The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare)

The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency―a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results. Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization. M. L. R. Smith is professor of strategic theory in the Department of War Studies at King's College, University of London. Among his publications are Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement and The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works and Why It Fails. David Martin Jones is associate professor in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Brisbane. His publications include Political Development in Pacific Asia, The Image of China in Western Social and Political Thought, and, with M. L. R. Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion and Sacred Violence: Political Religion in a Secular Age. Concise, impeccably well structured and penetrating, this book provides the most insightful analysis yet of the theoretical underpinnings of insurgency warfare, and what this means for contemporary armed conflict. (Huw Bennett, Aberystwyth University) As the 'success' of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan is increasingly called into question, The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency offers valuable insights that are likely to be both timely and enduring. The authors demonstrate with admirable lucidity that 21st century counterinsurgency has often been a catechism rather than a real strategy, with technocratic and modernizing zeal frequently blinding its practitioners to historical and contemporary reality. Vital for those seeking to understand the past, present, and future of counterinsurgency in theory and practice. (Austin Long, Columbia University) A penetrating study... The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency shows itself to be confident and decisive in its sceptical outlook, and a powerful and authoritative contribution to the literature of counter-insurgency. (Survival) Partly on the strength of their apparent success in "small wars" such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world-beating. Yet under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with militia violence and fear, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand province resulted in numerous casualties and a burgeoning opium trade. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly baled out by the US military. In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, former military intelligence officer Frank Ledwidge, a veteran of both campaigns, examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers and his own experiences, he looks in detail at how British strategy is developed and how senior officers are trained. He discusses the culture of the British military and argues that at the root of these flawed operations has been a reliance on obsolete structures, approaches and tactics, a culture of not asking difficult questions and -- above all -- an inability to adapt to new challenges. This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs.-- Jacket The Counterinsurgency (coin) Paradigm Dominates Military And Political Conduct In Contemporary Western Strategic Thought. It Assumes Future Wars Will Unfold As 'low Intensity' Conflicts Within Rather Than Between States, Requiring Specialized Military Training And Techniques. Coin Is Understood As A Logical, Effective, And Democratically Palatable Method For Confronting Insurgency - A Discrete Set Of Practices That, Through The Actions Of Knowledgeable Soldiers And Under The Guidance Of An Expert Elite, Creates Lasting Results. Through An Extensive Investigation Into Coin's Theories, Methods, And Outcomes, This Book Undermines Enduring Claims About Coin's Success While Revealing Its Hidden Meanings And Effects. What Is Counterinsurgency Mean To Counter? The Puzzle Of Insurgency -- Counterinsurgency And Strategy: Problems And Paradoxes -- Counterinsurgency And The Ideology Of Modernization -- The Paradoxes Of Counterinsurgency And Globalization -- The Illusion Of Tradition: Myths And Paradoxes Of British Counterinsurgency -- The Puzzle Of Counterinsurgency And Escalation. M. L. R. Smith And David Martin Jones. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Partly on the strength of their apparent success in insurgencies such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world-beating. However, their recent performance in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely seen as - at best - disappointing; under British control, Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with internecine violence, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand province resulted in heavy civilian and military casualties and a climate of violence and insecurity. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly bailed out by the US army. In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, Frank Ledwidge examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers and his own personal experiences, he looks in detail at the failures of strategic thinking and culture that led to defeat in Britain's latest 'small wars'. This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs Partly on the strength of their apparent success in insurgencies such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world beating. However, their recent performance in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely seen as—at best—disappointing; under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with internecine violence, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand Province resulted in heavy civilian and military casualties and a climate of violence and insecurity. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly bailed out by the US army. In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, Frank Ledwidge examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers, and his own personal experiences, he looks in detail at the failures of strategic thinking and culture that led to defeat in Britain's latest'small wars.'This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs. Partly on the strength of their apparent success in insurgencies such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world beating. However, their recent performance in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely seen asat bestdisappointing; under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with internecine violence, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand Province resulted in heavy civilian and military casualties and a climate of violence and insecurity. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly bailed out by the US army. In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, Frank Ledwidge examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers, and his own personal experiences, he looks in detail at the failures of strategic thinking and culture that led to defeat in Britain's latest "small wars." This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs. M. L. R. Smith is professor of strategic theory in the Department of War Studies at King's College, University of London. Among his publications are Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement and The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works and Why It Fails. David Martin Jones is associate professor in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Brisbane. His publications include Political Development in Pacific Asia, The Image of China in Western Social and Political Thought, and, with M. L. R. Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion and Sacred Violence: Political Religion in a Secular Age. POL037000,Political Science/Political Freedom & Security/Terrorism,POL059000,Political Science/World/Middle Eastern Examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers and the author's own personal experiences, this book looks at the failures of strategic thinking and culture that led to defeat in Britain's 'small wars'.