The Power of Separation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the Legislative Veto (Princeton Studies in American Politics: Historical, International, and Comparative Perspectives Book 174)

Jessica Korn challenges the notion that the eighteenth-century principles underlying the American separation of powers system are incompatible with the demands of twentieth-century governance. She demostrates the continuing relevance of these principles by questioning the dominant scholarship on the legislative veto. As a short-cut through constitutional procedure invented in the 1930s and invalidated by the Supreme Court's __Chadha__ decision in 1983, the legislative veto has long been presumed to have been a powerful mechanism of congressional oversight. Korn's analysis, however, shows that commentators have exaggerated the legislative veto's significance as a result of their incorrect assumption that the separation of powers was designed solely to check governmental authority. The Framers also designed constitutional structure to empower the new national government, institutionalizing a division of labor among the three branches in order to enhance the government's capacity. By examining the legislative vetoes governing the FTC, the Department of Education, and the president's authority to extend most-favored-nation trade status, Korn demonstrates how the powers that the Constitution grants to Congress made the legislative veto short-cut inconsequential to policymaking. These case studies also show that __Chadha__ enhanced Congress's capacity to pass substantive laws while making it easier for Congress to preserve important discretionary powers in the executive branch. Thus, in debunking the myth of the legislative veto, Korn restores an appreciation of the enduring vitality of the American constitutional order. Jessica Korn challenges the widespread notion that the eighteenth-century principles underlying the American separation of powers system are incompatible with the demands of twentieth-century governance. She demonstrates the continuing relevance of these principles by questioning the dominant scholarship on the legislative veto. As a short-cut through constitutional procedure invented in the 1930s and invalidated by the Supreme Court's Chadha decision in 1983, the legislative veto has long been presumed to have been a powerful mechanism of congressional oversight. Korn's analysis, however, shows that commentators have exaggerated the legislative veto's significance as a result of their incorrect assumption that the separation of powers was designed solely to check governmental authority. In fact, the Framers also designed constitutional structure to empower the new national government, institutionalizing a division of labor among the three branches in order to enhance the government's capacity to perform legislative, executive, and judicial functions well. Through case studies of the legislative vetoes governing the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Education, and the president's authority to extend most-favored-nation trade status, Korn demonstrates how the extensive and flexible powers that the Constitution grants to Congress made the legislative veto short-cut inconsequential to policy-making. This work challenges the notion that the 18th-century principles underlying the American separation of powers system is incompatible with the demands of 20th-century governance. It argues that the significance of the legislative veto has been exaggerated. As a new wave of democratization sweeps the world, political scientists and reformers have turned with keen interest to the study of the American political system, the oldest on-going experiment in constitutional democracy.