The political economy of U.S. tariffs: An empirical analysis (Economic theory, econometrics, mathematical economics)

The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis provides information pertinent to the political economy of trade barriers. This book discusses the cross-sectional regression analysis across industries to understand why some industries have been more privileged than others. Organized into seven chapters, this book begins with an overview of the structure of protection and identifies the primary actors or principles that condition the formation of trade policy more generally. This text then evaluates the institutional and theoretical reasons why political leverage should not be expected to play a significant role in explaining tariffs. Other chapters consider the notion that the structure of protection at any point in time represents some sort of equilibrium. This book discusses as well the distinction between nominal and effective tariffs. The final chapter deals with individual regressors and groups of regressors. This book is a valuable resource for economists and specialists in quantitative analysis. Content: Front Matter, Page iii Copyright, Page iv Preface, Pages vii-ix 1 - Introduction, Pages 1-10 2 - Theoretical and Institutional Aspects of Tariff Policy, Pages 11-34 3 - Equilibrium, Continuity, and Change in the Tariff Structure, Pages 35-47 4 - Measures of Protection, Pages 49-66 5 - The Comparative Disadvantage Variables, Pages 67-90 6 - Other Hypotheses and Variables, Pages 91-145 7 - Empirical Results, Pages 147-182 8 - Conclusion, Pages 183-187 References, Pages 189-203 Index, Pages 205-210 ECONOMIC THEORY, ECONOMETRICS, AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, Pages ibc1-ibc2 By Réal P. Lavergne. Includes Index. Bibliography: P. 189-203.