The psychology of nuclear proliferation : identity, emotions, and foreign policy

Dozens of states have long been capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, yet only a few have actually done so. Jacques E. C. Hymans finds that the key to this surprising historical pattern lies not in externally imposed constraints, but rather in state leaders' conceptions of the national identity. Synthesizing a wide range of scholarship from the humanities and social sciences to experimental psychology and neuroscience, Hymans builds a rigorous model of decisionmaking that links identity to emotions and ultimately to nuclear policy choices. Exhaustively researched case studies of France, India, Argentina, and Australia - two that got the bomb and two that abstained - demonstrate the value of this model while debunking common myths. This book will be invaluable to policymakers and concerned citizens who are frustrated with the frequent misjudgments of states' nuclear ambitions, and to scholars who seek a better understanding of how leaders make big foreign policy decisions. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Contents......Page 7 Figures......Page 8 Tables......Page 9 Preface......Page 11 Acronyms and abbreviations......Page 14 1 Introduction: life in a nuclear-capable crowd......Page 15 The puzzle......Page 16 The answer: a theoretical and empirical preview......Page 26 2 Leaders’ national identity conceptions and nuclear choices......Page 30 The decision to go nuclear: a big decision......Page 31 The concept of the “national identity conception”......Page 32 Typology of national identity conceptions......Page 35 The generic pathway from NICs to choice......Page 39 NIC-linked emotions and their behavioral tendencies......Page 42 Hypotheses on NICs and nuclear choices......Page 49 Theory-testing and contextualization......Page 54 Testing the theory......Page 55 Placing decisions for nuclear weapons in context......Page 58 Operationalizing identity: concept streamlining......Page 61 A multimethod approach......Page 63 Source material......Page 64 The quantitative coding frame......Page 65 Reliability and validity......Page 70 Existing perspectives on Australian identity conceptions......Page 71 The content analysis......Page 73 Overall judgments......Page 74 Argentina......Page 77 Existing perspectives on Argentine identity conceptions......Page 78 The data sources......Page 80 The content analysis......Page 81 Overall judgments......Page 82 Existing perspectives on Indian identity conceptions......Page 84 The data sources......Page 86 The content analysis......Page 87 Overall judgments......Page 89 France......Page 91 Existing perspectives on French identity conceptions......Page 92 The data sources......Page 94 The content analysis......Page 95 Overall judgments......Page 96 Introduction......Page 99 De Gaulle in the immediate postwar period: “We have time.”......Page 101 The early years of the Fourth Republic: an “absence of nuclear-mindedness”......Page 102 1950–52: Discussions of German rearmament and the first attempted renunciation......Page 103 Dien Bien Phu......Page 107 New Look and the nuclearization of the Cold War......Page 109 Pierre Mendès France and the attempt to contain German rearmament......Page 111 Mendès France’s oppositional nationalism and the bomb decision......Page 121 After 1954: the road to the bomb......Page 123 Introduction......Page 128 The traditional Liberals, 1949–67: participation in free world defenses......Page 129 Still searching for a stronger guarantee: 1957–63......Page 131 Still no Plan B: 1964–67......Page 135 A new kind of Liberal: Gorton’s quest for the bomb, 1968–71......Page 138 The fight over the NPT......Page 140 Moves toward nuclear weapons: the power reactor and uranium enrichment......Page 143 Labor in power, 1972–75: fear no more......Page 147 Whitlam’s nuclear stances......Page 149 The campaign against French nuclear testing......Page 151 After Whitlam......Page 153 Introduction......Page 155 Argentina’s nuclear choices to 1974......Page 156 Diplomatic policies......Page 157 Technology policies: the first power reactor......Page 159 The second power reactor......Page 160 Carter, Videla, and the Tlatelolco Treaty......Page 163 Continuing progress in the nuclear program via the tactics of “blackmail” and “bribery”......Page 166 Argentina’s secret uranium enrichment plant: genesis and purposes......Page 169 A Southern Cone nuclear arms race?......Page 173 The Argentine–Brazilian nuclear accord of 1980......Page 174 Argentina’s non-bomb lobby......Page 175 Nuclear policies of the Alfonsín government......Page 177 The Menem nuclear policy shift......Page 179 Introduction......Page 185 Nehruvian India’s nuclear diplomacy......Page 187 Nehruvian India’s push for nuclear development......Page 189 India in the aftermath of China’s nuclear test......Page 191 Nuclear India as of 1971......Page 195 Explaining the “peaceful nuclear explosion”......Page 197 The 1971 war and its aftermath......Page 198 India’s nuclear stance between 1974 and 1998......Page 202 The decision for “weaponization”......Page 203 The 1995 test non-decision......Page 207 The BJP bomb......Page 209 Why Vajpayee chose to go nuclear......Page 212 Identities, emotions, and the nuclear choice......Page 218 Puncturing common myths......Page 222 Myth No. 1: “States want the bomb because it is a great deterrent”......Page 223 Myth No. 2: “States want the bomb as a ticket to international status”......Page 225 Myth No. 3: “Behind the decision for the bomb stand the mean interests of those who stand to benefit personally from it”......Page 226 Myth No.4: “The international non-proliferation regime is the finger in the dike protecting the world from a cascade of new nuclear wepons states"......Page 228 Lessons for intelligence analysis......Page 230 A stricter international non-proliferation regime?......Page 233 Nuclear abolition?......Page 235 Preventive war?......Page 237 Non-proliferation today and tomorrow......Page 239 B. Coding for references to external actors......Page 243 Precisions to basic coding rules......Page 244 C. Moving from the list of external actors to assessment of national identity conceptions......Page 246 Tabular data......Page 247 INTERVIEWS......Page 250 ARCHIVAL SOURCES......Page 251 SECONDARY AND PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES CITED......Page 252 Name index......Page 275 Subject index......Page 278 Cover 1 Half-title 3 Title 5 Copyright 6 Contents 7 Figures 8 Tables 9 Preface 11 Acronyms and abbreviations 14 1 Introduction: life in a nuclear-capable crowd 15 The puzzle 16 The answer: a theoretical and empirical preview 26 2 Leaders’ national identity conceptions and nuclear choices 30 The decision to go nuclear: a big decision 31 The national identity conception (NIC): definition and types 32 The concept of the “national identity conception” 32 Typology of national identity conceptions 35 From NICs to nuclear decisions 39 The generic pathway from NICs to choice 39 NIC-linked emotions and their behavioral tendencies 42 Hypotheses on NICs and nuclear choices 49 Theory-testing and contextualization 54 Testing the theory 55 Placing decisions for nuclear weapons in context 58 3 Measuring leaders’ national identity conceptions 61 Methodological considerations 61 Operationalizing identity: concept streamlining 61 A multimethod approach 63 Source material 64 The quantitative coding frame 65 Reliability and validity 70 Australia 71 Existing perspectives on Australian identity conceptions 71 The data sources 73 The content analysis 73 Overall judgments 74 Argentina 77 Existing perspectives on Argentine identity conceptions 78 The data sources 80 The content analysis 81 Overall judgments 82 India 84 Existing perspectives on Indian identity conceptions 84 The data sources 86 The content analysis 87 Overall judgments 89 France 91 Existing perspectives on French identity conceptions 92 The data sources 94 The content analysis 95 Overall judgments 96 4 The struggle over the bomb in the French Fourth Republic 99 Introduction 99 Nuclear France before 1954 101 De Gaulle in the immediate postwar period: “We have time.” 101 The early years of the Fourth Republic: an “absence of nuclear-mindedness” 102 1950–52: Discussions of German rearmament and the first attempted renunciation 103 The year of decision: 1954 107 Dien Bien Phu 107 New Look and the nuclearization of the Cold War 109 Pierre Mendès France and the attempt to contain German rearmament 111 Mendès France’s oppositional nationalism and the bomb decision 121 After 1954: the road to the bomb 123 5 Australia’s search for security: nuclear umbrella, armament, or abolition? 128 Introduction 128 The traditional Liberals, 1949–67: participation in free world defenses 129 Still searching for a stronger guarantee: 1957–63 131 Still no Plan B: 1964–67 135 A new kind of Liberal: Gorton’s quest for the bomb, 1968–71 138 The fight over the NPT 140 Moves toward nuclear weapons: the power reactor and uranium enrichment 143 Labor in power, 1972–75: fear no more 147 Whitlam’s nuclear stances 149 The campaign against French nuclear testing 151 After Whitlam 153 6 Argentina’s nuclear ambition – and restraint 155 Introduction 155 Argentina’s nuclear choices to 1974 156 Diplomatic policies 157 Technology policies: the first power reactor 159 The second power reactor 160 The gaucho–gringo tangle: 1974–89 163 Carter, Videla, and the Tlatelolco Treaty 163 Continuing progress in the nuclear program via the tactics of “blackmail” and “bribery” 166 Argentina’s secret uranium enrichment plant: genesis and purposes 169 Summary: North America pushes, Argentina pushes back 173 A Southern Cone nuclear arms race? 173 The Argentine–Brazilian nuclear accord of 1980 174 Argentina’s non-bomb lobby 175 Nuclear policies of the Alfonsín government 177 The Menem nuclear policy shift 179 7 “We have a big bomb now”: India’s nuclear U-turn 185 Introduction 185 The nuclear expression of Indian nationalism, 1947–71 187 Nehruvian India’s nuclear diplomacy 187 Nehruvian India’s push for nuclear development 189 India in the aftermath of China’s nuclear test 191 India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” 195 Nuclear India as of 1971 195 Explaining the “peaceful nuclear explosion” 197 The 1971 war and its aftermath 198 India’s nuclear stance between 1974 and 1998 202 The decision for “weaponization” 203 The 1995 test non-decision 207 The BJP bomb 209 Why Vajpayee chose to go nuclear 212 8 Conclusion: lessons for policy 218 Identities, emotions, and the nuclear choice 218 Puncturing common myths 222 Myth No. 1: “States want the bomb because it is a great deterrent” 223 Myth No. 2: “States want the bomb as a ticket to international status” 225 Myth No. 3: “Behind the decision for the bomb stand the mean interests of those who stand to benefit personally from it” 226 Myth No.4: “The international non-proliferation regime is the finger in the dike protecting the world from a cascade of new nuclear wepons states" 228 Lessons for intelligence analysis 230 Lessons for international policy 233 A stricter international non-proliferation regime? 233 Nuclear abolition? 235 Preventive war? 237 Non-proliferation today and tomorrow 239 Appendix Coding rules and results 243 1 Coding rules 243 A. General rules for all codings 243 B. Coding for references to external actors 243 Precisions to basic coding rules 244 C. Moving from the list of external actors to assessment of national identity conceptions 246 Tabular data 247 Bibliography 250 INTERVIEWS 250 ARCHIVAL SOURCES 251 SECONDARY AND PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES CITED 252 Name index 275 Subject index 278 Dozens Of States Have Long Been Capable Of Acquiring Nuclear Weapons, Yet Only A Few Have Actually Done So. Jacques E. C. Hymans Finds That The Key To This Surprising Historical Pattern Lies Not In Externally Imposed Constraints, But Rather In State Leaders' Conceptions Of National Identity. Synthesizing A Wide Range Of Scholarship From The Humanities And Social Sciences To Experimental Psychology And Neuroscience, Hymans Builds A Rigorous Model Of Decisionmaking That Links Identity To Emotions And Ultimately To Nuclear Policy Choices. Exhaustively Researched Case Studies Of France, India, Argentina, And Australia - Two Countries That Got The Bomb And Two That Abstained - Demonstrate The Value Of This Model While Debunking Common Myths.--book Jacket. Life In A Nuclear-capable Crowd -- Leaders' National Identity Conceptions And Nuclear Choices -- Measuring Leaders' National Identity Conceptions -- Struggle Over The Bomb In The French Fourth Republic -- Australia's Search For Security -- Argentina's Nuclear Ambition ... And Restraint -- 'we Have A Big Bomb Now'-- Lessons For Policy. Jacques E.c. Hymans. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 236-260) And Indexes. Dozens of states have long been capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, yet only a few have actually done so. Jacques E.C. Hymans finds that the key to this surprising historical pattern lies not in externally imposed constraints, but rather in state leaders' conceptions of the national identity. Synthesizing a wide range of scholarship from the humanities and social sciences to experimental psychology and neuroscience, Hymans builds a rigorous model of decisionmaking that links identity to emotions and ultimately to nuclear policy choices. Exhaustively researched case studies of France, India, Argentina, and Australia - two that got the bomb and two that abstained - demonstrate the value of this model while debunking common myths. This book will be invaluable to policymakers and concerned citizens who are frustrated with the frequent misjudgments of states' nuclear ambitions, and to scholars who seek a better understanding of how leaders make big foreign policy decisions.-- Publisher description