The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000 (The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000 2 Volume Hardback Set) (Volume 1)

The period from 1960 to 2000 was one of remarkable growth and transformation in the world economy. Why did most of Sub-Saharan Africa fail to develop over this period? Why did a few small African economies succeed spectacularly? The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960-2000 is by far the most ambitious and comprehensive assessment of Africa's post-independence economic performance to date. Volume 1 examines the impact of resource wealth and geographical remoteness on Africa's growth and develops a new dataset of governance regimes covering all of Sub-Saharan Africa. Separate chapters analyze the dominant patterns of governance observed over the period and their impact on growth, the ideological formation of the political elite, the roots of political violence and reform, and the lessons of the 1960-2000 period for contemporary growth strategy. Volume 2 contains the twenty-six detailed country studies on which these analyses are based. These volumes are an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with the economic development of Africa. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Contents......Page 7 Figures......Page 9 Tables......Page 11 Contributors......Page 14 Foreword......Page 17 Acronyms......Page 20 Part 1 Overview......Page 23 1 Policy plus: African growth performance, 1960–2000......Page 25 1.1 Economic growth in Africa, 1960–2000......Page 27 1.2 Scope and structure of the Project......Page 30 1.3 A taxonomic approach to synthesis......Page 33 1.4 A guide to this volume......Page 34 2.1 Divergence......Page 37 2.2 Slow accumulation and productivity growth......Page 41 2.3 Limited structural transformation......Page 45 2.4 Lingering volatility......Page 47 3.1 Regression models of growth......Page 48 3.2 Interpreting regression evidence......Page 50 3.3 A shifting platform: geography and human resources......Page 53 3.3.1 Demography......Page 54 3.3.2 Human development......Page 55 3.3.3 Geography......Page 58 3.4 Governance and growth......Page 63 3.4.1 Peace......Page 66 3.4.2 Policy......Page 67 3.4.3 The institutional environment......Page 76 3.4.5 Polarization......Page 78 3.5 From growth econometrics to case analysis......Page 82 4 Opportunities and choices: learning from the country evidence......Page 83 5 Conclusions......Page 87 5.2 Overcoming locational disadvantages......Page 88 5.3 Building human resources......Page 90 References......Page 91 1 Introduction......Page 98 2.1.1 Endowments......Page 101 2.1.3 Endowments and location in growth regressions......Page 103 2.2 Differential growth performance and its decomposition......Page 106 2.3 Key questions......Page 109 3 Choices......Page 111 3.1 Regulatory syndromes......Page 112 3.2 Redistributive syndromes......Page 113 3.3 Intertemporal syndromes......Page 115 3.5 Syndromes and opportunities......Page 118 4.1 Possible effects of the syndromes on opportunities......Page 122 4.2 How important were the syndromes?......Page 124 4.3 Syndromes and the foreclosing of opportunities......Page 134 4.3.1 Coastal, resource-scarce economies......Page 135 4.3.2 Resource-rich economies......Page 139 4.3.3 Landlocked, resource-scarce economies......Page 142 5.1 Understanding the past......Page 144 5.2 Facing the future......Page 146 Appendix......Page 148 References......Page 158 1 Introduction: the anti-growth syndromes......Page 159 2.1 State controls......Page 162 2.1.1 Burkina Faso: 1960–1982 (soft control); 1983–1990 (hard control)......Page 163 2.1.4 Ghana: 1960–1966, 1972–1983 (hard control)......Page 164 2.1.6 Tanzania: 1970–1985 (hard control); 1986–1994 (soft controls)......Page 166 2.2.1 Burundi: 1975–1987......Page 168 2.3 Intertemporally unsustainable spending......Page 169 2.3.3 Nigeria: 1974–1986......Page 170 2.3.4 Togo: 1974–1989......Page 172 2.4.2 Chad: 1979–1984, 1985–1993......Page 173 2.4.3 Sierra Leone: 1967–1968, 1991–2000......Page 174 2.5.1 Botswana: 1960–2000......Page 175 2.5.3 Ghana: 1968–1972, 1984–2000......Page 176 2.5.5 Tanzania: 1961–1967, 1995–2000......Page 177 2.5.6 Togo: 1960–1973......Page 178 3.1.1 Reigning international paradigms......Page 179 3.1.2 Experience of the initial leaders......Page 180 3.1.3 Group-identity rivalry......Page 181 3.1.4 Initial institutions......Page 182 3.2.1 Negative supply shocks......Page 183 3.3 Opportunity......Page 185 3.4.2 Political system......Page 186 3.5 Economically driven political expediency......Page 187 4 Conclusion......Page 188 References......Page 190 Part 2 Interpretation......Page 195 4 Domestic interests and control regimes......Page 197 2 Pricesinthe macroeconomy......Page 198 3.1 The industrial sector......Page 199 3.2 The agricultural sector......Page 200 4 The economic impact......Page 201 5.1 Manufacturing......Page 203 5.2 Public services......Page 204 5.3 Farming......Page 205 6 Temporal and political correlates......Page 207 6.1.1 Early adopters......Page 210 6.1.2 Embattled reformers......Page 211 7 The politics of economics......Page 212 7.1.2 In particular......Page 213 7.2 Regional redistribution......Page 214 7.3 Discussion......Page 216 8 Conclusion......Page 217 References......Page 220 1 Introduction......Page 224 2 Unsustainable public spending......Page 225 2.1 Evidence on spending booms......Page 229 3 Looting......Page 234 3.1 Looting the private sector in autocracies......Page 236 3.2 Looting the private sector in democracies......Page 237 3.3 Looting the public sector in autocracies......Page 239 3.4 Looting the public sector in democracies......Page 241 4 Conclusion and implications......Page 243 References......Page 245 1 Introduction......Page 247 2 Ethnicity and the polarization of wealth......Page 250 3 Howtopayfor the peace......Page 254 4 Triangular redistribution and political control......Page 260 5 Conclusion......Page 267 References......Page 268 1 Introduction......Page 271 2 Patterns of state breakdown......Page 272 3.1 Immediate costs......Page 275 3.2 Lagged effects......Page 279 4 State failure......Page 283 5.1 Theory of the state......Page 284 5.3 The model......Page 285 5.4 Political order as an equilibrium......Page 287 5.5.1 Revenue......Page 290 5.5.3 Natural resources......Page 291 6.1 Variables......Page 294 6.2 Core model......Page 295 7 Insearch of causal paths......Page 301 7.1 Petroleum production......Page 302 7.2 Revenues......Page 304 7.3 Political reform......Page 308 References......Page 312 1 Introduction: Hamlet without the prince?......Page 319 2 Growth and risk: the basics......Page 320 3 How does risk affect growth? Plausible channels......Page 323 4 Does it matter? Empirical estimates......Page 327 5 Conclusion......Page 332 References......Page 333 Part 3 Explanation......Page 335 1 Introduction: growth syndromes and ideas......Page 337 2 The evolution of global development paradigms......Page 339 2.1 Phase 1: 1960s–mid-1980s – the dominance of control regimes......Page 341 2.2 Phase 2: 1980s – a sharp turn away from the strong role of the state......Page 343 2.3 Phase 3: 1990s onwards – the paradigm of balance and one-world consensus......Page 344 3.1 Development paradigms, leaders, and growth syndromes: Fabianism and African control regimes......Page 345 3.2.1 The World Values Survey......Page 350 3.2.2 The Afrobarometer survey......Page 353 3.3 Influence of global development ideas through aid conditionality and selectivity......Page 355 3.3.1 CPIA and African growth syndromes......Page 356 4 Conclusion......Page 359 Appendix 1: Growth syndromes and types of leadership in Africa, 1970–2000......Page 361 Appendix 2: Syndromes and political regimes......Page 366 References......Page 367 10 Political reform......Page 370 1 Background......Page 371 2.1 The international path......Page 376 2.2 The domestic path......Page 378 3 Empirics......Page 380 4 The impact of political reform......Page 388 4.2 The economy......Page 389 4.4 The game......Page 390 4.5.2 Participation constraint......Page 391 4.6 Equilibrium......Page 392 4.7 Testing the model......Page 393 4.7.3 Discount rate......Page 395 4.7.6 Control variables......Page 398 4.8.2 The Nature of the economy......Page 399 4.8.4 Discount rate......Page 402 4.9 Political business cycle......Page 403 4.10.1 Candidates......Page 405 4.10.2 Voter sophistication......Page 406 5 Conclusion......Page 408 References......Page 409 1 Introduction......Page 413 2 Building blocks of political geography......Page 414 2.1.1 Stage 1: constitutional democracy in conditions of ethnic identity......Page 415 2.1.2 Stage 2: single-party systems......Page 417 2.1.3 Stage 3: rule by fear......Page 420 2.1.5 Concentration, composition, and duration: a summary of their implications for growth......Page 423 2.2.1 Landlocked, resource-scarce countries......Page 424 2.2.2 Resource-rich countries......Page 425 2.2.3 Coastal, resource-scarce countries......Page 426 2.3.3 Learning from the world......Page 427 3.1 Determinants of syndrome-free status......Page 428 3.2.1 Redistribution......Page 432 3.2.3 State breakdown......Page 433 4 Conclusions......Page 434 References......Page 438 Part 4 Looking ahead......Page 441 1 Introduction......Page 443 2.1.1 Strategy 1: increase neighborhood growth spillovers......Page 445 2.1.2 Strategy 2: improve neighbors’ economic policies......Page 446 2.1.5 Strategy 5: don’t be air-locked or E-locked......Page 447 2.1.6 Strategy 6: encourage remittances......Page 448 2.1.8 Strategy 8: create a transparent and investor-friendly environment for resource prospecting......Page 449 2.2.1 Political requirement 1: internalize neighborhood externalities......Page 450 2.2.2 Political requirement 2: internalize international externalities......Page 451 2.2.3 Political requirement 3: rebalancing interest groups......Page 452 3.1.1 Strategy 1: governments should transform the resource rents efficiently into public goods and private capital formation......Page 453 3.2.1 Political requirement 1: protecting the commons of the future......Page 454 3.2.4 Political requirement 4: protecting the technocrats......Page 455 4.1.1 Strategy 1: emulate the Asian model......Page 456 4.2.1 Political requirement 1: protecting exporters from predation......Page 457 4.2.3 Political requirement 3: temporary protection from Asia......Page 458 5 Conclusions......Page 459 References......Page 460 Index......Page 461