The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950-55 (Cold War History)

The new Cold War History Series aims to make available to scholars and students the results of advanced research on the origins and the development of the Cold War and its impact on nations, alliances and regions at various levels of statecraft, and in areas such as diplomacy, security, economy, military and society. Volumes in the series range from detailed and original specialised studies, proceedings of conferences, to broader and more comprehensive accounts. Each work deals with individual themes and periods of the Cold War and each author or editor approaches the Cold War with a variety of narrative, analysis, explanation, interpretation and reassessments of recent scholarship. These studies are designed to encourage investigation and debate on important themes and events in the Cold War, as seen from both East and West, in an effort to deepen our understanding of this phenomenon and place it in its context in world history. Using the European Defence Community (EDC) as a case-study, this book examines the competing and often conflicting views of the British and American governments towards European integration in the 1950s. Unlike much of the scholarship on Britain and Europe, this study argues that London, with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to the fore, was both positive and constructive in its support for the supranational EDC. Indeed, in 1953, when the US government warned of an 'agonizing reappraisal' of its defence relationship with Europe if the project failed, British support actually intensified. By 1954, this American factor, rather than support for European unity per se, had become the dominant feature of EdenOs policy. When, in August 1954, the French parliament destroyed the EDC and simultaneously plunged NATO into chaos, it was fear of the 'agonizing reappraisal' that also determined much of Eden's ultimately successful crisis management. At the London Nine-Power Conference of September-October 1954, the British were instrumental not only in holding NATO together and anchoring West Germany firmly in the Western camp, but in encouraging Washington to re-dedicate itself to European defence. This last achievement has rarely been given the prominence it deserves, perhaps because contemporary observers, and many historians, dismissed the 'agonizing reappraisal' as a bluff. However, as this book will show, there was more substance to the threat than is often allowed, with sections of the US Congress in particular pressing the Eisenhower Administ-tion to adopt a 'peripheral' defence of Europe Front Matter....Pages i-ix Introduction: Agonizing Reappraisals....Pages 1-12 Front Matter....Pages 13-13 Britain, the United States and the Rearming of Germany, October 1950 to May 1952....Pages 15-30 Anglo-American Relations and the EDC, May 1952 to December 1953....Pages 31-50 Front Matter....Pages 51-51 A Parting of the Ways: the Bermuda Conference and the Paris NATO Council, December 1953 ....Pages 53-69 French Ratification of the EDC: Competing Anglo-American Approaches, January to July 1954 ....Pages 70-88 The Death of the EDC, July to August 1954 ....Pages 89-108 Front Matter....Pages 109-109 Selling the Solution: British Crisis Management, August to September 1954 ....Pages 111-129 Anglo-American Divorce and Reconciliation, September 1954 ....Pages 130-151 Phoenix from the Ashes: the Birth of the Western European Union, September 1954 to May 1955 ....Pages 152-172 Front Matter....Pages 173-173 Agonizing Reappraisals: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence....Pages 175-199 Back Matter....Pages 200-252 Using the European Defence Community (EDC) as a case-study, this book examines the competing and often conflicting view of the British and American governments towards European integration in the early 1950s. The British, fearing an 'agonizing reappraisal' of the American defence commitment to Europe if the supranational EDC failed, went to great lengths to ensure the success of the scheme. When, despite these efforts, the EDC finally collapsed in August 1954, NATO was plunged into arguably the most severe crisis in its history. The crisis also possessed an Anglo-American dimension, with London and Washington badly divided on how it should be resolved. In the end, the British were instrumental in the creation of the Western European Union as a successor to the EDC. Their crisis management, however, had been rooted in fear of the 'agonizing reappraisal', a danger dismissed by many historians as exaggerated but which the British, in 1954, were perhaps right to take seriously. Using the European Defense Community (EDC) as a case-study, this book examines the competing and often conflicting views of the British and American governments towards European integration in the early1950s. The British, fearing an "agonizing reapprais"' of the American defense commitment to Europe if the supranational EDC failed, went to great lengths to ensure the success of the scheme. When despite these efforts, the EDC finally collapsed in August 1954, NATO was plunged into arguably the most severe crisis in history. The crisis also possessed an Anglo-American dimension, with London and Washington badly divided on how it should be resolved. In the end, the British were instrumental in the creation of the Western European Union as a successor to the EDC. Their crisis management, however, had been rooted in fear of the "agonizing reappraisal"a danger dismissed by many historian as exaggerated but which the British, in 1954, were perhaps right to take seriously. Using the European Defense Community (EDC) as a case-study, this book examines the competing and often conflicting views of the British and American governments towards European integration in the early-1950s. The British, fearing an "agonizing reappraisal"' of the American defense commitment to Europe if the supranational EDC failed, went to great lengths to ensure the success of the scheme. When despite these efforts, the EDC finally collapsed in August 1954, NATO was plunged into arguably the most severe crisis in history. The crisis also possessed an Anglo-American dimension, with London and Washington badly divided on how it should be resolved. In the end, the British were instrumental in the creation of the Western European Union as a successor to the EDC. Despite reservations about its military effectiveness and the time it could take to create, the principle of a European Army - that which was enshrined in the Pleven Plan of October 1950 - was eventually accepted by the United States, Britain and the rest of NATO as the only way forward on the problem of German rearmament. Using the European Defence Community (EDC) as a case study, this book examines the competing and often conflicting view of the British and American governments towards European integration in the early 1950s Kevin Ruane. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 229-241) And Index.