The Parmenides and Plato's Late Philosophy : Translation of and Commentary on the Parmenides with Interpretative Chapters on the Timaeus, the Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Philebus

Fourth example. Zeno in his treatise finds the 'consequences' of the supposition that many are to be contradictory, thus requiring by modus tollens that the supposition of the 'many' be rejected. Plato, turning the tables on Zeno, finds that, unless the supposition that one is requires the duality of one and being, the claim that one is is self-destructive. Given that duality, the supposition of the many (in a somewhat different form) is reinstated. But enough. My point has been to show that a great deal of the effort to explain the Parmenides (and the other late dialogues) requires the attempt to understand the sorts of philosophical problems Plato was looking at and the language in whose terms he stated them. Even though in the end the explanations must conform to the text as we have it (unless there is good reason to believe it corrupt), coming up with adequate explanations is at least as much a philosophical task as it is a philological one. And, in the end, of course, objectivity in the history of philosophy is lost if texts are either patronized or ignored. So let us proceed to the real task of explaining the Parmenides and its connections with several of Plato's late dialogues. 'Having Shares' (126A-35C) 10 The Parmenides and Plato's Late Philosophy friend -and that he had heard recounted so often the [126C] conversation which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides once had that he can relate it by heart.' 'What you say is true,' he said. 'Then,' said I, 'we wish to hear that conversation.' 'That's not difficult,' he said, 'for as a youth he took great pains with it, though now, like his grandfather who had the same name, he devotes himself to the care of horses. If that's your need, let's go to him. For he has only just now gone home from here, and he lives nearby in Melite.' [127A] Having said as much, we started walking, and we found Antiphon at home, giving a smith instructions for making some sort of bit. When he was free from him, the brothers told him our purpose in coming. He recognized me from the earlier visit and welcomed me, and we asked him to recount the conversation. At first he hesitated, for he said it was a hard task. Finally, however, he went through it. to the effect that, if one is, many ludicrous conclusions follow and, as well, conclusions that are contrary to his contention. This treatise of mine argues against those speaking on behalf of the many and returns to them the same and more. For it undertakes to show that their supposition, if many are, must allow, if one pursues it sufficiently, even more ludicrous conclusions than the supposition, if one is. It was from such love of controversy and while yet quite young that I wrote it, and then someone stole the manuscript, so that there was no chance to consider [128E] whether to publish it or not. Not being aware of this, Socrates, you think that it was written, not from youthful love of controversy, but from mature love of honour. Even so, as I said, your representation of it is not bad at all. Plato would have helped subsequent scholarship a great deal if he had reproduced Zeno's book (whether or not there was but one book) completely or, at any rate, had given us a great deal more of it. We must assume, however, that Socrates produces a reasonably accurate statement either of one of the book's arguments or of the general thrust of all of them. Plato does, however, supply us with quite a bit of additional information when, at the end of the first part of the dialogue, Parmenides describes the sort of 'exercise' that Socrates needs and refers to it as the procedure followed by Zeno. And there is good reason to believe that the procedure followed by Parmenides (in the dialogue) for 'his own' supposition, If one is, (notably in determining the 'consequences' for what I have labelled suppositions one and two) is like Zeno's procedure. These, as well as the other suppositions, follow a more or less set pattern in which part/whole, same/different, like!unlike, and other pairs of opposites appear. Like/unlike is used here. As Socrates states it, Zeno's supposition is: // the beings are many (et TToAAa eort ra dvra). Later (136A) Parmenides refers to Zeno's supposition as if many are (si TroXXa eort), so I doubt that much, if anything, turns on the precise formulation given it by Socrates in the present section. The Zeno argument, as stated by Socrates, is of the form modus tollendo tollens: If the beings are many, they must be likes and unlikes. But it is impossible for them to be likes and unlikes. Hence, the beings cannot be many.

From antiquity, Plato's Parmenides has been considered an enigma. In this book Robert Turnbull offers a translation and explanation of the Parmenides, using his interpretation to illuminate Plato's major late dialogues.

Turnbull claims that in the Parmenides Plato abandoned the earlier Phaedo account of form-participation, and instead worked out the metaphysics of form-participation and mathematics that grounds the framework of his late philosophy. Relying on the testimony of Aristotle, Euclid, and Plotinus, and rejecting most modern accounts, Turnbull finds in the Parmenides a radical departure that that clarifies and illuminates Plato's mature Pythagoreanism.

Until now there has been no standard modern interpretation of the Parmenides or of Plato's late dialogues. Professor Turnbull's book, with its meticulous translation and careful analysis, could well become that standard interpretation.

"From antiquity, Plato's Parmenides has been considered an enigma. In this book Robert Turnbull offers a translation and explanation of the Parmenides, using his interpretation to elucidate Plato's major late dialogues." "Turnbull claims that, in the Parmenides, Plato abandoned the earlier Phaedo account of form-participation, and instead, worked out the metaphysics of form-participation and mathematics that grounds the framework of his late philosophy. Relying on the testimony of Aristotle, Euclid, and Plotinus, and rejecting most modern accounts, Turnbull finds in the Parmenides a radical departure that clarifies and illuminates Plato's mature Pythagoreanism."--Jacket Contents 7 PREFACE 9 1. Introduction 13 2. Zeno's Stricture, Predication, and 'Having Shares' (126A–35C) 21 3. The Needed Exercise and Supposition One (135C–42A) 49 4. Supposition Two as the Clue to the Parmenides 72 5. Supposition Two, Part One (142B–48D) 83 6. Supposition Two, Part Two (148D–55E) 105 7. The 'Coda' and the Remaining Affirmative Suppositions (155E–60B) 123 8. The 'One' and the 'Others' on Both Versions of If One Is Not (160B–66C) 136 9. The Timaeus 154 10. The Theaetetus and the Sophist 168 11. The Philebus 181 Afterword 197 APPENDIX: OTHER APPROACHES TO THE PARMENIDES 201 NOTES 213 BIBLIOGRAPHY 217 Turnbull offers a close and detailed reading of the Parmenides, using his interpretation to illuminate Plato's major late dialogues. The picture presented of Plato's later philosophy is plausible, highly interesting, and original.