The Political Economy of Antitrust, Volume 282 (Contributions to Economic Analysis) (Contributions to Economic Analysis)

Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrust policy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, the book brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume. Content: Introduction to the Series Page v Acknowledgements Page vii List of Contributors Pages xv-xvi Chapter 1 Issues in Antitrust Enforcement Review Article Pages 1-23 Vivek Ghosal, Joseph E. Harrington Jr., Johan Stennek Chapter 2 Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics Review Article Pages 25-57 Stephen Martin Chapter 3 The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path Review Article Pages 59-80 Joe Chen, Joseph E. Harrington Jr. Chapter 4 Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison? Review Article Pages 81-122 Paolo Buccirossi, Giancarlo Spagnolo Chapter 5 Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests Review Article Pages 123-148 Cécile Aubert Chapter 6 Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel Review Article Pages 149-176 William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Matthew E. Raiff Chapter 7 Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels Review Article Pages 177-215 John M. Connor Chapter 8 The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control Review Article Pages 217-239 Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright, Jean Tirole Chapter 9 The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger Review Article Pages 241-258 Jay Pil Choi Chapter 10 The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small vs. Large Member States Review Article Pages 259-285 Henrik Horn, Johan Stennek Chapter 11 A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control Review Article Pages 287-302 Sven-Olof Fridolfsson Chapter 12 EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment Review Article Pages 303-348 Tomaso Duso, Klaus Gugler, Burcin Yurtoglu Chapter 13 The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice Review Article Pages 349-367 Jérôme Foncel, Marc Ivaldi, Valérie Rabassa Chapter 14 Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers Review Article Pages 369-381 Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz, Gregory J. Werden Chapter 15 Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator Review Article Pages 383-415 Antoine Faure-Grimaud, David Martimort Chapter 16 Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law Review Article Pages 417-451 Timothy J. Brennan Chapter 17 Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive? Review Article Pages 453-462 R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon, Sue H. Mialon Chapter 18 Antitrust in Open Economies Review Article Pages 463-483 Joseph Francois, Henrik Horn Subject Index Pages 485-489 Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers. This book covers topics such as: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and, systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrust policy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and, systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corpora Issues In Antitrust Enforcement / Vivek Ghosal, Joseph E. Harrington And Johan Stennek -- Remembrance Of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, And The Development Of Industrial Economics / Stephen Martin -- The Impact Of The Corporate Leniency Program On Cartel Formation And The Cartel Price Path / Joe Chen And Joseph E. Harrington -- Optimal Fines In The Era Of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still Go To Prison? / Paolo Buccirossi And Giancarlo Spagnolo -- Instruments For Cartel Deterrence, And Conflicts Of Interests / Cécile Aubert -- Lessons For Competition Policy From The Vitamins Cartel / William E. Kovacic ... [et Al.] -- Effectiveness Of Antitrust Sanctions On Modern International Cartels / John M. Connor -- The Economics Of Tacit Collusion: Implications For Merger Control / Marc Ivaldi ... [et Al.] -- The Economics And Politics Of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study Of The Ge/honeywell Merger / Jay Pil Choi -- The Political Economy Of Eu Merger Control: Small Vs. Large Member States / Henrik Horn And Johan Stennek -- A Consumer Surplus Defense In Merger Control / Sven-olof Fridolfsson -- Eu Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment / Tomaso Duso, Klaus Gugler And Burcin Yurtoglu -- The Significant Impediment Of Effective Competition Test In The New European Merger Regulation: In Theory And Practice / Jérôme Foncel, Marc Ivaldi And Valérie Rabassa -- Vertical Restraints And The Effects Of Upstream Horizontal Mergers / Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz And Gregory J. Werden -- Political Stabilization By An Independent Regulator / Antoine Faure-grimaud And David Martimort -- Saving Section 2: Reframing U.s. Monopolization Law / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive Or Anticompetitive? / R. Preston Mcafee, Hugo M. Mialon And Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust In Open Economies / Joseph Francois And Henrik Horn. Edited By Vivek Ghosal, John [i.e. Johan] Stennek. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / C(c)Øecile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / Matthew E. Raiff -- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU merger remedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu -- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator / David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolization law / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private antitrust litigation : procompetitive or anticompetitive? / Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust in open economies / Henrik Horn -- The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path / Joseph E. Harrington Jr -- Optimal fines in the era of whistleblowers : should price fixers still go to prison? / Giancarlo Spagnolo