The politics of the First World War : a course in game theory and international security

The Great War is an immense, confusing and overwhelming historical conflict - the ideal case study for teaching game theory and international relations. Using thirteen historical puzzles, from the outbreak of the war and the stability of attrition, to unrestricted submarine warfare and American entry into the war, this book provides students with a rigorous yet accessible training in game theory. Each chapter shows, through guided exercises, how game theoretical models can explain otherwise challenging strategic puzzles, shedding light on the role of individual leaders in world politics, cooperation between coalitions partners, the effectiveness of international law, the termination of conflict, and the challenges of making peace. Its analytical history of World War I also surveys cutting edge political science research on international relations and the causes of war. Written by a leading game theorist known for his expertise of the war, this textbook includes useful student features such as chapter key terms, contemporary maps, a timeline of events, a list of key characters and additional end-of-chapter game-theoretic exercises. Sommario fornito dall'editore Cover Half-title Title page Copyright information Brief Contents Contents Figures Maps Preface Acknowledgments Timeline of Key Events Dramatis Personae 1 Introduction: The Great War 1.1 History, War, and Political Science 1.2 Theory and Simplicity 1.3 War (and What It's Good For) 1.4 The International System 1.5 A Plan for the Book 2 The Theory of War I: Commitment Problems 2.1 A Brief Introduction to Game Theory 2.1.1 Games 2.1.2 Nash Equilibrium 2.2 Commitment Problems and War 2.3 Conclusion 3 Armed Continent: The Anglo-German Naval Race 3.1 Britain, Germany, and Dreadnoughts 3.2 Explaining Arms Races 3.2.1 Solving the Puzzle 3.2.2 Was the Naval Race Futile? 3.3 Equilibrium, Strategy, and Tragedy 3.4 Arms Races and International Politics 3.5 Conclusion 4 Leaping into the Dark: Europe Goes to War 4.1 The July Crisis and the Great War 4.2 Explaining War Outbreak and Expansion 4.2.1 Solving the Puzzle 4.2.2 Why 1914? 4.3 Whose Fault Was It? 4.4 On “Unwinnable" Wars 4.5 Conclusion 4.6 Exercises: System Effects 5 The Theory of War II: Information Problems 5.1 Uncertainty and Bayesian Games 5.1.1 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 5.1.2 Information Problems and War 5.2 Why Did France and Germany Hesitate? 5.3 Conclusion 5.4 Exercises: The UN and Public Opinion 6 A Scrap of Paper: Belgium, France, and British Entry 6.1 The Defense of Belgium 6.2 Explaining British Entry 6.2.1 Solving the Puzzle 6.2.2 Was It Law or Self-Interest? 6.3 What Is the Balance of Power? 6.4 Reassurance and International Politics 6.5 Conclusion 7 Troubled Partnerships: Coalitions at War 7.1 Cooperation in Rival Coalitions 7.2 Explaining Wartime Cooperation 7.2.1 Solving the Puzzle: The Entente 7.2.2 Solving the Puzzle: The Central Powers 7.3 On Solving Collective Action Problems 7.4 Coalitions and International Politics I 7.5 Conclusion 8 The Best-Laid Plans: Attrition's Static Horror 8.1 From Maneuver to Attrition 8.2 Explaining Attrition 8.2.1 Solving the Puzzle: The Frontiers 8.2.2 Solving the Puzzle: After the Marne 8.3 Attrition and Maneuver in the East 8.4 Military Strategy and International Politics 8.5 Conclusion 8.6 Exercises: Armaments and Military Secrecy 9 Choosing Sides: Building Military Coalitions 9.1 Italy and the Ottoman Empire Join the War 9.2 Explaining Coalition Building 9.2.1 Solving the Puzzle 9.2.2 Did Italy Break Faith? 9.3 The War in East Asia 9.4 Coalitions and International Politics II 9.5 Conclusion 10 Coordinating Caution: Naval Warin the North Sea 10.1 Limited War in the North Sea 10.2 Explaining Limits on War 10.2.1 Solving the Puzzle 10.2.2 Did the Dreadnoughts Matter? 10.3 On Limited War 10.4 Coordination and International Politics 10.5 Conclusion 11 The Theory of War III: Commitment and War Termination 11.1 “Real" and “Absolute" War 11.2 Solving Commitment Problems 11.2.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 11.2.2 Commitment Problems and Subgame Perfection 11.3 Restraint in the Trenches 11.4 Commitment Problems and Civil War 11.5 Conclusion 11.6 Exercises: Interdependence and War 12 The Theory of War IV: Information and War Termination 12.1 The Puzzle of Persuasion 12.2 Solving Information Problems 12.2.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 12.2.2 Information Problems and Bayesian Perfection 12.3 Fighting, Learning, Bargaining 12.4 Conclusion 12.5 Exercises: Communication and Bluffing 13 Too Proud to Fight? U-boats and American Neutrality 13.1 Deterrence and the Submarine War 13.2 Explaining American Intervention 13.2.1 Solving the Puzzle 13.2.2 Why “Associated," Not “Allied"? 13.3 War Finance 13.4 National Leaders and International Politics 13.5 Conclusion 14 The End of the Beginning: Victory, Defeat, and Peace 14.1 Ending with a Whimper 14.2 Explaining War Termination 14.2.1 Solving the Puzzle 14.2.2 What Happened to the “Knockout"? 14.3 Democracy and War 14.4 The Politics of Peace 14.5 Conclusion 15 Conclusion: History and the Present 15.1 Contemporary International Relations 15.2 The Great War and Political Science Bibliography Index