The political economy of sanctions : resilience and transformation in Russia and Iran

This book presents a comparative analysis of Russia and Iran under sanctions. Whilst the growing literature on sanctions has focused primarily on their effectiveness, much less attention has been paid to the ways in which sanctions have transformed target societies and states. Despite, or indeed because of, the relentless enactment of sanctions, Russia and Iran have become increasingly Hobbesian in their governance more self-reliant, less democratic, and more aggressive towards the West. The author explores these developments through a novel Welfare State Regime framework (WSR) that combines welfare state functionality with institutional, economic, and cultural structural dimensions. Ksenia Kirkham is Lecturer in the Department of War Studies at Kings College London, UK Contents List of Figures List of Tables 1 Introduction 1.1 Welfare State Theories and IPE 1.2 The Political Economy of Sanctions 1.3 The Political Economy of Russia and Iran 1.4 Book Outline References Part I Theoretical Identification of the Mechanisms of Sanctions 2 The Welfare State Regime as a Theoretical Account: From Welfare State to Gramsci 2.1 First Theoretical Adaptation: From Functional Representation of the Welfare State to ‘Regime’ Approach 2.1.1 Regime Approach 2.2 Second and Third Theoretical Adaptations: Global Dimension and Structural Power Relations 2.2.1 Global Dimension 2.2.2 Structural Power Relations References 3 The Welfare State Regime as an Analytical Tool: From Gramsci to Welfare 3.1 Contextual Settings: Capitalism and ‘Integral’ State 3.1.1 Capitalism 3.1.2 The Role of the State 3.1.3 Hegemonic Projects 3.2 Hegemonic Rivalry and Counter-Hegemonic Mechanisms 3.2.1 Sanctions as a Tool of Hegemonic Rivalry 3.2.2 Counter-Hegemony 3.2.3 The Welfare State Regime 3.3 Conclusion to Part I: Completing Theoretical Merger 3.3.1 Self-Protection of Society References Part II Institutional Design 4 Russia: Institutional Design 4.1 De-commodifying WSR Function 4.1.1 Labour Market: Pension Legislation 4.1.2 Households: Benefits-in-Cash and Benefits-in-Kind 4.2 Redistributive WSR Function 4.2.1 Primary Mechanisms for Income Distribution 4.2.2 Secondary Mechanisms of Income Distribution 4.3 Connecting WSR Function 4.3.1 Macro-Level Arrangements 4.3.2 Micro-Level Arrangements References 5 Iran (Institutional Design) 5.1 De-commodifying WSR Function 5.1.1 Labour Market: Pension Legislation 5.1.2 Households: Benefits-In-Cash and Benefits-In-Kind 5.2 Redistributive WSR Function 5.2.1 Primary Mechanisms for Income Distribution 5.2.2 Secondary Mechanisms of Income Distribution 5.3 Connecting WSR Function 5.3.1 Macro-Level Arrangements 5.3.2 Micro-Level Arrangements 5.4 Summing Up... 5.4.1 Decommodification 5.4.2 Redistribution 5.4.3 Connection References Part III Material Capabilities 6 Russia (Material Capabilities) 6.1 De-commodifying WSR Function 6.1.1 Labour Market Precarisation 6.1.2 Households’ Dependence on the Market 6.2 Redistributive WSR Function 6.2.1 Primary Distribution: Trade and Production 6.2.2 Secondary Distribution: The Effect of Macroeconomic Management on Poverty and Inequality 6.3 Connecting WSR Function 6.3.1 Macro-Level: Investment Opportunities 6.3.2 Micro-Level: Informal Connections References 7 Iran (Material Capabilities) 7.1 De-commodifying WSR Function 7.1.1 Labour Market Precarisation 7.1.2 Households’ Dependence on the Market 7.2 Redistributive WSR Function 7.2.1 Primary Distribution: Trade and Production 7.2.2 Secondary Distribution: The Effect of Macroeconomic Management on Poverty and Inequality 7.3 Connecting WSR Function 7.3.1 Macro-Level: Investment Opportunities 7.3.2 Micro-Level: Informal Connections 7.4 Summing Up... 7.4.1 Decommodification 7.4.2 Redistribution 7.4.3 Connection References Part IV Cultural Leadership 8 Russia (Cultural Leadership) 8.1 De-commodifying WSR Function 8.1.1 Labour Markets: Ideology, National Security and ‘Cadre’ Formation 8.1.2 Households: Consumerism and Human Values 8.2 Redistributive WSR Function 8.2.1 Primary: The Moral and Ethical Aspects for Accumulation of Wealth and Ideological Drivers for ‘Modernisation from Above’ 8.2.2 Secondary: People’s Attitudes to Distributional Practices 8.3 Connecting WSR Function 8.3.1 Macro-Level the Ideology of Statecraft 8.3.2 Micro-Level: State—Civil Society Complex References 9 Iran (Cultural Leadership) 9.1 De-commodifying WSR Function 9.1.1 Labour Markets and Ideological-Political Fluidity 9.1.2 Households: Consumerism and Human Values 9.2 Redistributive WSR Function 9.2.1 Primary: The Moral and Ethical Aspects for Accumulation of Wealth and Ideological Drivers for ‘Modernisation from Above’ 9.2.2 Secondary: People’s Attitudes to Distributional Practices 9.3 Connecting WSR Function 9.3.1 Macro-Level: The Ideology 9.3.2 Micro-Level: State–Civil Society Complex 9.4 Summing Up... 9.4.1 De-commodification 9.4.2 Redistribution 9.4.3 Connection References Part V Welfare State Regime Reproduction 10 WSR Reproduction 10.1 Introduction 10.1.1 De-commodification 10.1.2 Redistribution 10.1.3 Connection 10.2 Counter-Hegemonic Trends 10.2.1 Power Centralisation 10.2.2 Modernisation and Optimisation 10.2.3 Strategic Partnership and Diversification 10.2.4 Para-Constitutional Reform 10.2.5 Cadre Formation References 11 Concluding Remarks 11.1 Hobbesian Contender States? 11.2 Lockean ‘Heartland’? 11.3 Some Thoughts for Future Research References Appendices Appendix I. Russia Appendix II. Iran Bibliography Index