The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness (Advances in Consciousness Research)

Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, "implicit" awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or "what-it-is-like," dimension of conscious experience, defending the innovative thesis that phenomenal character is constituted by the implicit self-awareness built into every conscious state. This account stands in marked contrast to most influential extant theories of phenomenal character, including qualia theories, according to which phenomenal character is a matter of having phenomenal sensations, and representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is constituted by representational content. (Series A) The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness......Page 2 Editorial page ......Page 3 Title page ......Page 4 LCC data ......Page 5 Table of contents......Page 6 Acknowledgements......Page 8 Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character......Page 10 Some remarks on methodology......Page 13 The primacy of phenomenology......Page 14 Preamble......Page 20 Creature consciousness: transitive and intransitive......Page 21 State consciousness......Page 25 Unconscious mental states......Page 30 Self-consciousness......Page 31 Phenomenal consciousness......Page 32 Hacker and Lycan's criticisms of the "what-it-is-like" locution......Page 34 Nagel's what-it-is-like formula......Page 42 Putative counterexamples......Page 43 Access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness......Page 46 The daydreaming, long-distance truck driver......Page 55 Non-conscious phenomenality......Page 62 Summary......Page 65 A gloss on intentionality......Page 68 The Transitivity Principle......Page 78 Two positive arguments for the Transitivity Principle......Page 83 The Symmetry Argument......Page 84 Objections and replies......Page 87 The argument from spontaneous reportability......Page 88 Preamble......Page 94 The Higher-Order theory of consciousness......Page 95 Confabulated conscious states......Page 105 A phenomenological objection......Page 108 Preamble......Page 112 The Brentanian model......Page 113 The regress argument......Page 119 A twist......Page 124 De Se content......Page 127 The "self"......Page 138 Objections and replies......Page 140 The representational theory of phenomenal character......Page 146 The Transparency Assumption......Page 150 The Property Assumption......Page 156 Preamble......Page 164 Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness......Page 165 Differences in phenomenal character......Page 172 Pains and other bodily sensations......Page 175 Some brief remarks on privacy......Page 178 Conclusion......Page 181 Bibliography......Page 182 Index of subjects......Page 192 Index of names......Page 194 The series Advances in Consciousness Research......Page 196 Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character -- Some remarks on methodology - The primacy of phenomenology -- Some semantics of consciousness -- Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive -- State consciousness -- Unconscious mental states -- Self-consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Hacker and Lycan's criticisms of the what-it-is-like locution -- A formula for state consciousness -- Nagel's what-it-is-like formula -- Putative counterexamples -- Access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness -- The daydreaming, long-distance truck driver -- Non-conscious phenomenality -- Consciousness and self-awareness -- A gloss on intentionality -- The transitivity principle -- Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle -- The symmetry argument -- Objections and replies -- The argument from spontaneous reportability -- Higher-orderism -- The higher-order theory of consciousness -- Confabulated conscious states -- A phenomenological objection -- A one-state alternative -- The brentanian model -- The regress argument -- A twist -- De se content -- The E self -- Objections and replies -- Representationalism -- The representational theory of phenomenal character -- The transparency assumption -- The property assumption -- The nature of phenomenal character -- Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness -- Differences in phenomenal character -- Pains and other bodily sensations -- Some brief remarks on privacy Introduction Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character Some remarks on methodology Some semantics of "consciousness" Preamble Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive State consciousness Unconscious mental states Self-consciousness Phenomenal consciousness A formula for state consciousness Nagel's what-it-is-like formula Putative counterexamples Non-conscious phenomenality? Summary Consciousness and self-awareness Preamble A gloss on intentionality The transitivity principle Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle Higher-orderism Preamble The higher-order theory of consciousness A "one-state" alternative Preamble The Brentanian model Objections and replies Representationalism Preamble The representational theory of phenomenal character The nature of phenomenal character Preamble Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness Some brief remarks on privacy Conclusion.