The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality (Philosophy of Mind Series)

Intentionality is the mind's ability to be "of," "about," or "directed" at things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might "say" that grass is green or that Santa Claus is jolly, and a visual experience might be "of" a blue cup. While the existence of the phenomenon of intentionality is manifestly obvious, how exactly the mind gets to be "directed" at things, which may not even exist, is deeply mysterious and controversial. It has been long assumed that the best way to explain intentionality is in terms of tracking relations, information, functional roles, and similar notions. This book breaks from this tradition, arguing that the only empirically adequate and in principle viable theory of intentionality is one in terms of phenomenal consciousness, the felt, subjective, or qualitative feature of mental life. According to the theory advanced by Mendelovici, the phenomenal intentionality theory, there is a central kind of intentionality, phenomenal intentionality, that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone, and any other kind of intentionality derives from it. The phenomenal intentionality theory faces important challenges in accounting for the rich and sophisticated contents of thoughts, broad and object-involving contents, and nonconscious states. Mendelovici proposes a novel and particularly strong version of the theory that can meet these challenges. The end result is a radically internalistic picture of the mind, on which all phenomenally represented contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some sense represent are expressly singled out by us. Some Mental States seem to be "of" or "about" things or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionally. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. It has been long assumed that the best way to explain intentionally is in terms of tracking and informational relations, functional roles, and similar ingredients. Mendelovici breaks from this tradition, arguing that the only empirically adequate and in principle viable theory of intentionality is one in terms of phenomenal consciousness, the felt, subjective, or qualitative feature of mental life. According to her phenomenal intentionality theory, there is a central kind of intentionality, phenomenal intentionality, that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone, and any other kind of intentionality derives from it. The phenomenal intentionality theory faces important challenges in accounting for the rich and sophisticated contents of thoughts, broad and object-involving contents, and unconscious states. Mendelovici proposes a novel and particularly strong version of the theory that can meet these challenges. The end result is a radically internalistic picture of the mind, on which all phenomenally represented contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some sense represent are expressly singled out by us. Book jacket Contents 8 Preface 12 Overview 16 I Introduction 20 1 Fixing Reference on Intentionality 22 2 Goals and Methodology 40 II Alternative Theories of Intentionality 50 3 The Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories 52 4 Functional Role Theories and Tracking Theories Again 89 III The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory 100 5 The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory 102 6 PIT’s Status as a Theory of Intentionality 128 IV Challenging Cases 140 7 Thought 142 8 Nonconscious States 179 V The Aspect View 212 9 Is Intentionality a Relationto a Content? 214 VI Conclusion 260 10 Conclusion: Intentionality and Other Related Phenomena 262 Glossary 268 Bibliography 274 Index 286