The political economy of rural-urban conflict : predation, production, and peripheries

In some cases of insurgency, the combat frontier is contested and erratic, as rebels target cities as their economic prey. In other cases, it is tidy and stable, seemingly representing an equilibrium in which cities are effectively protected from violent non-state actors. What factors account for these differences in the interface between urban-based states and rural-based challengers? To explore this question, this volume examines two regions representing two dramatically different outcomes. In West Africa (Liberia and Sierra Leone), capital cities became economic targets for rebels, who posed dire threats to the survival of the state. In Maoist India, despite an insurgent ideology aiming to overthrow the state via a strategy of progressive city capture, the combat frontier effectively firewalls cities from Maoist violence. This book argues that trade networks underpinning the economic relationship between rural and urban areas - termed 'interstitial economies' - may differ dramatically in their impact on (and response to) the combat frontier. It explains rebel predatory tendencies towards cities as a function of transport networks allowing monopoly profits to be made by urban-based traders. It explains combat frontier delineation as a function of the social structure of the trade networks: hierarchical networks permit elite-elite bargains that cohere the frontier. These factors represent what might be termed respectively the 'hardware' and 'software' of the rural-urban economic relationship. Of interest to any student of political economy and violence, this book presents new arguments and insights about the relationships between violence and the economy, predation and production, core and periphery. Cover 1 The Political Economy of Rural-Urban Conflict 4 Copyright 5 Acknowledgments 8 Contents 10 List of Figures 12 List of Tables 14 Part I: The Political Economy of the Rural-Urban Interface 16 1: Introduction 18 1.1 The Battle Lines Are Drawn 18 1.2 Traders and Raiders 21 1.3 The Stakes 28 1.4 The Road Less Travelled 33 1.5 The Road Map 37 References 40 2: Production and Predation 47 2.1 Town and Country 47 2.2 Through the Looking Glass 51 2.3 The Extensification-Intensification Dialectic 53 2.3.1 Production, Predation, and the State 56 2.3.2 The State ́s Economic (Un)doing 61 2.3.3 Non-State Armed Actors 65 2.3.4 A Note on Epistemology 66 2.4 A Simple Model of Rural-Urban Predation 67 2.4.1 A Two-Region, Two-Sector Model 67 2.4.2 The Formal Model 67 2.4.3 Multiple Equilibria 69 References 72 Part II: Violence Acts on ProductionNetworks 80 3: How Production Networks Adapted to Civil War in Liberia 82 3.1 Why Study Liberian Industry? 82 3.1.1 The Importance of Production Firms 83 3.1.2 What We Can Glean from Past Studies 85 3.2 Qualitative Research of Liberian Firms 88 3.2.1 The Liberian Case 88 3.2.2 Methods 90 3.3 Dispersal Strategies in Production Networks 92 3.3.1 Determinants of Predation Levels 92 Proximity to the Combat Frontier 92 Rebel and Civilian Behavior 93 Value of the Targeted Good 93 3.3.2 A Typology of Dispersal Strategies and Their Competitors 94 Increased Materials Throughput 94 Property Rights Investments 96 Accommodation with Predatory Groups 96 Dispersal Strategies 97 3.3.3 The Balancing Act 101 Production as Nerve Center 101 The Role of Information 102 3.4 Lessons and Leads 103 Acknowledgment 104 References 104 4: Stateless State-Led Industrialization 108 4.1 Overview 108 4.2 Methods for Examining Conflict Effects on Firms 110 4.3 The Cloud 112 4.4 SLI in Historical Context 114 4.4.1 Infant Industry Protection 115 4.4.2 Dependency Theory 115 4.4.3 Tacit Knowledge 116 4.5 Resemblances to SLI in Liberia 117 4.5.1 Import Tariffs 117 4.5.2 Local Content 118 4.5.3 Staff and Firm Localization 120 4.5.4 Knowledge Accumulation 121 4.5.5 SLI Mimicry in Summary 122 4.6 Where the Comparison Breaks Down 124 4.7 A Case for Postconflict Protectionism 125 Acknowledgment 127 References 128 5: Trade Network Splintering and Ethnic Homogenization in Liberia and Sierra Leone 133 5.1 Overview 133 5.2 The Dispersal and Homogenization Hypotheses 134 5.3 Predicting Trade as a Primary Occupation 137 5.4 Predicting Distance from Ethnic Homeland 138 5.5 Predicting Traders ́ Income 139 5.6 Radial Trade, Ethnic Homogenization, and Monopoly 141 References 142 Part III: Production Networks Acton Violent Actors 144 6: Multipolar Trade and Rural-Urban Violence in Maoist India 146 6.1 Trade or Invade 146 6.2 Hypothesizing Violence at the Combat Frontier 147 6.3 Background to the Naxal Conflict 149 6.4 A Statistical Model of Naxal Violence 153 6.4.1 Variables for Inclusion 154 6.4.2 Building a Control Model 155 6.5 Rural-Urban Strength and Network Reticulation as Violence Moderators 159 6.6 Theorizing Mechanisms 162 6.7 Implications for Development Policy 165 Acknowledgment 167 References 167 7: Trade Networks and the Management of the Combat Frontier 170 7.1 The Case of India with a Backward Glance at West Africa 170 7.2 Rural-Urban Linkages 173 7.3 Cleavage and Commerce 176 7.4 Segmentation and Stability 178 References 180 Part IV: Conclusion 182 8: Interstitial Economies 184 8.1 Where We Have Come 184 8.2 Trade Networks and Society in Comparative Perspective 186 8.3 Managing Coercive Violence 192 8.4 State Identity and Mass Violence 194 References 195 9: Into an Urban World 197 9.1 From Dusk to Red Dawn 197 9.2 Through a Glass, Darkly 198 9.3 Back to the Future 200 9.4 Do Not Go Gentle 202 References 205 APPENDIX A: Supply-Chain Management in a Predatory Environment 210 APPENDIX B: Multiplication of Trade Routes 214 APPENDIX C: Methodology and Regression Tables for Chapter 5 215 C.1 Dataset Generation 215 C.2 Regression Tables 216 References 221 APPENDIX D: Technical Details of Chapter 6 222 D.1 Derivation of Select Variables 222 D.2 Regression Tables 224 Reference 227 Index 228 In some cases of insurgency, the combat frontier is contested and erratic, as rebels target cities as their economic prey. In other cases, it is tidy and stable, seemingly representing an equilibrium in which cities are effectively protected from violent non-state actors. What factors account for these differences in the interface urban-based states and rural-based challengers? To explore this question, this book examines two regions representing two dramatically different outcomes. In West Africa (Liberia and Sierra Leone), capital cities became economic targets for rebels, who posed dire threats to the survival of the state. In Maoist India, despite an insurgent ideology aiming to overthrow the state via a strategy of progressive city capture, the combat frontier effectively firewalls cities from Maoist violence. This book argues that trade networks underpinning the economic relationship between rural and urban areas—termed “interstitial economies”—may differ dramatically in their impact on (and response to) the combat frontier. It explains rebel predatory tendencies toward cities as a function of transport networks allowing monopoly profits to be made by urban-based traders. It explains combat frontier delineation as a function of the social structure of the trade networks: hierarchical networks permit elite–elite bargains that cohere the frontier. These factors represent what might be termed respectively the “hardware” and “software” of the rural–urban economic relationship. Of interest to any student of political economy and violence, this book presents new arguments and insights about the relationships between violence and the economy, predation and production, core and periphery. Pt. I. The Political Economy Of Rural-urban Interface. Introduction ; Production And Predation -- Pt. Ii. Violence Acts On Production Networks. How Production Networks Adapted To Civil War In Liberia ; Stateless State-led Industrialization ; Trade Network Splintering And Ethnic Homogenization In Liberia And Sierra Leone -- Pt. Iii. Production Networks Act On Violent Actors. Multipolar Trade And Rural-urban Violence In Maoist India ; Trade Networks And The Management Of The Combat Frontier -- Pt. Iv. Conclusion. Interstitial Economies ; Into An Urban World. Topher L. Mcdougal. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Why do some rebel insurgencies target cities as economic prey, whilst others are content to trade with them? This volume examines how the trade networks underpinning the economic relationship between rural and urban areas differ in their impact on (and response to) the combat frontier.