The Paradoxes of Action: (Human Action, Law and Philosophy) (Law and Philosophy Library Book 67)

Through the combined effects of certain natural facts (connected with the passage of time), institutional acts (performed at various points within the university system) and bonds offriendship (forged over quite a number ofyears ofacademic life), I have lately become an occasional writer of forewords. It is certainly not a kind of work that dis­ pleases me; but it would be too much to say that I have learned to do it with ease. Quite to the contrary! Writing a foreword is, it seems to me, an example ofa rather complex action (al­ though, of course, much less complex than writing the book it accompanies). Infact, it is not even an action; it is rather an activity, carried out over a more or less prolonged period of time and typically including something like the following stages: deciding to write the foreword; carefully reading the book; taking notes; thinking about what would be appropriate aspects to be mentioned; sketching an outline; writing a first draft by hand; writing several corrected versions; typing the last ofthem into the computer; dis­ tributing it to several colleagues to see how they like it; correcting the text once more; sending it to the author of the book; delivering it to the publisher. Ineach of these ac­ tions (leaving aside for a moment purely mental actions such as thinking) we can in turn distinguish several components. These are, basically: bodily movements, intentions, and (intentionally or unintentionally produced) changes in the world. What is an action, and what is an omission? Are actions natural phenomena, or rather a product of our vision of the world? What is the difference between an action and a mere bodily movement? Can actions be counted? What is the role of intention for the identification of actions? Can we make mistakes in identifying our own actions? Under what conditions is it possible to impute a non-intentional action to someone? This book suggests answers, or at least presents conceptual tools for finding answers, to these and other, related questions. The author displays a sovereign command and profound understanding of the complex theoretical issues involved and offers an original approach to the analysis of action. The book is written in a very accessible style and is of interest to lawyers, legal scientists and philosophers. It will be of specific interest to specialists of action theory and non-specialists who wish to learn more about some of the principal philosophical and legal conceptions of action and the analysis of their structures Front Matter....Pages i-10 Preliminaries....Pages 11-16 Our Intuitions and the Paradoxes of Action....Pages 17-22 The Debate in the Philosophy of Action....Pages 23-37 The Debate in Criminal Law....Pages 39-54 The Debate in the Philosophy of Language....Pages 55-78 The Paradoxes Dissolved....Pages 79-90 The Structure of Action....Pages 91-114 Other Kinds of Actions....Pages 115-122 Epilogue....Pages 123-126 Back Matter....Pages 127-139

This book suggests answers, or at least presents conceptual tools for finding answers, to questions such as: What is an action, and what is an omission? Can actions be counted? What is the role of intention for the identification of actions? The author offers an original approach to the analysis of action. Written in a very accessible style, the book is of interest to lawyers, legal scientists and philosophers.