The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability (Oxford Handbooks)
معرفی کتاب «The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability (Oxford Handbooks)» نوشتهٔ Adam Cureton; David Wasserman، منتشرشده توسط نشر Oxford University Press در سال 2020. این کتاب در فرمت pdf، زبان انگلیسی ارائه شده است.
Disability raises profound and fundamental issues: questions about human embodiment and well-being; dignity, respect, justice and equality; personal and social identity. It raises pressing questions for educational, health, reproductive, and technology policy, and confronts the scope and direction of the human and civil rights movements. Yet it is only recently that disability has become the subject of the sustained and rigorous philosophical inquiry that it deserves. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability is the first comprehensive volume on the subject. The volume's contents range from debates over the definition of disability to the challenges posed by disability for justice and dignity; from the relevance of disability for respect, other interpersonal attitudes, and intimate relationships to its significance for health policy, biotechnology, and human enhancement; from the ways that disability scholarship can enrich moral and political philosophy, to the importance of physical and intellectual disabilities for the philosophy of mind and action. The contributions reflect the variety of areas of expertise, intellectual orientations, and personal backgrounds of their authors. Some are founding philosophers of disability; others are promising new scholars; still others are leading philosophers from other areas writing on disability for the first time. Many have disabilities themselves. This volume boldly explores neglected issues, offers fresh perspectives on familiar ones, and ultimately expands philosophy's boundaries. More than merely presenting an overview of existing work, this Handbook will chart the growth and direction of a vital and burgeoning field for years to come. Cover The Oxford Handbook of PHILOSOPHY AND DISABILITY Copyright Dedication Acknowledgments Table of Contents List of Contributors Introduction Historical Overview The Contents of This Volume Summaries of Chapters 1. Concepts, Models, and Perspectives of Disability 2. Well-Being, Adaptation, and Causing Disability 3. Justice, Equality, and Inclusion 4. Knowledge and Embodiment 5. Respect, Appreciation, and Care 6. Moral Status and Significant Mental Disabilities 7. Intellectual and Psychiatric Disability 8. Technology and Enhancement 9. Health-care Allocation 10. Reproduction and Parenting References Note Part One: CONCEPTS, MODELS, AND PERSPECTIVES OF DISABILITY Chapter 1: Theoretical Strategies to Define Disability How Should We Manage the Polysemy of a Highly Contested Concept? Determinate Accounts of Disability Reductionist Models Mixed Models Second-Order Accounts of Disability Open-Ended Referents Open-Ended Values Radically Open-Ended Accounts of “Disability” Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes References Chapter 2: In Pursuit of Justice for Disability: Model Neutrality Revisited Introduction Modeling Modeling Disability Using Models of Disability: Many Minorities, Many Models What Can Make a Model of Disability Bad? Modeling Badly: Modeling Disability as Bad? Not Intrinsically But Nevertheless Inveterately Bad? Conclusion Afterword Notes References Chapter 3: Disability, Health, and Difference Introduction Disability, Health, and the ICF “Disabled but Completely Healthy” Disability and Mere-Difference What Difference Does It Make? Notes References Chapter 4: Habilitative Health and Disability Common Sense About the Concept of Disability Species-Characteristics and Associated Inabilities Mortality and the Meaning of Life Typical, Functional but Problematic Individual Endowments Atypical Anatomy and Physiology Developmental Abilities Individual, Nondevelopmental Diversity Common Sense About the Concept of Health Complete Health Good Health A Health Scale Functional Good Health Getting the Strengths of Good Health Habilitative Health Habilitative Health and Its Necessity Habilitative Health and Its Agentic Development Prosocial and Eudaimonistic Traits Habilitative Necessities, Duties, and Disabilities Disabilities Are Presumptively Connected to Habilitative Health Necessities, Practical Requirements, and Disabilities Habilitative Health Status Habilitative Disabilities Habilitative Disabilities and Social Duties Recipient Health Caregiver and Donor Health Multigenerational Health Hospitable Environments Conclusions Disabilities, Good Lives, and a Hospitable World Good Health Is More Than Just Enough for Immediate Necessities It Helps that Habilitative Health Is So Focused on Agentic Health Notes References Further Reading Chapter 5: Philosophy and the Apparatus of Disability A Naturalized Narrative The Apparatus of Disability Historicizing and Relativizing the Apparatus of Disability Biopower and Normalization Bioethics as a Local Center of the Apparatus Note References Chapter 6: Disability Liberation Theology Disability Ethics and the Cultural Work of Images Modern Civil and Human Liberation Movements Liberty and Liberation Disability Liberation The Iconography of Liberation Disability Liberation Theology Resymbolization as Liberation The Ideology of Ability and the Denigration of Care A Sacred Iconography of Care Notes References Part Two: WELL-BEING, ADAPTATION, AND CAUSING DISABILITY Chapter 7: Disabilities and Well-Being: The Bad and the Neutral Introduction Disability and Well-Being Two Problem Cases Locked-in Syndrome Minimally Conscious State Implications for the Mere-Difference View Control Over One’s Situation Acknowledgments Notes References Chapter 8: Causing Disability, Causing Non-Disability: What’s the Moral Difference? The Scope of Our Inquiry Putative Factors in the Explanation of a Moral Asymmetry Evaluating the Putative Factors Likelihood of Lower Well-Being Risk of Very Low or Negative Well-Being Irreversibility Questionable Preference in the Individual Questionable Motivation in Third Party Vulnerability to Stigma and Discrimination Social Cost Conclusion Notes References Chapter 9: Why Inflicting Disability is Wrong: The Mere-Difference View and the Causation-Based Objection The Value of Disability and the Mere-Difference View (MDV) Are Disability Inflictors Wrongdoers? The Causation-Based Objection The Transition Costs Argument The Principle of Non-Interference and the “Natural Path” Bias Kahane’s and Savulescu’s Reply to the MDV Conclusion Notes References Chapter 10: Evaluative Diversity and the (Ir)Relevance of Well-Being The Well-Being Debate Causing and Curing “You Don’t Know What You’re Talking About” “And Anyway Who Made You Boss” The Advisability of Abstinence Political Liberalism and the Scope of Public Reason Disability, Disadvantage, and Reasonable Disagreement Objection: Pride and Pity Implications: Disability and the Public Value of Health Notes References Part Three: JUSTICE, EQUALITY, AND INCLUSION Chapter 11: Contractualism, Disability, and Inclusion Introduction Conceptions of Disability and Theories of Justice Contractarianism and Disability Rawls, Contractualism, and Disability Inclusive Contractualism Acknowledgments Notes References Chapter 12: Civic Republican Disability Justice Civic Republicanism Against Negative Liberty Domination and Disability Disability Justice as Nondomination A Civic Approach to Disability Justice Some Normative Recommendations Dependence Conclusion References Chapter 13: Disability and Disadvantage in the Capabilities Approach Introduction Defining Disability Through Disadvantage Justice, Capabilities, and Disadvantage Priority and Disadvantage Conclusion Notes References Chapter 14: Disability and Partial Compliance Theory Non-Ideal or Partial Compliance? Difference or Bad-Difference? Non-Compliance Infeasibility Non-Ideal Theory, Ideals, and Disability Civil Rights Eugenics and the Perversion of the Ideal Notes References Chapter 15: Fair Difference of Opportunity Formal Equality of Opportunity Fair Equality of Opportunity Fair Difference of Opportunity Original Position Conclusion Notes References Chapter 16: The Disability Case Against Assisted Dying The Paternalistic DR Argument and Some Conceptions of Autonomy Assessing the Paternalistic DR Argument Two Nonpaternalistic DR Objections; the Nonexpressivist Objection Terry Schiavo and the Persistently Comatose The Expressivist Objection Conclusion Notes References Part Four: KNOWLEDGE AND EMBODIMENT Chapter 17: Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and Disability Feminist Social Epistemology Power Epistemic Privilege, Exclusion, and Injustice Disability Is Distinctive Epistemic Exclusion Now Improving the Epistemology of Disability Notes References Chapter 18: What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy,but . . . ” Reasoning? “It Ignores Lived Experience” A “It Rests on a View of Adaptive Preferences that Overgeneralizes” “It Challenges Everyone’s Well-Being—and Is Further Morally Risky” Acknowledgments Notes References Chapter 19: Interactions with Delusional Others: Reflections on Epistemic Failures and Virtues Epistemic Injustice and Disability Epistemic Failures and Delusions The Label of “Delusional” and Epistemic Injustice Epistemic Injustice and Persons with Delusions Responsibility and the Political and Social Context of Delusions Epistemic Humility, Radical Listening, and Delusions Notes References Chapter 20: Disability, Rationality, and Justice: Disambiguating Adaptive Preferences Autonomy, Proceduralism, and Well-Being Adaptation Adaptation and the Political Project Well-Being Adaptive Preferences Why Identify WBAPs? Perfectionism, Substantive Accounts, and Justice Adaptation The Need for a Substantive Approach Preferences in a Theory of Justice Justice Adaptive Preferences Responding to JAPs Conclusion Notes References Part Five: RESPECT, APPRECIATION, AND CARE Chapter 21: Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect Aims, Method, and Larger Project Appreciation Positive Expressions of Respect Ideals Inherent in Human Dignity An Analogy: Local and Global Dignity Human Dignity from a Kantian Perspective Application to Disabilities: Appreciation Application to Disabilities: Positive Expressions of Respect Notes References Chapter 22: The Limiting Role of Respect Disabled Strangers Aspects of Human Dignity Welfare Community Justice Appreciation Positive Respect Negative Respect Making Assumptions About Others Privacy Responsibilities and Prerogatives Negative Respect and Human Dignity Separateness of Persons Freedom Conditions of Agency Negative Respect for Disabled People Making Assumptions About Others Privacy Responsibilities and Prerogatives Practical Suggestions Welfare Community Justice Appreciation Positive Respect Notes References Chapter 23: Respect, Identification, and Profound Cognitive Impairment Introduction Having a Point of View Warranting Respect Identifying with Others Special Relations Identifying with Fellow Human Beings Extending the Argument Notes References Chapter 24: Care and Disability: Friends or Foes The Quarrel Between Care Ethics and Disability Theorists and Activists The Stigma of Dependence and the Illusion of Independence A Clear-Eyed View of Dependency A Clear-Eyed View of Independence Beyond the Stigma of Dependency and the Over-Valorization of Independence An Ethics of Care—In Brief Care as a Fully Normative Concept Articulating an Ethics of Care Failures of Care The Taking Up of Care by the Cared For Notes References Chapter 25: A Dignitarian Approach to Disability: From Moral Status to Social Status What Is Dignity? Is Dignity a Worthless Notion? The Importance of Being Treated with Dignity: “Psychic Harms” The Harm of Stigmatized Cultural Schemas Is Equal Status Enough? Notes References Part Six: MORAL STATUS AND SIGNIFICANT MENTAL DISABILITIES Chapter 26: Cognitive Disability and Moral Status Acknowledgments References Chapter 27: Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive Disability Introduction Respect Theories of Dignity From Natural to Social Kinds Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive Disability Redux Notes References Chapter 28: On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability: Challenging and Expanding the Debates Conceptual Clarity and Specificity Is Dehumanizing Philosophy Dehumanizing? The Persistence of Animal Companions Moral Expansions Acknowledgments Notes References Part Seven: INTELLECTUAL AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY Chapter 29: Neurodiversity, Autism, and Psychiatric Disability: The Harmful Dysfunction Perspective Introduction: Neurodiversity and Its Roots The Challenge of Autism’s Heterogeneity The Harmful Dysfunction Analysis of Mental Disorder The Harmful Dysfunction Analysis and the Prima Facie Case for Severe Classic Autism Being a Disorder Is Autism a Harmful Dysfunction? Contingent Harms, Essential Benefits The Essence of Autism—Autism Itself—Is a Normal Variation, Not a Dysfunction Focus on Detail, Decontextualization, and “Weak Coherence” as an Evolutionary Trade-off Savant Skills as an Evolutionary Trade-off Autism Is a Psychological and Social Identity, Not a Disorder Autism as Central to Personal Identity Social Construction of the “Autism” Category and the Formation of an Autistic Community Even If Autism, or Some Autistic Conditions, Are Dysfunctional, They Are Not Harmful The Social Model of Autism: Attributing Harm to an Adverse Social Environment Concluding Comments Acknowledgments References Chapter 30: Beyond Instrumental Value: Respecting The Will of Others and Deciding OnTheir Behalf A Common Vulnerability Against the Welfare Only View Insulting the Agency of Another What Does Due Respect Entail? Notes References Chapter 31: Educational Justice for Students with Intellectual Disabilities Introduction A Capability Approach to Justice in Education for Students with Disabilities Distributive Principles: Equality, Adequacy, and the Threshold of Capability Equality Educational Aims: Equal Citizenship and Human Flourishing Acknowledgments Notes References Part Eight: TECHNOLOGY AND ENHANCEMENT Chapter 32: A Symmetrical View of Disability and Enhancement Narrowing the Search The Welfarist Account Welfarist Account The Typical-Functioning Account Typical-Functioning Account (First Approximation) Typical-Functioning Account (Refined) Lessons from a Symmetrical Understanding of Disability and Enhancement Notes References Chapter 33: Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended Minds Introduction Embodied and Extended Minds Brains, Bodies, and Beyond Embodied Cognition Extended Cognition Cognitive Impairment and Rehabilitation Cognitive Impairment Cognitive Rehabilitation Cognitive Reserve Cognitive Disability Models of Disability Can Extended Minds Enhance Rational Autonomy? Conclusion References Chapter 34: The Visible and the Invisible: Disability, Assistive Technology, and Stigma Introduction Assistive Auditory Technology Assistive Respiratory Technology A Phenomenological Framework for Assistive Technology Design Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes References Chapter 35: Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled People Introduction Distributive Justice and Neurotechnology Access to Devices Post-Trial Access to Devices and Care Justice as Recognition and Disabled People Recognition for Disabled People in Neurotechnology Research Is It Necessary? What to Ask and of Whom? Conflicting Views of Technology within the Disability Community Notes References Chapter 36: Second Thoughts on Enhancement and Disability Introduction Background and Terminology Transhumanist Enhancement Strategies A Foucauldian Critique of Transhumanism A Counterdiscourse of Enhancement Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes Bibliography Part Nine: HEALTH-CARE ALLOCATION Chapter 37: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability Discrimination What Is Cost-Effectiveness Analysis? How Does CEA Discriminate Against People with Disabilities? What Makes Discrimination Unjust? Injustice Without Discrimination? Conclusion Notes References Chapter 38: Prioritization and Parity: Which Disabled Newborn Infants Should be Candidates for Scarce Life-Saving Treatment? Introduction Should We Provide ECMO? Treatment-Level Prioritization of ECMO Patient-Level Prioritization of ECMO Which Patient Should Receive ECMO? Simultaneous Patients Triage Case 1 Nonsimultaneous patients Balancing Ethical Principles in P-Prioritization Fairness Benefit Compromise Combining Fairness and Benefit: Parity The Parity Threshold Different-Number Cases (Duration, Cost) Triage Case 2 Probability of Survival Triage Policies 1 Same-Number Cases (Duration of Survival, Quality of Life) Triage Case 3 Triage Case 4 Split-the-Difference Probability of Benefit Triage Policies 2 Applying Parity Acknowledgments Notes References Part Ten: REPRODUCTION AND PARENTING Chapter 39: Why People with Cognitive Disabilities Are Justified in Feeling Disquieted by Prenatal Testing and Selective Termination Introduction Expressions of Concern by People with Cognitive Disabilities and Their Advocates First Form of Reassurance: “You Are Not the Target of Prenatal Testing” Second Form of Reassurance: “These Decisions Are Not Necessarily Biased” Third Form of Reassurance: “Prenatal Decisions Are Not Motivated by Bias” An Argument that Bias Influences Prenatal Decisions Objections to My Argument Conclusion Notes References Further Readings Chapter 40: Reproductive Choice, in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency? Introduction Virtuous Parenting The Contextual Nature of Reproductive Decision Making Navigating Context-Sensitivity Notes References Chapter 41: Bioethics, Disability, and Selective Reproductive Technology: Taking Intersectionality Seriously Introduction Intersectionality: Some Main Strands The Disability Criticism of SRT Intersectionally Reframing the Disability Criticism of SRT Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes References Chapter 42: Procreation and Intellectual Disability: A Kantian Approach Respect for the Dignity of Persons Selecting Against Embryos and Respect for the Dignity of Persons with Intellectual Disability Treating Offspring Merely as Means in Nonidentity Cases? Motives for Procreation and Respect for the Value in Persons Acknowledgments Notes References Chapter 43: Parental Autonomy, Children with Disabilities, and Horizontal Identities Parental Autonomy Justifications for Parental Autonomy Questioning Strong Deference to Parental Autonomy Parental Autonomy and Medical Choices for Children with Disabilities Similar Cases Justifications for Limiting Deference Invading Bodily Integrity and Reproductive Capacity: The “Ashley Treatment” Affecting a Child’s Identity “Horizontal Identity”: Discerning and Advancing Best Interests Elevated Conflicts of Interest Influence of Cultural Biases (Un)acceptable Parental Discrimination? Constraining Parental Autonomy Legal Constraints on Parental Decisions Guiding Parental Decisions Conclusion Notes References Index Disability raises profound and fundamental issues: questions about human embodiment and well-being; dignity, respect, justice and equality; personal and social identity. It raises pressing questions for educational, health, reproductive, and technology policy, and confronts the scope and direction of the human and civil rights movements. Yet it is only recently that disability has become the subject of the sustained and rigorous philosophical inquiry that it deserves. 0The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability is the first comprehensive volume on the subject. The volume's contents range from debates over the definition of disability to the challenges posed by disability for justice and dignity; from the relevance of disability for respect, other interpersonal attitudes, and intimate relationships to its significance for health policy, biotechnology, and human enhancement; from the ways that disability scholarship can enrich moral and political0philosophy, to the importance of physical and intellectual disabilities for the philosophy of mind and action. The contributions reflect the variety of areas of expertise, intellectual orientations, and personal backgrounds of their authors. Some are founding philosophers of disability; others are promising new scholars; still others are leading philosophers from other areas writing on disability for the first time. Many have disabilities themselves. This volume boldly explores neglected issues, offers fresh perspectives on familiar ones, and ultimately expands philosophy's boundaries. More than merely presenting an overview of existing work, this Handbook will chart the growth and direction of a vital and burgeoning field for years to come This Handbook introduces philosophers, as well as other scholars in the humanities and social sciences, to one of the most dynamic new areas of philosophical inquiry. Disability raises some of the deepest conceptual and normative issues about human embodiment and well-being; dignity, respect, justice and equality; and personal and social identity. But it also raises pressing practical questions for educational, health, reproductive, and technology policy, and confronts controversial questions about the scope and direction of the human and civil rights movements. The Handbook addresses these issues and more, with contributions from some of the most prominent philosophers in the field. The clarity it brings to these discussions demonstrates fully the continued centrality and importance of philosophical inquiry
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