The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Physics 1915-1925 (Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science)

Ryckman's book is an excellent work full of novel insights. Ryckman single-handedly revives the non-positivist "transcendental philosophy" insights of early discussions of General Relativity Theory. Much of this suggestive insight and interpretation was lost with the triumph of the logical positivist (later logical empiricist) appropriation of Einstein's relativity theory as showing that Kant's a priori and transcendental philosophy was overthrown by Einstein. Schlick and later Hans Reichenbach became the "standard" interpreters of General Relativity Theory by the end of the 1930s. Later American philosophers of science, such as Adolph Gruenbaum and Wesley Salmon, even where not agreeing with all claims of Reichenbach, very much followed his lead and tended to dismiss the neo-Kantian and phenomenological interpretations that were developed by European thinkers concerning relativity theory. Ryckman discusses the work on unified field theories of mathematician Herman Weyl and the physicist Arthur Eddington, as well as the philosophical interpretations of general relativity by Ernst Cassirer and Emile Meyerson among others. Ryckman's grasp of both Husserl's phenomenology and of the relevant differential geometry is superb. His long sections on Herman Weyl are tremendously informative and illuminating. I think Ryckman's interpretations of Eddington as a "transcendental philosopher" in the traditional sense of Kant and Husserl are a bit of a stretch, however, as Eddington's philosophical excursions were very much seat of the pants. Nevertheless Ryckman persuasively discredits those, like Susan Stebbing, who ridiculed Eddington's philosophical interpretations without understanding the physics and mathematics that led him to them. A minor but significant weakness is Ryckman's totally downplaying and dismissing the influence of the German romantic idealist Fichte on Weyl's interpretation of field theory and matter, claiming that Weyl was interested only in Fichte religious thought. In fact Erhard Scholz has made a well documented case in various articles that not only Husserl but Fichte was a very strong influence on Weyl's interpretations, and Weyl says so himself in his autobiographical reminiscences. Overall Ryckman's work is an outstanding contribution and I hope it will revive interest in phenomenological philosophy of physics among physicists as well as Anglo-American philosophers.

Universally recognized as bringing about a revolutionary transformation of the notions of space, time, and motion in physics, Einstein's theory of gravitation, known as "general relativity," was also a defining event for 20th century philosophy of science. During the decisive first ten years of the theory's existence, two main tendencies dominated its philosophical reception. This book is an extended argument that the path actually taken, which became logical empiricist philosophy of science, greatly contributed to the current impasse over realism, whereas new possibilities are opened in revisiting and reviving the spirit of the more sophisticated tendency, a cluster of viewpoints broadly termed transcendental idealism, and furthering its articulation. It also emerges that Einstein, while paying lip service to the emerging philosophy of logical empiricism, ended up siding de facto with the latter tendency.

Ryckman's work speaks to several groups, among them philosophers of science and historians of relativity. Equations are displayed as necessary, but Ryckman gives the non-mathematical reader enough background to understand their occurrence in the context of his wider philosophical project.

"Universally recognized as bringing about a revolutionary transformation of the notions of space, time, and motion in physics, Einstein's theory of gravitation, known as 'general relativity,' was also a defining event for 20th century philosophy of science. During the decisive first ten years of the theory's existence, two main tendencies dominated its philosophical reception. This book is an extended argument that the path actually taken, which became logical empiricist philosophy of science, greatly contributed to the current impasse over realism, whereas new possibilities are opened in revisiting and reviving the spirit of the more sophisticated tendency, a cluster of viewpoints broadly termed transcendental idealism, and furthering its articulation. It also emerges that Einstein, while paying lip service to the emerging philosophy of logical empiricism, ended up siding de facto with the latter tendency. Ryckman's work speaks to several groups, among them philosophers of science and historians of relativity. Equations are displayed as necessary, but Ryckman gives the non-mathematical reader enough background to understand their occurrence in the context of his wider philosophical project."-- Jacket Contents......Page 12 1. Introduction......Page 16 2. General Covariance and the ‘‘Relativized A Priori’’: Two Roads from Kant......Page 26 3. 1921: ‘‘Critical or Empiricist Interpretation of the New Physics?’’......Page 60 4. Einstein Agonists: Weyl and Reichenbach......Page 90 5. Transcendental-Phenomenological Idealism: Husserl and Weyl......Page 121 6. Weyl’s ‘‘Purely Infinitesimal’’ Constitution of Field Physics......Page 158 7. ‘‘World Building’’: Structuralism and Transcendental Idealism in Eddington......Page 190 8. Geometrizing Physics: Eddington’s Theory of the Affine Field......Page 231 9. Epilogue: The ‘‘Geometrization of Physics’’ and Transcendental Idealism......Page 248 Appendix to Chapter 2: Michael Friedman and the ‘‘Relativized A Priori’’......Page 258 Notes......Page 264 References......Page 302 C......Page 324 E......Page 325 H......Page 326 K......Page 327 P......Page 328 S......Page 329 Y......Page 330 Einstein's theory of 'general relativity' (1915) was a defining event for 20th century philosophy of science. During the decisive first ten years of the theory's existence, two main ideas dominated its philosophical reception. Ryckman's book is an extended argument concerning these ideas. For a brief decade in the early part of the 20th century, an observer with a passing interest in the scene may well have forecast a considerably different course for the subsequent development of 20th century philosophy of science.