 Correlated Types......Page 114 Factions and Heterogeneous Voting Weights......Page 115 Multiple Risky Actions......Page 116 Power Concentration......Page 117 Proof of Theorem 1......Page 118 Probability of Receiving a Lump Sum Between p and q