The Regulator–Regulatee Relationship in High-Hazard Industry Sectors: New Actors and New Viewpoints in a Conservative Landscape (SpringerBriefs in Safety Management)

This open access book addresses relationships that develop from the complex set of legislative, regulatory, and institutional arrangements that arise in the governance of high-hazard industries, especially those connected with safety. It analyses the difference in practices between high-hazard sectors such as nuclear power, chemical processing, and transport with those in the finance and healthcare sectors. The relationship between regulating and regulated entities is important in ensuring that safety is not subordinated to other concerns and in maintaining public confidence. As a result, the brief addresses various pressures and trade-offs inherent in that relationship, trade-offs between such considerations as: cost of the oversight activity and its effectiveness; regulator independence and its level of competency and understanding of the risks involved; ability to provide advice on meeting regulatory goals and being able to criticize decisions made; and effectiveness and intrusion in operational activities. The contributors show how, over time, a more horizontal or “decentred” approach to regulatory oversight has appeared, with a larger degree of delegation of certain decisions to industry and a greater role for a range of third parties such as certification bodies, auditors, insurers, industry associations and NGOs. This book is of interest to academics working in the fields of safety science or organizational management and to practitioners, regulators and policy-makers concerned with health and safety and critical infrastructure. Contents 1 The Unfolding Regulator–Regulatee Relationship 1.1 The Advent of Safety-Critical Systems 1.2 Regulating in Evolving Contexts 1.3 An Illustration: The Regulation of Hazardous Plants in France 1.4 The Chapters of This Book References 2 The Risk of Risk Regulation: A Thirty-Year LSE Perspective 2.1 The Dilemma of Risk Regulation: How Much Togetherness Between Regulators and Regulatees and How Much Information Asymmetry? 2.2 Where the Journey Began: The Risk Regulation World of the Early 1990s 2.3 Four Recurring Recipes for Limiting Regulatory Capture in High-Hazard Industries 2.4 From Mad Cows to Corona: So Where Are We Now? References 3 The Role of Third Parties in Regulatory Systems: Examples from Financial Services Regulation 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Third Parties in Regulatory Systems: Some Examples 3.3 How Many Third Parties Be Enrolled in Regulatory Systems? 3.4 Third Parties in Regulatory Systems: Dependencies and Resilience 3.5 Summary References 4 The Healthcare Regulatory Ecosystem 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Literature Review 4.3 Regulation of and in Healthcare 4.4 The Australian Health System as an Exemplar 4.5 Self-Regulation on the Front-Lines of Care 4.6 Theoretical Paradigms of Interest 4.7 Discussion and Conclusion References 5 The Tripartite System: A Key in Polycentric Risk Governance: Lessons from Norwegian Offshore Industry 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Polycentric Risk Governance 5.3 The Tripartite OHS Model in the Offshore Regime 5.4 Developing a New Regime 5.5 New Tripartite Arenas 5.6 Lessons Learnt 5.7 Conclusion References 6 The Power of Dialogue: The Regulator–Regulatee Relationship in the Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Context: The Norwegian Model of Working Life 6.3 Dialogue as Policy Instrument 6.4 Properties and Impacts of Regulatory Dialogue 6.5 Concluding Remarks References 7 Recognising the Social Nature of Regulatory Compliance and Focusing on Front-Line Interactions 7.1 The Nature of Regulation 7.2 Regulatory Actors 7.3 The Regulatory Environment of These Actors 7.4 Regulatory Actor Behaviours 7.5 Regulatory Interactions 7.6 Implications References 8 Standards, Certification, and Accreditation: Indispensable Tools for European Safety Regulations? 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The “New Approach” Directives 8.3 The Medical Devices Sector and Its Failures 8.4 Discussion and Conclusion References 9 Auditism: Symptoms, Safety Consequences, Causes, and Cure 9.1 Introduction (What Is Auditism and Why Try to Understand It?) 9.2 Symptoms (What Auditism Looks Like and Possible Consequences) 9.3 General Symptoms of Auditism: Two Streams of Tasks 9.4 Symptoms Related to Safety Management: Safety Clutter and Illegitimate Core Tasks 9.5 Marine Examples: Apathy or Attention to Decoys 9.6 Causes for Auditism (Why Auditism Develops in Organisations) 9.7 Drivers for Auditism: Function-Based Regulations and Shallow Audit Regimes 9.8 Drivers for Auditism: Legitimacy, Accountability, and Liability 9.9 Drivers for Auditism: Efficiency Virtues 9.10 Prevalence (Where Do We Find Auditism?) 9.11 Treatment or Cure (How to Get Rid of Auditism) 9.12 Prognosis (What Happens Next?) References 10 Rule Design: Defining the Regulator–Regulatee Relationship 10.1 Rules and the Regulator–Regulatee Relationship 10.2 A Framework for Rule Design 10.3 Rule Designs: Advantages and Disadvantages 10.4 Implications for the Regulator–Regulatee Relationship 10.5 Conclusion References 11 Responsive Regulation, Trust, and Intrinsic Motivation Within the Nuclear Industry: Impacts of a Safety Culture Tool 11.1 Safety Culture as a Responsive Regulation Tool 11.2 A Combination of Trust and Control 11.3 Metaphors as Keys to Cognitive Changes 11.4 Conclusions References 12 The Regulator, the Regulatee, and the End of the World as We Knew It 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Three Perspectives on the Regulation of Hazardous Industries 12.3 The Future of Hazardous Industries and Risk Regulation Regimes 12.4 The Future of the Regulator–Regulatee Relationship 12.5 Conclusion Notes References