The Political Economy of Industry Organizations and Mercosur's North-South Trade Negotiations: The cases of Brazil and Argentina (International Political Economy Series)

This book addresses two of the most relevant yet understudied questions in field of International Political Economy (IPE): 1) what explains the trade policy preferences of the organizations that represent economic producers in the political sphere?; and 2) how they are formed? Specifically, it focuses on the evolution of the preferences of industry peak organizations in Brazil and Argentina, the National Confederation of Industry (CNI) -and the Sao Paulo Federation of Industries (FIESP) - in the first case, and the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA) in the second, regarding Mercosur's preferential trade agreements (PTA) negotiation agenda between 2010 and 2020. The author proposes a novel explanation, which combines elements from the open economy politics (OEP) paradigm with insights from ideational IPE. This book will appeal to research scholars, postgraduate and advanced undergraduate students, policymakers and professionals working in the fields of trade and industrial policies, trade agreements and negotiations, regionalism and government-business relations. Acknowledgments Contents Abbreviations List of Figures List of Tables 1 A Puzzling Evolution of Preferences: Industry Organizations in Brazil and Argentina and Mercosur’s North–South Preferential Trade Agreements Agenda Preferential Trade Agreements, Mercosur External Negotiations, and Industry Organizations in Brazil and Argentina Book Overview References 2 A Theory of Trade Policy Preference Formation for Unstable Contexts: Interaction Between Distributive Incentives and Ideas Existing Explanations of Trade Policy Preferences and Their Limitations An Alternative Explanation: Distributive Incentives and Ideas Hypotheses and Method References 3 Brazilian Industry Organizations and the Evolution of Preferences Towards North–South PTAs Industry Organizations and Trade Policy in Brazil Origins and Structure A Brief Historical Overview Industry Skepticism Towards North–South PTA Negotiations: The FTAA and EU–Mercosur A Move to a Rather Favorable Preference References 4 Why Did They Change? Inside the Process of Preference Formation in Brazilian Industry Organizations (2010–2016) The Role of Sectors and Firms Sectoral Distributive Incentives Sectoral Stances Brazilian Industrial MNCs The Interaction Between Distributive Incentives and Ideas Comes Into Play A Context of Industrial Crisis and Greater Uncertainty The Entrepreneurial Role of CNI’s International Unit An Unexpected Partner: The SECEX A New Push Amid the Questioning of Developmentalism Sectors Adjust Conclusion References 5 Brazilian Industry Organizations in Actual North–South PTA Negotiations (2016–2020) Negotiations Under Temer The Brazilian Industry in the EU–Mercosur Negotiation (2016–2018) Other Initiatives Negotiations Under Bolsonaro The Conclusion of the EU–Mercosur Negotiation Support and Opposition to Other Initiatives Conclusion References 6 Argentine Industry Organizations and the Evolution of Preferences Towards North–South PTAs Industry Organizations and Trade Policy in Argentina Origins and Structure A Brief Historical Overview The Argentine Industry and North–South Negotiations (1997–2009) Between Continuity and Adjustment in the Last Decade References 7 When Ideas Reinforce Sectoral Distributive Incentives: The Formation of Preferences Within UIA (2010–2015) Sectoral Distributive Incentives Distributive Incentives and Ideas in the Process of Preference Formation An Increasingly Unstable Context Ideas Reinforce Sectoral Distributive Incentives The Interaction with Government Officials Conclusion References 8 Adjustment for EU–Mercosur, Continuity for the Rest: Explaining the Evolution of UIA’s Preferences (2016–2020) Preference Formation During the Macri Administration (2016–2019) From Initial Expectations to Once Again a Context of Crisis A Government’s Push for North–South PTAs and Industry Responses Sectoral-Level Interactions for EU–Mercosur and Divergences Within UIA Other Initiatives Continuity, in All Senses, During the Beginning of Alberto Fernández’s Tenure (Early 2020) Conclusion References 9 Collective Actors’ Preference Formation and Their Impact in Times of Crises and Uncertainty Collective Actors, Unstable Contexts, and the Study of the Distributive Incentives-Ideas Interaction Empirical Findings Implications and Extensions References Appendix I: Process Tracing Tests Brazil Results Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 (3.1 and 3.2) Conclusion Results Component 1 Component 2 Conclusion Results Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Conclusion Argentina Results Component 1 Component 2 (2.1 and 2.2) Component 3 (3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) Conclusion Results Component 1 Component 2 Conclusion Results Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Conclusion Appendix II Interviews Brazil Peak Organizations Sectoral Associations Government Officials/Diplomats Experts Argentina UIA Sectoral Chambers Government Officials/Diplomats Experts Trade Opportunities and Threats Analysis Methodology and Application References Index