سیاست‌های استراتژی کلان: بریتانیا و فرانسه برای جنگ آماده می‌شوند، 1904-1914

The emergence of the Anglo-French entente after 1904 reshaped the international system before the First World War. After Russi's addition in 1907, the Triple Entente confronted the Triple Alliance in crisis after crisis. This study, first published in 1969, chronicles the impact of the entente upon the British decision to pursue a policy of Continental intervention and looks at the ramifications of that decision upon both British and French strategic policies. Britain's search for support against an assertive Germany represented its first acknowledgement of relative decline in the international system. The British sought to conceal the extent of their policy shift, denying the entente relationship had any military or naval dimension. In fact, from late 1905 to the war, there were secret military and naval conversations between the two governments. Mr. Williamson, focusing upon the content and conduct of the covert planning, examines the assumptions of entente strategy and its operational consequences. In the years after 1905 the military and naval talks would become a British substitute for a formal alliance commitment to the French; this use of the secret talks, which misled the British cabinet for years and the British parliament down to August 1914, possibly also explains Germany's failure to assess correctly Britain's support for France. Williamson thus helps put Fritz Fischer's arguments about German policy into a comparative framework. The Politics of Grand Strategy also examines the domestic ramifications of the secret staff planning and the ineptness of radical leadership in the British Cabinet in trying to block the Continental strategy. The author analyzes the problems of civil-military relations, the difficulty of controlling zealous staff officers, and the inherent risks of all forms of strategic planning. This second edition has a new preface that analyzes the abundant new literature appearing since 1969 on British military and intelligence operations, on the evolution of French strategic planning, and on the clashes of the entente and alliance systems.

the Emergence Of The Anglo-french Entente After 1904 Reshaped The International System Before The First World War. After Russi's Addition In 1907, The Triple Entente Confronted The Triple Alliance In Crisis After Crisis. This Study, First Published In 1969, Chronicles The Impact Of The Entente Upon The British Decision To Pursue A Policy Of Continental Intervention And Looks At The Ramifications Of That Decision Upon Both British And French Strategic Policies.

britain's Search For Support Against An Assertive Germany Represented Its First Acknowledgement Of Relative Decline In The International System. The British Sought To Conceal The Extent Of Their Policy Shift, Denying The Entente Relationship Had Any Military Or Naval Dimension. In Fact, From Late 1905 To The War, There Were Secret Military And Naval Conversations Between The Two Governments. Mr. Williamson, Focusing Upon The Content And Conduct Of The Covert Planning, Examines The Assumptions Of Entente Strategy And Its Operational Consequences.

in The Years After 1905 The Military And Naval Talks Would Become A British Substitute For A Formal Alliance Commitment To The French; This Use Of The Secret Talks, Which Misled The British Cabinet For Years And The British Parliament Down To August 1914, Possibly Also Explains Germany's Failure To Assess Correctly Britain's Support For France. Williamson Thus Helps Put Fritz Fischer's Arguments About German Policy Into A Comparative Framework.

the Politics Of Grand Strategy Also Examines The Domestic Ramifications Of The Secret Staff Planning And The Ineptness Of Radical Leadership In The British Cabinet In Trying To Block The Continental Strategy. The Author Analyzes The Problems Of Civil-military Relations, The Difficulty Of Controlling Zealous Staff Officers, And The Inherent Risks Of All Forms Of Strategic Planning.

this Second Edition Has A New Preface That Analyzes The Abundant New Literature Appearing Since 1969 On British Military And Intelligence Operations, On The Evolution Of French Strategic Planning, And On The Clashes Of The Entente And Alliance Systems.

The emergence of the Anglo-French entente after 1904 reshaped the international system before the First World War. After Russia's addition in 1907, the Triple Entente confronted the Triple Alliance in crisis after crisis. This study, first published in 1969, chronicles the impact of the entente upon the British decision to pursue a policy of Continental intervention and looks at the ramifications of that decision upon both British and French strategic policies. Britain's search for support against an assertive Germany represented its first acknowledgement of relative decline in the international system. The British sought to conceal the extent of their policy shift, denying the entente relationship had any military or naval dimension. In fact, from late 1905 to the war, there were secret military and naval conversations between the two governments. Mr. Williamson, focusing upon the content and conduct of the covert planning, examines the assumptions of entente strategy and its operational consequences. In the years after 1905 the military and naval talks would become a British substitute for a formal alliance commitment to the French; this use of the secret talks, which misled the British cabinet for years and the British parliament down to August 1914, possibly also explains Germany's failure to assess correctly Britain's support for France. Williamson thus helps put Fritz Fischer's arguments about German policy into a comparative framework. The Politics of Grand Strategy also examines the domestic ramifications of the secret staff planning and the ineptness of radical leadership in the British Cabinet in trying to block the Continental strategy. The author analyzes the problems of civil-military relations, the difficulty of controlling zealous staff officers, and the inherent risks of all forms of strategic planning. This second edition has a new preface that analyzes the abundant new literature appearing since 1969 on British military and intelligence operations, on the evolution of French strategic planning, and on the clashes of the entente and alliance systems. Frontmatter (page N/A) Abbreviations (page xix) Chapter 1 The Formation of the Entente Cordiale, 1898-1904 (page 1) Chapter 2 The Entente Challenged: The First Morroccan Crisis, 1905 (page 30) Chapter 3 The Military Conversations Begin, 1905-1906 (page 59) Chapter 4 Preparing for War: British Defense Policy, 1906-1910 (page 89) Chapter 5 French Strategy in Transition, 1905-1911 (page 115) Chapter 6 The Entente Under Stress, 1908-1911 (page 131) Chapter 7 Agadir Confirms Britains Continental Strategy (page 167) Chapter 8 Joffre Reshapes French Strategy, 1911-1913 (page 205) Chapter 9 The Naval Conversations Begin, 1911-1912 (page 227) Chapter 10 The Haldane Mission, 1912 (page 249) Chapter 11 The Mediterranean and the Entente, 1912 (page 264) Chapter 12 The Political Consolidation of the Entente, 1912 (page 284) Chapter 13 Prepared for War: The Entente Military and Naval Arrangements (page 300) Chapter 14 The Entente on the Eve of War, 1913-1914 (page 328) Chapter 15 The Anglo-French Entente Goes to War: August 1914 (page 343) Select Bibliography (page 373) Index (page 397)