The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (Oxford Handbooks)

'The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity' contains 44 commissioned chapters on a wide range of topics, and will appeal to readers with an interest in ethics or epistemology. A diverse selection of substantive positions are defended by leading proponents of the views in question, and provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons as part of the study of ethics and as part of the study of epistemology (as well as focusing on reasons as part of the study of the philosophy of language and as part of the study of the philosophy of mind), the Handbook covers recent developments concerning the nature of normativity in general. A number of the contributions to the Handbook explicitly address such "metanormative" issues, bridging subfields as they do so. -- Provided by publisher Cover The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity Copyright Contents Contributors Introduction Part I The Structure of Reasons and Normativity 1. The Unity of Normativity 2. The Unity of Reasons 3. The Logic of Reasons 4. The Language of “Ought,” and Reasons 5. Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons Part II Reasons, Motivation, and Action Explanation 6. Internalism and Externalism about Reasons 7. Motivating Reasons and Normative Reasons 8. Psychologism and Anti-​Psychologism about Motivating Reasons 9. Reasons and Action Explanation 10. Reasons and Ability Part III Reasons Fundamentalism 11. The Metaphysics of Reasons 12. Reasons Fundamentalism and Value 13. Reason Fundamentalism and What Is Wrong With It Part IV Reasons Explained 14. Reasons, Evidence, and Explanations 15. Constructivism about Reasons 16. Constitutivism about Practical Reasons Part V Practical Deliberation 17. Practical Reasoning 18. Weighing Reasons 19. Underdetermination by Reasons 20. Reasons, Choices, and Responsibility Part VI Reasoning and Rationality 21. Reasons and Rationality 22. Norms, Reasons, and Reasoning: A Guide Through Lewis Carroll’s Regress Argument 23. Reasons and Theoretical Rationality Part VII Epistemic Reasons 24. The Place of Reasons in Epistemology 25. Reasons for Belief and Normativity 26. Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters Part VIII Types and Sources of Reasons for Belief 27. Reasons and Perception 28. Reasons and Testimony 29. Knowledge, Understanding, and Reasons for Belief 30. Pragmatic Reasons for Belief Part IX Types and Sources of Reasons for Action 31. Instrumental Reasons 32. Teleological Reasons 33. Subjective and Objective Reasons 34. Prudential and Moral Reasons 35. Agent-​Relative and Agent-​Neutral Reasons 36. Reasons and Moral Principles Part X Reasons Difficult to Categorize 37. Reasons to Intend 38. Reasons and Emotions 39. Aesthetic Reasons Part XI Skepticism about Reasons 40. Reliable and Unreliable Judgments about Reasons 41. The Evolutionary Challenge to Knowing Moral Reasons Part XII Normativity, Meaning, and the Mind 42. Normativity and Concepts 43. The Normativity of Meaning 44. Normativity and Intentionality Index The Oxford Handbook Of Reasons And Normativity Maps A Central Terrain Of Philosophy, And Provides An Authoritative Guide To It. Few Concepts Have Received As Much Attention In Recent Philosophy As The Concept Of A Reason To Do Or Believe Something. And One Of The Most Contested Ideas In Philosophy Is Normativity, The 'ought' In Claims That We Ought To Do Or Believe Something. This Is The First Volume To Provide Broad Coverage Of The Study Of Reasons And Normativity Across Multiple Philosophical Subfields. In Addition To Focusing On Reasons In Ethics, Epistemology, And The Philosophy Of Mind, Action, And Language, The Handbook Explores Philosophical Work On The Nature Of Normativity In General. Topics Covered Include: The Unity Of Normativity; The Fundamentality Of Reasons; Attempts To Explain Reasons In Other Terms; The Relation Of Motivational Reasons To Normative Reasons; The Internalist Constraint; The Logic And Language Of Reasons And 'ought'; Connections Between Reasons, Intentions, Choices, And Actions; Connections Between Reasons, Reasoning, And Rationality; Connections Between Reasons, Knowledge, Understanding And Evidence; Reasons Encountered In Perception And Testimony; Moral Principles, Prudence And Reasons; Agent-relative Reasons; Epistemic Challenges To Our Access To Reasons; Normativity In Relation To Meaning, Concepts, And Intentionality; Instrumental Reasons; Pragmatic Reasons For Belief; Aesthetic Reasons; And Reasons For Emotions. This Handbook maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides the definitive guide to it. An illustrious team of philosophers explore the concept of a reason to do or believe something, in order to determine what these reasons are and how they work. And they investigate the nature of 'normative' claims about what we ought to do or believe.