The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues that all authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. First, dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule - this is the problem of authoritarian control. A second, separate challenge arises from the elites with whom dictators rule - this is the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Crucially, whether and how dictators resolve these two problems is shaped by the dismal environment in which authoritarian politics takes place: in a dictatorship, no independent authority has the power to enforce agreements among key actors and violence is the ultimate arbiter of conflict. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators, such as Saddam Hussein, establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why leadership changes elsewhere are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. When assessing his arguments, Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis of comprehensive, original data on institutions, leaders, and ruling coalitions across all dictatorships from 1946 to 2008. Cover ......Page 1 The Politics of Authoritarian Rule......Page 3 Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics......Page 5 Title ......Page 7 Copyright ......Page 8 Dedication ......Page 9 Contents ......Page 11 Figures......Page 15 Tables......Page 17 Acknowledgments......Page 19 1 Introduction: The Anatomy of Dictatorship......Page 21 1.1 THE TWO PROBLEMS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE......Page 23 1.1.1 The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing......Page 25 1.1.2 The Problem of Authoritarian Control......Page 29 1.2 THE AUTHORITARIAN SETTING......Page 33 1.3 PLAN OF THE BOOK......Page 37 2 The World of Authoritarian Politics ......Page 39 2.1 WHAT COUNTS AS A DICTATORSHIP?......Page 42 2.2 MAKING SENSE OF INSTITUTIONAL HETEROGENEITYUNDER DICTATORSHIP......Page 46 2.3 THIS BOOK'S APPROACH TO POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONOF DICTATORSHIPS......Page 52 2.4 LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN DICTATORSHIPS......Page 59 2.5 THE SURVIVAL OF AUTHORITARIAN RULING COALITIONS......Page 61 2.6 CONCLUSION: THE RICH WORLD OF AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS......Page 63 2.7 APPENDIX: AUTHORITARIAN SPELLS, 1946–2008......Page 65 I THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITARIAN POWER-SHARING......Page 71 3 And Then There Was One! Authoritarian Power-Sharing and the Path to Personal Dictatorship ......Page 73 3.1 AUTHORITARIAN POWER-SHARING AND THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL AUTOCRACY......Page 77 3.2 A FORMAL MODEL......Page 83 3.2.1 Authoritarian Power-Sharing......Page 85 3.2.2 Balance of Power and Authoritarian Power-Sharing......Page 88 3.2.3 A Model with Endogenously Evolving Balance of Power......Page 91 3.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EMPIRICAL STUDYOF AUTHORITARIAN TENURES......Page 92 3.4 THE PATH TO PERSONAL AUTOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIAN EXIT FROM OFFICE......Page 95 3.5 CONCLUSION: THE MANAGEMENT OF ESTABLISHED AUTOCRACY......Page 98 3.6 APPENDIX: PROOFS......Page 101 4 WHEN AND WHY INSTITUTIONS CONTRIBUTE TO AUTHORITARIAN STABILITY: Commitment, Monitoring, and Collective Action Problems in Authoritarian Power-Sharing......Page 105 4.1 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND AUTHORITARIAN POWER-SHARING......Page 108 4.2 THE ALLIES' COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEMAND CREDIBLE POWER-SHARING......Page 114 4.3 A FORMAL MODEL......Page 120 4.3.1 Allies’ Rebellion as a Collective-Action Problem......Page 122 4.3.2 Authoritarian Power-Sharing without Institutions......Page 126 4.3.3 Authoritarian Power-Sharing with Institutions......Page 128 4.4 POWER-SHARING INSTITUTIONS ANDAUTHORITARIAN STABILITY......Page 130 4.5 CONCLUSION: THE DISTINCTLY AUTHORITARIAN PURPOSEOF NOMINALLY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN DICTATORSHIPS......Page 136 Cited Works ......Page 137 Forming a larger than minimum ruling coalition κ0.......Page 138 PART II THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL ......Page 141 5 Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and the Origins of Military Dictatorships......Page 143 5.1 THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM IN AUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION......Page 147 5.2 BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF MILITARY INTERVENTION......Page 154 5.3 A FORMAL MODEL......Page 158 5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS......Page 168 5.6 APPENDIX I: PROOFS......Page 179 5.7 APPENDIX II: MULTIPLE IMPUTATION......Page 180 6 Why Authoritarian Parties? The Regime Party as an Instrument of Co-optation and Control......Page 182 6.1 THE LOGIC OF PARTY-BASED AUTHORITARIAN CO-OPTATION......Page 187 6.1.1 Hierarchical Assignment of Service and Benefits......Page 188 6.1.2 Political Control over Appointments......Page 198 6.1.3 Selective Recruitment, Promotion, and Repression......Page 202 6.2 REGIME PARTIES AND AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE......Page 204 6.3 CONCLUSION: WHY AUTHORITARIAN REGIME PARTIES?......Page 212 7 Conclusion: Incentives and Institutions in Authoritarian Politics......Page 216 7.1 WHY DICTATORS PRESIDE OVER POLICY DISASTERS......Page 217 7.2 WHY SO FEW DICTATORSHIPS SOLVE SUCCESSION CRISESAND DEPERSONALIZE POLITICAL AUTHORITY......Page 218 7.3 A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE FOR THE ARAB SPRING?......Page 219 Bibliography ......Page 223 News Sources ......Page 240 Index ......Page 243 What Drives Politics In Dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik Argues Authoritarian Regimes Must Resolve Two Fundamental Conflicts. Dictators Face Threats From The Masses Over Which They Rule - The Problem Of Authoritarian Control. Secondly From The Elites With Whom Dictators Rule - The Problem Of Authoritarian Power-sharing. Using The Tools Of Game Theory, Svolik Explains Why Some Dictators Establish Personal Autocracy And Stay In Power For Decades; Why Elsewhere Leadership Changes Are Regular And Institutionalized, As In Contemporary China; Why Some Dictatorships Are Ruled By Soldiers, As Uganda Was Under Idi Amin; Why Many Authoritarian Regimes, Such As Pri-era Mexico, Maintain Regime-sanctioned Political Parties; And Why A Country's Authoritarian Past Casts A Long Shadow Over Its Prospects For Democracy, As The Unfolding Events Of The Arab Spring Reveal. Svolik Complements These And Other Historical Case Studies With The Statistical Analysis On Institutions, Leaders And Ruling Coalitions Across Dictatorships From 1946 To 2008-- 1. Introduction: The Anatomy Of Dictatorship -- 2. The World Of Authoritarian Politics -- Part I. The Problem Of Authoritarian Power-sharing -- 3. And Then There Was One!: Authoritarian Power-sharing And The Path To Personal Dictatorship -- 4. When And Why Institutions Contribute To Authoritarian Stability: Commitment, Monitoring, And Collective Action Problems In Authoritarian Power-sharing -- Part Ii. The Problem Of Authoritarian Control -- 5. Moral Hazard In Authoritarian Repression And The Origins Of Military Dictatorships -- 6. Why Authoritarian Parties?: The Regime Party As An Instrument Of Co-optation And Control -- 7. Conclusion: Incentives And Institutions In Authoritarian Politics. Milan W. Svolik, University Of Illinois, Urbana-champaign. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 203-221) And Index. "What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule -- the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule -- the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008"-- Provided by publisher Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship; 2. The world of authoritarian politics; Part I. The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing: 3. And then there was one!: Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship; 4. Institutions, collective action, and the success of authoritarian power-sharing; Part II. The Problem of Authoritarian Control: 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships; 6. Why authoritarian parties?: The regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control; 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics. What drives politics in dictatorships? Svolik explores two fundamental conflicts that shape the politics of dictatorships - the problems of authoritarian control and authoritarian power-sharing - and shows how they account for key outcomes in dictatorships, including their institutions and policies, as well as the survival of leaders and regimes.