The Politics of Weapons Inspections : Assessing WMD Monitoring and Verification Regimes

Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes—the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? __The Politics of Weapons Inspections__ examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future. Given Recent Controversies Over Suspected Wmd Programs In Proliferating Countries, There Is An Increasingly Urgent Need For Effective Monitoring And Verification Regimes-the International Mechanisms, Including On-site Inspections, Intended In Part To Clarify The Status Of Wmd Programs In Suspected Proliferators. Yet The Strengths And Limitations Of These Nonproliferation And Arms Control Mechanisms Remain Unclear. How Should These Regimes Best Be Implemented? What Are The Technological, Political, And Other Limitations To These Tools? What Technologies And Other Innovations Should Be Utilized To Make These Regimes Most Effective? How Should Recent Developments, Such As The 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal Or Syria's Declared Renunciation And Actual Use Of Its Chemical Weapons, Influence Their Architecture? The Politics Of Weapons Inspections Examines The Successes, Failures, And Lessons That Can Be Learned From Wmd Monitoring And Verification Regimes In Order To Help Determine How Best To Maintain And Strengthen These Regimes In The Future. In Addition To Examining These Regimes' Technological, Political, And Legal Contexts, Nathan E. Busch And Joseph F. Pilat Reevaluate The Track Record Of Monitoring And Verification In The Historical Cases Of South Africa, Libya, And Iraq; Assess The Prospects Of Using These Mechanisms In Verifying Arms Control And Disarmament; And Apply The Lessons Learned From These Cases To Contemporary Controversies Over Suspected Or Confirmed Programs In North Korea, Iran, And Syria. Finally, They Provide A Forward-looking Set Of Policy Recommendations For The Future. -- Provided By Publisher. What Are Monitoring And Verification Regimes? -- South Africa -- Iraq -- Libya -- Verifying Global Disarmament -- Applying Lessons To The Difficult Cases : North Korea, Iran, And Syria -- Conclusion : Strengthening Monitoring And Verification Regimes. Nathan E. Busch, Joseph F. Pilat. Stanford Security Studies. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. La 4e de couv. indique : "Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes-the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? The Politics of Weapons Inspections examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future." Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes-the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? The Politics of Weapons Inspections examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future.-- Résumé de l'éditeur On July 14, 2015, U.S. president Barack Obama announced what he described as an historic deal that was designed to resolve the ongoing crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. The Iranian nuclear crisis, which had lasted well over a decade, was sparked by revelations in 2002 and 2003 that Iran had constructed a covert uranium enrichment facility at a site called Natanz, was building a heavy-water production plant at a site called Arak, and had stated that it planned to construct a heavy-water reactor at the Arak site as well. These facilities raised significant international concerns, since they could be used to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, both key ingredients for a nuclear bomb. These concerns intensified following reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stating in November 2003 that Iran had been conducting covert nuclear activities for nearly twenty years.1 In the years following these revelations, and in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, Iran continued to press forward with its nuclear program, which many suspected to be part of a nuclear-weapon program, installing nearly twenty thousand centrifuges, producing a significant stockpile of enriched uranium, and nearing completion of the heavy-water reactor at Arak.