The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control (Studies in International Relations (Columbia, S.C.).)

Five Swiss and one American scholar of international relations and political science question whether or not it is sensible to buy cooperation in arms control from critical states by offering them money, technology, know-how, or other goodies. Combining social science theory with empirical studies, they examine seven explicit deals, analyzing in detail the transfer of two light water reactors and oil to North Korea and of considerable resources to Ukraine. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com) The Politics Of Positive Incentives In Arms Control Poses The Question Of Whether Or Not It Is Sensible To Buy Cooperation From Critical States And Examines Various Recent Cases Of Nuclear Nonproliferation Diplomacy, Including Experiences With Ukraine And North Korea. In Exploring The Conditions Under Which Positive Incentives Are Effective And Efficient In Resolving International Collaboration Problems, Editors Thomas Bernauer And Dieter Ruloff And Four Other Contributors Draw On A Wide Range Of Social Science Theories And Results Of Empirical Research. They Define Positive Incentives As Transfers Of Positively Valued Resources, Such As Money, Technology, Or Know-how, From One Actor To Another With The Aim Of Driving The Behavior Of The Recipient In A Direction That Is Desirable From The Viewpoint Of The Provider.--jacket. Introduction And Analytical Framework / Thomas Bernauer And Dieter Ruloff -- Incentives Provided For In Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements / Jozef Goldblat -- North Korea : A Case In Progress / Amy Smithson -- The Denuclearization Of Ukraine / Thomas Bernauer, Stefan Brem, And Roy Suter -- Positive Incentives In Nuclear Nonproliferation And Beyond / Thomas Bernauer. Edited By Thomas Bernauer And Dieter Ruloff. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. "The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control poses the question of whether or not it is sensible to "buy" cooperation from critical states and examines various recent cases of nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy, including experiences with Ukraine and North Korea. In exploring the conditions under which positive incentives are effective and efficient in resolving international collaboration problems, editors Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff and four other contributors draw on a wide range of social science theories and results of empirical research. They define positive incentives as transfers of positively valued resources, such as money, technology, or know-how, from one actor to another with the aim of driving the behavior of the recipient in a direction that is desirable from the viewpoint of the provider."--BOOK JACKET. Introduction and analytical framework / Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff Incentives provided for in major multilateral arms control agreements / Jozef Goldblat North Korea : a case in progress / Amy E. Smithson The denuclearization of Ukraine / Thomas Bernauer, Stefan Brem, and Roy Suter Positive incentives in nuclear nonproliferation and beyond / Thomas Bernauer. An examination of the effectiveness of material incentives in negotiating arms agreements. It asks whether or not it is sensible to ""buy"" co-operation from critical states and explores various cases of nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy, including experiences with Ukraine and North Korea.