The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

This book uses a transactions cost approach to explain the key institutional characteristics across the public sector. It defines the distinctive governance, financing and employment arrangements that characterize the common forms of public sector organization: the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau and the state-owned enterprise. It suggests why these forms are used to perform different administrative functions, and why legislators often leave very important decisions to be resolved at the administrative level. This book applies the basic ideas and models of economics to develop a single transactions framework to explain the key institutional arrangements across the whole range of public sector organization: the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau, and the state-owned enterprise. This book also explores the link between agency form and administrative function, agency independence from the legislature, the rights extended to private interests to influence administrative decision making, the role of civil service arrangements that are so often seen as simply frustrating efficiency and responsiveness, and the boundary between public and private sectors. This book should be of value to those with a practical interest in public administration as well as students of political science, public administration, economics, and public policy 1. Introduction -- 2. Basic Theory And Method: A Transactions Cost Approach -- 3. Regulatory Institutions -- 4. Bureaus And The Budget -- 5. Bureaus And The Civil Service -- 6. Public Versus Private Enterprise -- 7. Public Enterprise Versus Public Bureau -- 8. Conclusion. Murray J. Horn. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 241-255) And Indexes.