The Political Economy of International Agreements: A Collection of Essays (International Law and Economics)

This volume analyzes international agreements from a political economy perspective. In four essays, it raises the question of whether domestic institutions help explain if countries join international agreements, and in case they do, what type of international organization they join. The book examines how specific democratic design elements channel and mediate domestic demands directed at politicians, and how under certain circumstances entering international agreements helps politicians navigate these demands to their benefit. The volume also distinguishes between different types of international instruments with a varying expected constraining effect upon member states, and empirically tests if this matters for incentives to join. The volume addresses scholars, students, and practitioners interested in a better understanding of how the shape of domestic institutions affects politicians’ incentives to enter into binding international agreements. Acknowledgments Contents Introduction 1 Domestic Institutions and the Political Economy of International Agreements: A Survey and Hypotheses 2 Domestic Institutions and the Ratification of International Agreements in a Panel of Democracies (Co-authored with Jerg Gutm... 3 Choosing to Be Constrained: Electoral Institutions and the Varieties of International Organizations 4 Enforcing International Deals: The System of International Organizations from a Politics-as-Exchange Perspective References Domestic Institutions and the Political Economy of International Agreements: A Survey and Hypotheses 1 Introduction 2 Why Do States Bind Themselves Through International Agreements? 2.1 International Agreements as Signaling and Policy Entrenchment Devices 2.1.1 Political Structure and Government Credibility 2.1.2 Political Structure and Locking in 2.2 Particularistic Electoral Pressures and International Hands-Tying 2.2.1 Electoral Institutions and Political Responsiveness 2.2.2 Electoral Institutions and Political Incentives to Join International Agreements 3 Domestic Politics and Compliance with International Agreements 3.1 Veto Points and Compliance with International Agreements 3.2 Electoral Institutions, Political Clientelism, and Compliance 4 Conclusions References Domestic Institutions and the Ratification of International Agreements in a Panel of Democracies 1 Introduction 2 Domestic Institutions and International Agreements 2.1 Rational Choice of International Agreements 2.2 Electoral Institutions and International Agreements 2.3 Programmatic Parties and International Agreements 2.4 Domestic Political Constraints and International Agreements 2.4.1 Credible Commitment and Policy Reversal 2.4.2 Overcoming Domestic Opposition 2.4.3 Judicial Independence 2.5 Constitutional Provisions on International Agreements 3 Data and Estimation Approach 4 Empirical Results 5 Conclusion Appendix 1: Description of Variables and Data Sources Appendix 2: List of Countries Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix Appendix 4: Additional Regression Results References Choosing to Be Constrained: Electoral Institutions and the Varieties of International Organizations 1 Introduction 2 Domestic Politics and IO Institutionalization: Brief Literature Review 3 Electoral Institutions and IO Institutionalization: Theory 3.1 Why Would Politicians in Majoritarian Countries Prefer Highly Over Weakly Institutionalized IOs? The Hands-Tying Argument 3.1.1 What Benefits Do Politicians in Majoritarian Countries Derive from Being Members of Highly Instead of Weakly Institution... 3.1.2 Politicians ́ Original Choice to Delegate: Ex-ante Incentives in Majoritarian Countries Regarding the IO Membership Decis... 3.2 Considering the Opposite Argument: Why Would Politicians in Majoritarian Countries Prefer Weakly Over Highly Institutional... 3.3 Summary of Theoretical Expectations and Hypotheses 4 Data and Estimation Approach 4.1 Dependent Variables: Measuring IO Institutionalization 4.2 Independent Variables 4.2.1 Electoral Institutions 4.2.2 Socio-Economic Control Variables 4.2.3 Other Institutional Variables 5 Empirical Results 5.1 Robustness 5.1.1 Adding More Institutional Variables 5.1.2 Excluding the U.S. 6 Conclusion Appendix References Enforcing International Deals: The System of International Organizations from a Politics-as-Exchange Perspective 1 Introduction 2 Rationalist Theories of International Institutions 2.1 Public Choice 2.2 Agency Theory and Delegation 2.3 The Transaction Cost Approach 2.4 Gaps in the Current Literature 3 Institutions, Political Markets, and the Exchange of Support 3.1 International Institutional Arrangements 3.2 Legislative Organization and Transaction Cost Politics 3.3 Legislative Institutions and the Exchange of Support in Congress 3.4 International Institutions and the Exchange of Support 3.5 Enforcement of Deals to Exchange Support 3.6 Informal Ties and Formal International Institutions 3.7 The Parochial Benefits of International Institutions 4 Conclusion References