The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
معرفی کتاب «The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)» نوشتهٔ GEORG S VANBERG، منتشرشده توسط نشر Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing) در سال 2004. این کتاب در فرمت pdf، زبان انگلیسی ارائه شده است.
Constitutional courts have emerged as central institutions in many advanced democracies. This book investigates the sources and the limits of judicial authority, focusing on the central role of public support for judicial independence. The empirical sections of the book illustrate the theoretical argument in an in-depth study of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews with judges and legislators. The book's major finding is that the interests of governing majorities, prevailing public opinion, and the transparency of the political environment exert a powerful influence on judicial decisions. Judges are influenced not only by jurisprudential considerations and their policy preferences, but also by strategic concerns. By highlighting this dimension of constitutional review, the book challenges the contention that high court justices are largely unconstrained actors as well as the notion that constitutional courts lack democratic legitimacy. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 5 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Dedication......Page 9 Contents......Page 11 Acknowledgments......Page 13 1 The Politics of Constitutional Review......Page 17 Example 1: The Crucifix Decision in Germany......Page 18 Example 2: German Party Finance......Page 20 Example 3: The Legislative Veto in the United States......Page 21 CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE......Page 25 APPROACH OF THE BOOK......Page 28 PLAN OF THE BOOK......Page 33 2 Implementation, Public Support, and Transparency......Page 35 PUBLIC SUPPORT AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITY......Page 36 MODELING CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW......Page 40 PREDICTIONS OF THE MODEL......Page 44 INTERPRETATION AND COMPARATIVE STATICS......Page 55 TRANSPARENCY......Page 61 PUBLIC SUPPORT......Page 65 INFORMATION, POLITICAL COMPETITION, AND SEPARATION OF POWERS......Page 69 CONCLUSION......Page 72 Proof of the Equilibria......Page 74 3 The Federal Constitutional Court in Comparative Perspective......Page 77 ESTABLISHING A COURT......Page 78 WEATHERING THE FIRST STORM......Page 83 ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE......Page 93 THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS......Page 97 JURISDICTION AND CASELOAD......Page 103 DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES......Page 107 DECISIONS......Page 108 CONCLUSION......Page 109 4 Transparency and Judicial Deference......Page 111 FOCUSING ON TRANSPARENCY......Page 113 HYPOTHESES......Page 116 THE DATA......Page 118 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS......Page 122 CONTROLLING FOR THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT......Page 124 SUBSTANTIVE IMPACT......Page 127 CONCLUSION......Page 129 5 From the Inside Looking out Judicial and Legislative Perceptions......Page 132 PUBLIC SUPPORT AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITY......Page 135 PUBLIC SUPPORT AS CONSTRAINT ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR......Page 140 EVASION AND THE COSTS OF COMPLIANCE......Page 146 CONCLUSION......Page 153 Bundestag Deputies Interviewed (Party Affiliation, Committee Assignment, and Bundestag Tenure in Parentheses)......Page 154 APPENDIX B: BUNDESTAG QUESTIONNAIRE......Page 155 APPENDIX C: COURT QUESTIONNAIRE......Page 156 6 Pushing the Limits Party Finance Legislation and the Bundesverfassungsgericht......Page 159 PARTY FINANCE IN GERMANY......Page 162 THE COURT’S INITIAL APPROACH TO PARTY FINANCE......Page 163 LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO PARTY FINANCE II AND THE 1986 DECISIONS......Page 168 THE REVISION OF 1988 AND THE 1992 PARTY FINANCE DECISION......Page 178 CONCLUSION......Page 182 7 Prudent Jurists......Page 184 BEYOND GERMANY......Page 188 BROADER NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS......Page 191 Bibliography......Page 195 U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES......Page 203 Index......Page 205 This Book Investigates The Sources And Limits Of Judicial Authority, Focusing On The Central Role Of Public Support For Judicial Independence. The Empirical Sections Of The Book Illustrate The Theoretical Argument In An In-depth Study Of The German Federal Constitutional Court, Including Statistical Analysis Of Judicial Decisions, Case Studies, And Interviews With Judges And Legislators.--jacket. The Politics Of Constitutional Review -- Implementation, Public Support, And Transparency -- The Federal Constitutional Court In Comparative Perspective -- Transparency And Judicial Deference -- From The Inside Looking Out : Judicial And Legislative Perceptions -- Pushing Limits : Party Finance Legislation And The Bunderverfassungsgericht -- Prudent Jurists. Georg Vanberg. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 179-187) And Index. This book investigates the sources and the limits of judicial authority in constitutional courts, focusing on the central role of public support for judicial independence. The book provides an in-depth study of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews Constitutional review - defined as the power of judicial bodies to set aside ordinary legislative or administrative acts if judges conclude that they conflict with the constitution - has emerged as an almost universal feature of Western-style democracy.
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