The return of bipolarity in world politics : China, the United States, and geostructural realism

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system has been unipolar, centered on the United States. But the rise of China foreshadows a change in the distribution of power. �ystein Tunsj� shows that the international system is moving toward a U.S.-China standoff, bringing us back to bipolarity--a system in which no third power can challenge the top two.__The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics__surveys the new era of superpowers to argue that the combined effects of the narrowing power gap between China and the United States and the widening power gap between China and any third-ranking power portend a new bipolar system that will differ in crucial ways from that of the last century. Tunsj� expands Kenneth N. Waltz's structural-realist theory to examine the new bipolarity within the context of geopolitics, which he calls "geostructural realism." He considers how a new bipolar system will affect balancing and stability in U.S.-China relations, predicting that the new bipolarity will not be as prone to arms races as the previous era's; that the risk of limited war between the two superpowers is likely to be higher in the coming bipolarity, especially since the two powers are primarily rivals at sea rather than on land; and that the superpowers are likely to be preoccupied with rivalry and conflict in East Asia instead of globally. Tunsj� presents a major challenge to how international relations understands superpowers in the twenty-first century. Since The Collapse Of The Soviet Union, The International System Has Been Unipolar, Centered On The United States. But The Rise Of China Foreshadows A Change In The Distribution Of Power. Øystein Tunjø Shows That The International System Is Moving Toward A U.s.-china Standoff, Bringing Us Back To Bipolarity - A System In Which No Third Power Can Challenge The Top Two. The Return Of Bipolarity In World Politics Surveys The New Era Of Superpowers To Argue That The Combined Effects Of The Narrowing Power Gap Between China And The United States And The Widening Of Power Gap Between China And Any Third-ranking Power Portend A New Bipolar System That Will Differ In Crucial Ways From That Of The Last Century. Tunsjø Expands Kenneth N. Waltz's Strucutral-realist Theory To Examine The New Bipolarity Within The Context Of Geopolitics, Which He Calls Geostructural Realism. He Considers How A New Bipolar System Will Affect Balancing And Stability In U.s.-china Relations, Predicting That The New Bipolarity Will Not Be As Prone To Arms Races As The Previous Era's; That The Risk Of Limited War Between The Two Superpowers Is Likely To Be Higher In The Coming Bipolarity, Especially Since The Two Powers Are Primarily Rivals At Sea Rather Than On Land; And That The Superpowers Are Likely To Be Preoccupied With Rivalry And Conflict In East Asia Instead Of Globally. Tunsjø Presents A Major Challenge To How International Relations Understands Superpowers In The Twenty-first Century. -- From Dust Jacket. 1. Introduction: A New Bipolar System -- Part I: Past And Present Polarity -- 2. Explaining And Understanding Polarity -- 3. Contemporary U.s.-china Bipolarity -- 4. Distinguishing Top-ranking States And Comparing Bipolarity -- Part Ii: Systemic Effects: Patterns Of Behavior And Stability -- 5. Strong Balancing Postponed -- 6. U.s.-china Relations And The Risk Of War -- 7. The Return Of Bipolarity: Global And Regional Effects -- 8. Conclusion: Geostructural Realism. Øystein Tunsjø. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 189-259) And Index. "International relations scholar Oystein Tunsjo argues that the international system is transitioning to a bipolarity between the United States and China. Tunsjo develops the case for contemporary bipolarity not only by examining the current distribution of capabilities, but contends that the contemporary distribution of capabilities in the international system is roughly similar to the origins of the last bipolar system of the 1950s. Beginning with a foundation in theory, the book defines polarity and discusses how we can measure power and rank states. Tunsjo introduces three criteria for studying shifts in the distribution of capabilities among the top ranking powers: their rank based on a combined capability score derived from Kenneth Waltz's theory, the space between the second and third ranking power, and a historical comparison of the state's most recent bipolar system. With these models in place, we find that the Soviet hard-balancing seen in the Cold War is replaced by geographical conditions in the U.S.-China bipolar system to create instability and a likelihood for conflict. This is a provocative text that challenges long-held theories in the field and provides new insights on the important relationship between geography and bipolarity--in fact most of the current debates do not even consider bipolarity. Tunsjo discusses implications for the behavior of the U.S. and China and especially the effects of a new bipolar system for the dynamics of international politics"-- Provided by publisher Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system has been unipolar, centered on the United States. But the rise of China foreshadows a change in the distribution of power. �ystein Tunsj� shows that the international system is moving toward a U.S.-China standoff, bringing us back to bipolarity--a system in which no third power can challenge the top two. The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics surveys the new era of superpowers to argue that the combined effects of the narrowing power gap between China and the United States and the widening power gap between China and any third-ranking power portend a new bipolar system that will differ in crucial ways from that of the last century. Tunsj� expands Kenneth N. Waltz's structural-realist theory to examine the new bipolarity within the context of geopolitics, which he calls "geostructural realism." He considers how a new bipolar system will affect balancing and stability in U.S.-China relations, predicting that the new bipolarity will not be as prone to arms races as the previous era's; that the risk of limited war between the two superpowers is likely to be higher in the coming bipolarity, especially since the two powers are primarily rivals at sea rather than on land; and that the superpowers are likely to be preoccupied with rivalry and conflict in East Asia instead of globally. Tunsj� presents a major challenge to how international relations understands superpowers in the twenty-first century.