The Robust Federation: Principles of Design (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

The Robust Federation offers a comprehensive approach to the study of federalism. Jenna Bednar demonstrates how complementary institutions maintain and adjust the distribution of authority between national and state governments. These authority boundaries matter - for defense, economic growth, and adequate political representation - and must be defended from opportunistic transgression. From Montesquieu to Madison, the legacy of early institutional analysis focuses attention on the value of competition between institutions, such as the policy moderation produced through separated powers. Bednar offers a reciprocal theory: in an effective constitutional system, institutions complement one another; each makes the others more powerful. Diverse but complementary safeguards - including the courts, political parties, and the people - cover different transgressions, punish to different extents, and fail under different circumstances. The analysis moves beyond equilibrium conceptions and explains how the rules that allocate authority are not fixed but shift gradually. Bednar's rich theoretical characterization of complementary institutions provides the first holistic account of federal robustness. Front Cover......Page 1 The Robust Federation......Page 2 Credits......Page 4 Title Page......Page 6 Copyright......Page 0 Table of Contents......Page 8 List of Figures......Page 10 List of Tables......Page 11 Acknowledgements......Page 12 Constituting the Robust Federation......Page 14 The Virginia Plan......Page 18 1.2 Distributing Authority......Page 19 1.3 Opportunism......Page 21 Figure 1.1. The Problem of Federal Robustness......Page 23 1.4 Safeguards......Page 24 adaptation......Page 26 1.6 Discussion......Page 29 Independence:......Page 31 Direct Governance:......Page 32 Table 2.1. List of Federations, 1990–2000......Page 36 Military Security......Page 38 Efficiency.......Page 41 Innovation.......Page 43 Figure 2.1. The Trade-Off between Centralization and Decentralization......Page 46 Intergovernmental Competition.......Page 48 Externalities Management.......Page 52 Market Preservation.......Page 55 Political Participation.......Page 57 Managing and Satisfying Diversity.......Page 58 Anti-Tyranny and Rights.......Page 62 Higher Quality Representation.......Page 64 Federalism’s Engineering Problem......Page 65 Table 2.2. Prescriptions for Centralization or Decentralization by Objective......Page 66 2.3 Building Intuition: The Evolution of the European Union......Page 69 The Federal Problem......Page 76 Table 3.1. State Compliance with Requisitions for Troops (1777–1783) and Money (1784–1789) ......Page 77 3.1 A Typology of Opportunism......Page 79 Figure 3.1. Types of Opportunism: The Triangle of Federalism......Page 81 3.2 Why Do We See Opportunism?......Page 86 Figure 3.2. Slippage and Error in Deviance Space......Page 90 Figure 3.4. Intergovernmental Retaliation Generates Inherent Opportunism......Page 95 3.4 Fitting Federalism’s Complexity: Implications for Design......Page 98 3.5 Mathematical Appendix to Chapter 3......Page 100 The Safeguards of Federalism......Page 108 4.1 Structural Safeguards......Page 111 Enumerated Powers......Page 112 Interinstitutional Oversight.......Page 113 Incompleteness.......Page 117 State Supervision, as States?......Page 118 4.2 Popular Safeguards......Page 120 Theory of Popular Control......Page 121 Evaluation of Popular Control......Page 124 Theory of Political Safeguards......Page 126 Table 4.1. Criteria Defining Integrated Parties......Page 127 Evaluation of Political Safeguards......Page 129 4.4 Judicial Safeguards......Page 132 Theory of Judicial Safeguards......Page 133 The Court as Focal Point Provider.......Page 134 Evaluation of Judicial Safeguards......Page 135 Judicial Dependence......Page 136 4.5 Again Fitting Federalism’s Complexity......Page 138 redundancy......Page 140 4.6 Mathematical Appendix to Chapter 4......Page 141 5.1 The Issue: Coverage as a Necessary Condition ......Page 145 Table 5.1. Preliminary Assessment of the Coverage Capacity of Each Safeguard ......Page 147 The European Union......Page 150 Figure 5.1. The Triangle of Federalism, Admitting Shirking and Burden-Shifting......Page 151 Figure 5.2. The Triangle of Federalism, Leaving Encroachment Exposed......Page 153 The Antebellum United States......Page 156 5.4 Discussion......Page 159 6.1 The Issue: Inefficient Safeguards......Page 160 Figure 6.1. Intergovernmental Retaliation Generates Inherent Opportunism (Duplicated......Page 161 Figure 6.2. Behavioral Response to a Weakened Safeguard......Page 163 Figure 6.3. Complementary Safeguards......Page 164 The Severe Type: Intergovernmental Retaliation.......Page 165 The Mild Types: Auxiliary Safeguards.......Page 166 Figure 6.4. Insufficient Mild Safeguard......Page 167 Subnational Fiscal Responsibility......Page 168 6.4 The Insufficient Severe Safeguard......Page 172 Figure 6.5. Insufficient Severe Safeguard......Page 173 The European Union......Page 174 6.5 Discussion......Page 177 A Model of Complementary Safeguards......Page 178 Redundancy......Page 182 7.1 The Issue: Imperfect Safeguards......Page 183 Threshold Inef.ciencies......Page 184 Diverse Observations......Page 185 7.2 Overcoming—and Embracing—Imperfection......Page 187 Problem #1: Solving the Failure to Punish......Page 188 Problem #2: Tempering Frequent Punishment......Page 190 Problem #3: Adapting the Distribution of Authority......Page 194 Problem #4: Identifying Socially Beneficial Adjustments......Page 198 Putting It Together: The Theory of Redundant Safeguards......Page 204 Figure 7.2. The System of Safeguards......Page 205 Rethinking the Court’s Role as Safeguard......Page 208 Figure 7.3. Varying Structural or Political Safeguards Threshold Affects Judicial “Activism” ......Page 212 Resisting the Alien and Sedition Acts......Page 215 Canadian Constitutional Patriation......Page 217 7.4 Discussion......Page 222 Tying the Gordian Knot......Page 226 Table 8.1. The Robust Federation: Design Principles......Page 229 References......Page 233 Index......Page 248 "The Robust Federation offers a comprehensive approach to the study of federalism. Jenna Bednar demonstrates how complementary institutions maintain and adjust the distribution of authority between national and state governments."--Jacket