The Political Construction of Business Interests: Coordination, Growth, and Equality (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Many societies use labor market coordination to maximize economic growth and equality, yet employers' willing cooperation with government and labor is something of a mystery. The Political Construction of Business Interests recounts employers' struggles to define their collective social identities at turning points in capitalist development. Employers are most likely to support social investments in countries with strong peak business associations, that help members form collective preferences and realize policy goals in labor market negotiations. Politicians, with incentives shaped by governmental structures, took the initiative in association-building and those that created the strongest associations were motivated to evade labor radicalism and to preempt parliamentary democratization. Sweeping in its historical and cross-national reach, the book builds on original archival data, interviews, and cross-national quantitative analyses. The research has important implications for the construction of business as a social class and powerful ramifications for equality, welfare state restructuring and social solidarity. Cover ......Page 1 The Political Construction of Business Interests......Page 3 Series......Page 5 Dedication......Page 6 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Contents......Page 9 Figures......Page 11 Tables......Page 12 Acknowledgments......Page 15 Introduction......Page 19 Introduction......Page 24 Our Scholarly Inspirations......Page 26 Labor Activism, Skills, and Varieties of Capitalism......Page 27 Networks, Associations, and the Construction of Preferences......Page 29 Historical Institutionalism and the State in the Construction of the Social Classes......Page 30 Varieties of Encompassing Employers’ Associations......Page 33 Partisan Origins of Encompassing Employers’ Associations......Page 36 Impacts of Peak Employers’ Associations on Policy Preferences......Page 41 Business Organization, Equality, and Economic Growth......Page 42 Conclusion......Page 44 Introduction......Page 46 Theories of Business Organization......Page 47 Labor Activism......Page 51 Party Systems and State Structures......Page 53 Methodology......Page 56 Measurement for Historical Quantitative Analysis......Page 57 Estimation......Page 58 Findings......Page 59 Industrialization......Page 62 Labor Mobilization as a Cause of Employer Organization......Page 63 Party System Characteristics......Page 64 Conclusion......Page 66 Introduction......Page 68 Industrialization......Page 69 Labor: Activism and Skills......Page 70 The Structure of Party Competition and Danish Employers......Page 72 Right Party’s Interests and Niels Andersen’s Role......Page 75 Political Ambitions: Unifying Business Policy Positions and Self-Regulation......Page 76 Industrial Peace......Page 78 The September Compromise and the Danish Model......Page 80 Further Consolidation and Centralization of DA’s Power......Page 81 Conclusion......Page 85 Introduction......Page 87 Patterns of Industrialization......Page 89 Labor Characteristics......Page 90 Party Competition and the Evolution of British Employers’ Associations......Page 91 The Absence of a National Organization at Century’s Turn......Page 92 Background Context for the Formation of the FBI......Page 93 Conservative Party Constituency-Building Efforts......Page 95 The Formation of the Federation of British Industries......Page 96 The Federation of British Industry’s Downfall......Page 99 Conclusion......Page 105 Introduction......Page 107 Industrialization and the Evolution of U.S. Business Representation......Page 108 Labor and American Employers......Page 109 Party Competition and Employers’ Associations: Segmented Parties, Divided Business......Page 110 The Republican’s Strategic Interests in Business Organization......Page 111 The Formation of the National Association of Manufacturers......Page 113 NAM’s Goals for Industrial Coordination, Labor Peace, and Corporatist Representation......Page 115 The Failure of Coordination......Page 117 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce......Page 119 Conclusion......Page 124 Introduction......Page 127 Characteristics of Industrialism......Page 129 German Labor and the Industrial Relations System......Page 130 Deficits of the German Party System......Page 131 Political Challenges for Bismarck and the German Industrialists......Page 133 The Formation of the Central Association of German Industrialists......Page 135 The Formation of the Bund der Industriellen......Page 137 Incentives for Coordination during and after World War I......Page 138 The Formation of the Reich Association of German Industry......Page 141 Conclusion......Page 144 Introduction......Page 146 The Paradox of Postindustrial Capitalism......Page 148 Continued Divergence of Modes of Market Coordination?......Page 150 Postindustrial Challenges......Page 152 Political Institutions and Agency in the Postindustrial Era......Page 155 Empirical Analysis: Measurement and Estimation......Page 157 Estimation......Page 160 Determinants of Nonmarket Coordination in the Postindustrial Era......Page 161 Conclusion......Page 165 Introduction......Page 167 Employers and Policy Responses to Postindustrial Challenges......Page 168 Economic Determinants of Social Spending and Preferences......Page 169 Labor Determinants of National Spending and Firms’ Preferences......Page 171 Political Structural Determinants of National Spending and Firms’ Preferences......Page 172 Macrocorporatism......Page 173 Policy Impacts of Employers’ Organization at the National Level......Page 175 Findings: National Level Analysis of ALMP and Social Protection......Page 176 A Study of Firms and Active Social Policy in Denmark and the United Kingdom......Page 179 Findings......Page 181 Conclusion......Page 187 Introduction......Page 188 The Danish Model......Page 190 Challenges to Employer Coordination and the Welfare State......Page 192 Neoliberal Policy Reforms......Page 193 Sustaining Macrocorporatist Coordination......Page 194 The Impact of Macrocorporatism on Active Labor Market Policy......Page 197 Macrocorporatist Impacts on Subsequent Bourgeois Reforms......Page 204 Conclusion......Page 205 Introduction......Page 207 Cleavages, Crises, and Reforms......Page 209 Failed Efforts to Build Labor Market Coordination......Page 214 The New Deal Active Labor Market Reform......Page 217 Involving Employers in the New Deal Programs......Page 219 Conclusion......Page 225 Introduction......Page 226 The German Model, Crises, and Reforms......Page 227 Postindustrial Challenges to Sector Coordination and Social Protection......Page 229 Structural Adjustment: Employers, Labor, and the State......Page 232 Policy Responses to Postindustrialization: Neoliberalism in the German Context......Page 233 The Failure of Cooperation: Sector Coordination, State Weakness and the Minimal Role of Employers......Page 237 The Failure of National Cooperation: Sector Coordination and the German State......Page 238 Employers and the Rise of Dualism......Page 242 Conclusion......Page 244 Introduction......Page 245 Class, Redistribution, and Equality......Page 246 Economic Determinants of Redistribution......Page 249 Labor Determinants of Redistribution......Page 250 Organizational Determinants of Redistribution......Page 251 Empirical Analyses......Page 252 Findings for Coordination and Redistribution......Page 255 Findings for Low-Wage Work, Market Inequality, and Labor Market Dualism......Page 257 Coordination and Economic Growth......Page 260 Conclusion......Page 264 Introduction......Page 266 The State, Institutions for Coordination, and Equality......Page 267 The Logic of Postfinance Capitalism and Politics of Solidarity......Page 269 Implications for Regimes of Coordination......Page 271 Conclusion......Page 273 Academic, Government, Interest Group Publications......Page 275 Index......Page 319 Many Societies Use Labor Market Coordination To Maximize Economic Growth And Equality, Yet Employers' Willing Cooperation With Government And Labor Is Something Of A Mystery. The Political Construction Of Corporate Interests Recounts Employers' Struggles To Define Their Collective Social Identities At Turning Points In Capitalist Development. Employers Are Most Likely To Support Social Investments In Countries With Strong Peak Business Associations, That Help Members Form Collective Preferences And Realize Policy Goals In Labor Market Negotiations. Politicians, With Incentives Shaped By Governmental Structures, Took The Initiative In Association-building And Those That Created The Strongest Associations Were Motivated To Evade Labor Radicalism And To Preempt Parliamentary Democratization. Sweeping In Its Historical And Cross-national Reach, The Book Builds On Original Archival Data, Interviews, And Cross-national Quantitative Analyses. The Research Has Important Implications For The Construction Of Business As A Social Class And Powerful Ramifications For Equality, Welfare State Restructuring And Social Solidarity-- Machine Generated Contents Note: Introduction; 1. Collective Political Engagement And The Welfare State; 2. The Political Origins Of Coordinated Capitalism; 3. The Political Origins Of Danish Employers' Associations; 4. British Experiments In National Employers' Organization; 5. Sectional Parties, Divided Business In The United States; 6. The Origins Of Sector Coordination In Germany; 7. Twenty-first Century Breakdown: Challenges To Coordination In The Post-industrial Age; 8. Institutional Sources Of Firms' Preferences For The Welfare State; 9. Employers, Coordination, And Active Labor Market Policy In Post-industrial Denmark; 10. Employers, Coordination, And Active Labor Market Policy In Post-industrial Britain; 11. The Failure Of Coordination And Rise Of Dualism In Germany; 12. The Political Foundations Of Redistribution And Equality; Conclusion: 13. Social Solidarity After The Crisis Of Finance Capitalism. Cathie Jo Martin, Boston University, Duane Swank, Marquette University, Wisconsin. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.